1,720,997 research outputs found
Recensione a: F. Salsano, "Lecturae Dantis", Ravenna, Longo, 2003, 254 pp.
No full textRecensione a una raccolta di "Lecturae Dantis" svolte da Fernando Salsano con importanti osservazioni sul testo dantesco.La recensione esamina il libro di F. Salsano, "Lecturae Dantis" (Ravenna, Longo, 2003), che raduna studi su alcuni canti della "Commedia" dantesca
La politica monetaria in presenza di non perfetta osservabilità degli obiettivi del banchiere centrale
No full textIn questo lavoro viene presentato un modello teorico al fine di analizzare l'effetto della non-perfetta osservabilità delle preferenze del Banchiere Centrale da parte del settore privato, sulle scelte compiute dall'autorità monetaria e di conseguenza sul tasso di inflazione.
In particolare viene studiato il legame che, in presenza di un proble-ma di incoerenza temporale, esiste tra l'osservabilità degli obiettivi dell'i-stituzione monetaria e le strategie di equilibrio da essa poste in essere. Tale modello presenta risultati innovativi dal punto di vista tecnico e dal punto di vista economico.
Dal punto di vista tecnico, lo studio delle strategie di equilibrio in un semplice modello di segnalazione ci ha permesso di derivare gli esiti di equilibrio di un gioco di politica monetaria già esaminato in D'Amato e Pistoresi (1996) e Sibert (2002) senza le restrizioni che in questi lavori venivano poste sul supporto dei tipi di istituzione monetaria. In questo modo è stato possibile identificare le condizioni sui parametri del model-lo sotto cui emerge un puro equilibrio di separazione, e le condizioni sot-to cui esiste, invece, un equilibrio “ibrido” in cui alcuni tipi di Banchiere Centrale giocano strategie di separazione (Vickers, 1986; D'Amato e Pi-storesi 1996; Sibert, 2002) ed altri giocano strategie di pooling analoghe a quelle studiate da Backus e Driffill (1985).
Dal punto di vista economico abbiamo mostrato alcune relazioni che emergono, in equilibrio, tra il grado di osservabilità e trasparenza degli obiettivi monetari del Banchiere Centrale ed il tasso di inflazione deter-minato dal Banchiere Centrale
Monetary policy in the presence of imperfect observability of the objectives of central bankers
Full text linkThe paper presents a theoretical model for analysis of the imperfect observability of central bank preferences by the private sector on the decisions taken by the monetary authority, and therefore on the infation rate. It examines in particular the connection which, in the presence of a time inconsistency problem, arises between the observability of the monetary institution?s goals and its equilibrium strategies. The model yields innovative results from the technical and economic points of view. From the technical point of view, the study of equilibrium strategies in a simple signalling model allows derivation of the equilibrium outcomes of a monetary policy game already examined by D'Amato and Pistoresi (1996) and Sibert (2002), without the restrictions that those authors impose on the basis of the types of monetary institution. It is thus possible to identify the conditions on the model's parameters under which a pure separating equilibrium arises, and the conditions under which there instead exists a hybrid equilibrium in which some types of Central Bankers adopt separating strategies (Vickers 1986; D?Amato and Pistoresi 1996; Sibert 2002) while others adopt pooling strategies similar to those studied by Backus and Driffill (1985). From an economic point of view, the paper shows a number of relations that arise, in equilibrium, between the degree of observability and transparency of the Central Banker's goals and the infation rate set by the Central Banker
I sistemi elettorali e la politica fiscale : il caso italiano dal 1861 ai giorni nostri
No full textQuesto lavoro si propone come scopo principale l’analisi degli effetti delle regole elettorali sulla politica fiscale, con particolare riferimento al caso italiano: infatti l’Italia, dal 1861 ai giorni nostri, ha modificato più volte il sistema elettorale, alternando sistema maggioritario a quello proporzionale. In particolare viene analizzata come la “dimensione” dello Stato, calcolata in termini di spesa pubblica, entrate e saldo di bilancio, e la “composizione” dello Stato, misurata in termini di spesa redistributiva, vengano influenzate da distinti sistemi elettorali.
Diversamente da altri recenti lavori empirici, questo lavoro non si pone come scopo quello di analizzare l’effetto dei sistemi politici in differenti paesi, ma al contrario si concentra sull’analisi degli effetti del sistema elettorale in un solo paese, l’Italia, in un arco di tempo molto lungo, 140 anni.
Questa indagine empirica conferma, in parte, i risultati delle analisi cross-section: in generale sistemi elettorali di tipo maggioritario, rispetto a sistemi elettorali di tipo proporzionale, dedicano meno risorse finanziarie sia alla “dimensione” dello stato, che alla “composizione”
On the determinants of Central Bank independence in open economies
No full textWe test some positive implications of the commitment hypothesis for the design of monetary institutions in open economies, by studying the determinants of Central Bank independence on a sample of 55 countries, for the period 1980-89. We document fairly consistent empirical evidence in support of the hypothesis that strategic commitment is indeed important to understand cross country variation in the level of Central Bank degree of dependence. We also address the related question (Romer, 1993) why only highly industrialized countries have relied on such a solution to the inflationary bias of monetary policy whereas other countries have not. Data suggest that the answer is related to the presence and the size of world-wide common features in the business cycle at country level
Italian Spending on Education: a Long-Term Perspective
Full text linkThis paper analyses the long-term evolution of public spending on education in Italy. After presenting a historical overview of the Italian school system, we analyse the trend of public expenditure on education from the Unification of Italy up to the present day, comparing it with other items of public expenditure, in particular social expenditure. We also explore a long-term comparison of expenditure on education between some European countries. Our analysis seems to suggest extremely clear policy implications. Expenditure on the social system appears to be too high compared to expenditure on education, for this reason rebalancing intervention seems necessary
Electoral systems and immigration
Full text linkUnexplored stylized facts on OECD countries suggest that plurality electoral systems are associated with higher openness to immigration. We propose an explanation based on a retrospective voting model where immigration hurts voters but benefits a rent-seeking policymaker who appropriates part of the income generated by immigrants. To be reappointed, the policymaker must distribute the compensation. With respect to proportional systems, plurality systems make it possible to compensate only a few decisive districts and leave after-compensation rents higher, therefore producing higher immigration. In our model, non-decisive districts receive no compensation at all under both electoral systems, providing a rationale for widespread anti-immigration attitudes. Notably, our results also help to explain why governments often seem more pro-immigration than do voters. Finally, our model predicts that opposition to immigration is more geographically dispersed in plurality systems. Basic evidence supports this prediction
Political institutions and central bank independence revisited
No full textWe build on earlier studies regarding Central Bank Independence (CBI) by relating it to political, institutional and economic variables. The data suggest that CBI is positively related to the presence of federalism, the features of the electoral system and parties, the correlation between the shocks to the level of economic activity in the countries included in the sample and, for a sub-sample of economies, the convergence criteria to join the European Monetary Union (EMU)
Electoral systems and immigration
Full text linkWe study the effect of electoral systems on openness to immigration. According to the literature, in our model plurality systems induce a rent-seeking policymaker to get re-election through locally provided public goods rather than through transfers, whereas the opposite occurs under proportional representation. In both systems policymakers can use immigration to enlarge the tax base and retrieve increased rents after compensating the decisive majority. However, this mechanism is more effective when the increased tax base does not flow to non-voting immigrants through transfers. Therefore, plurality electoral systems generate more openness to immigration. We find support for this result on a cross-section of 34 OECD countries. In addition, we show that mass immigration \ might incentivize policymakers to get re-election throug public goods rather than transfers also in proportional electoral systems
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