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La storiografia finanziaria italiana : un bilancio degli studi più recenti sull’età moderna e contemporanea
No full textItalian government debt sustainability in the long run. 1861-2000
No full textAccording to Luigi Einaudi a government supported by social consensus would have founded some additional expenses by capital levy, or other additional taxes, while a politically weak one would have preferred issuing debt. So, governments, and social groups that press on ruling class, respectively managed their fiscal choices in order to drive social consensus and to avoid a burden. Some distributive effects (e.g. fiscal illusion) can accommodate taxes in order to maintain consensus toward government by social groups that it support and so to preserve its legitimacy. However, the debt, as delayed taxation, is a political decision that may be exploited until the public debt is sustainable. Later, a rising fiscal instability may destroy public debt credibility and crumbling social consensus.
According to the sociological approach to public finance (Schumpeter and Puviani), we emphasize that social conflicts curbed government choices. These dynamics of social consensus and public debt sustainability (measured following Pasinetti [1998] and Sylos Labini [2004]) are seized by a two-by-two table that defines some evolutionary trajectories from high sustainability towards dangerous unsustainability matched with these of loss or gain of a social consensus.
From 1861 to 2000, the history of large modern public debts in Italy followed some consent paths going to through three distinct systems of government finance and public debt sustainability. In each system, one type of constitutional consensus stood out upheld by a very different political regime. Before 1914, in the liberal era, property owners lent to governments that were as corporations controlled by themselves; and these governments guaranteed that funds borrowed will be repaid. The interwar period was an age of fiscal transition and of reaction toward the access of masses to the political life. During the first war and related postwar, the collapse of the liberal democracy derived firstly from a great fiscal shock, beyond to all financial means yielded in the current fiscal system and beyond to the fiscal tolerance of subjects’ incomes in the medium run. The fascist regime benefited of these widespread discontent and social strains in order to resume a fiscal stability, benefited just of inflation that nourished them, and finally establish a new social order. The overthrow of fascism set up the democratic republic. In this two postwars, fiscal rules and consensus mechanisms was reshuffled in terms of type of revenue, quality and levels of expenses, private savings and contributory burden, debt and debt management. The next financial system lasted from the liberation and the first republican governments based themselves on the acknowledgement of masses consent by the fiscal state
Government debt and financial markets : exploring pro-cycle effects in Northern Italy during the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries
No full textThe essay proves that during the first decades of the sixteenth century, the principal states of northern Italy (along with other states, leaders in the ‘financial revolution’, both on and off the peninsula) faced the problem of long-term public financing by introducing innovations that notably increased collection of monies and tied financial capital to the state organization.
These were – even with some differences – the progressive substitution of the emission of bonds for compulsory loans. These securities were: freely subscribed, their interest was guaranteed by a fixed fiscal source, there was no set time for the return of capital, they were marketable, they could be inherited and exempt from confiscation and taxes. The earmarking of future tax income for interest payment on the bonds issued, connnected to the their transferability, set up a public funded debt, thus long-term arrangements in this form became prevalent.
If the governments of Milan, Venice, Turin, Genoa and the Farnese Duchy were pushed in this direction by the extraordinary expansion of their balances due to war costs and the limits of their own fiscal systems, the notable growth of this new form of financing came about because of its acceptance by a large segment of subjects, who found this type of investment suitable to their own needs. In some periods a real push-pull mechanism occurred during which the buyers’ response was very quick. The article provides quantitative data regarding the secular trend and the social distribution of this kind of public debt. At the same time the spread of this genotype of public debt and its tumultuous increase did not seem to cause a sterile drain of private wealth to cover war expenses nor did it have a negative effect on the real economy. We have clues, especially for Lombardy, that this form of long-term public indebtedness, acting in a situation of expansion of circulating currency, did not cause a decrease in productive investments and neither did it bring private capital cost increases; on the contrary it had a pro-cycle effect between the second half of 1500 and 1620 and in the economic reorganization of the second half of the XVIIth century. In fact, in the former the public bonds turned into an attractive collateral for loans and increased the possibilities of private financing, acting as a credit matrix (i.e. it was the guarantee of the stipulation of personal loans, the censi consegnativi) for merchants and entrepreneurs; in the latter, when the economic centre of gravity moved towards a less dynamic agricultural-mercantile equilibrium, the debt allowed the state to sustain the public demand and the upper classes – who had in these securities a good income not subject to taxation – to enjoy a remarkable level of conspicuous consumption (palaces, art, clothing, but also country villas that were efficient agricultural farms).
Furthermore, investments in public debt constituted a means of redistribution and strengthening of assets that implicated the subscribers in the decision making processes of their governments and helped to maintain political stability throughout the XVIIth century, as is the case of the Duchy of Milan
Guild Statutes in Early Modern Age: Norms and Practices. Preliminary Results in the Veneto Area
No full textGoing Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
Full text linkThe present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
The Genoese Guilds (XVI-XVII Centuries). The food administration offices and the food sector Guilds in Genoa: organisation and conflicT
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