380 research outputs found
The powers of the Union : delegation in the EU
No full textThe powers of the Union develops a new theory of centralization and bureaucratization in the European Union. Using original data spanning five decades and a variety of qualitative and quantitative methods, it analyses the distribution of powers to implement EU policies across supranational institutions and levels of governance. Franchino explains why and how much EU law constrains national governments, why European political leaders delegate powers to supranational bureaucrats and why they adopt laws that limit their own policy autonomy. He also investigates the European Parliament's impact on these decisions
Replication Data for: Noncompliance risk, asymmetric power and the design of enforcement of the European economic governance
No full textReplication data for: Franchino F, Mariotto C. Noncompliance risk, asymmetric power and the design of enforcement of the European economic governance. European Union Politics. July 2021. doi:10.1177/1465116521102383
Delegating powers in the European Community
No full textAbstract: This article uses the theory of delegation of Epstein and O’Halloran, developed for the US federal system, to generate original hypotheses on the politics of delegation in the European Community (EC). It argues that two institutional features of the Community, namely the decision rules of the Council of Ministers and the possibility of relying on both the Commission and the Members States for policy implementation, are at the core of the choices of delegation of EC legislators. Using an original data set of 158 major EC legislative acts, it demonstrates that the Council delegates greater policy authority to national institutions if legislation is adopted unanimously or in issue areas that require specialized and technical knowledge, while it relies to a greater extent on the Commission when acts are adopted by qualified majority voting or require general managerial skills at the supranational level.
Results also show that national administrators are the main providers of policy expertise, while the informational role of the Commission appears to be secondary, though not negligible. Finally, these findings qualify propositions on the relation between veto players and bureaucratic autonomy and on that between conflict within the legislature and delegation outcomes
“Control of the Commission’s Executive Functions: Uncertainty, Conflict and Decision Rules”
No full textThe literature on implementation committees predominantly emphasizes their informational role and relies on a sui generis characterization of the European Union. This article reasserts their control function and locates these committees within the core tenets of rational choice and agency theory. It takes McCubbins and Page’s (1987) propositions about the determinants of legislators’ control of executive functions and applies these to the Member States’ control of the Commission’s executive powers. The likelihood of establishing ex-post control procedures and the stringency of control are positively correlated with 1) the uncertainty facing legislators about the optimum policy actions, 2) the conflict among legislators and 3) the need of unanimous agreement in the Council of Ministers. Using logistic regressions and a cumulative logic model applied to a stratified sample of non-amending secondary legislation adopted between 1987 and 1998, the article concludes that unanimity, conflict and uncertainty relevantly increase the likelihood of procedural control of the Commission’s activities. Conflict and uncertainty are also relevant factors affecting the stringency of control
A Formal Model of Delegation in the European Union
No full textThis article develops a formal model on the politics of delegation in the European Union incorporating key institutional features: the legislative-executive role of the Commission, the legislative-executive role of the members of the Council of Ministers, the possible implementation of European policies by different national administrations, and the variety of EU decision rules. The model generates propositions on how decision rules, policy conflict and the status quo affect the delegation of powers to the Commission and to national authorities. It demonstrates how qualified majority voting and, in some cases, codecision work as a commitment technology by facilitating the adoption of legislation that restrains national authorities, shifts powers from national administrations to and increases the discretion of the Commission. More generally, it shows that, first, the negative relation between conflict and discretion may not hold in case of many administrators and a high threshold for decision making, second, a less demanding bargaining environment in the legislature may work in favor of an administrator with agenda setting power
Experience and the distribution of portfolio payoffs in the European Commission
No full textThis article tests four theories of portfolio distribution within the European
Commission and assesses whether experience plays a role in the process of allocating policy responsibilities. The share of portfolios that each Member State is assigned, through its Commissioners, is strongly related to its resources and voting power, as predicted by the proportionality norm and bargaining theory, respectively. Additionally, Member States with Commissioners that have experience in the relevant portfolios are assigned shares that are significantly above what one may expect from these two theories. For half of the portfolios, Commissioners have moderate views along the dimension of the policy they manage, but appointed Commissioners also have significantly more experience in both supranational portfolios and similar national portfolios than the median Commissioner. The difference in experience in supranational and, more weakly, national portfolios significantly accounts for
the difference in preference between the appointed and the median Commissioner. Finally, salience matters as well. Left/right leaning Commissioners are significantly more likely to be assigned portfolios with a left-wing/right-wing ideological profile, but this strong relation
disappears for Commissioners with above average experience in the Commission, in the
relevant supranational portfolios or in national governments
Attitudes toward a fiscal union in the Eurozone
No full textWe investigate public attitudes toward the fiscal union: a policy advocated in official European Union documents and designed to address asynchronous economic fluctuations in the Eurozone. We employ survey questions and conjoint analyses embedded in population-based panel surveys in Italy, and draw expectations from political economy theories of tax-and transfer public insurance schemes, and theories of party cues, identity and trust. High income right-wing individuals with low trust, weak European identity and negative assessment of EU membership are more likely to oppose the measure. However, high income respondents display greater willingness to pay, especially in order to keep the euro, whereas lower income participants are readier to ditch the currency if the monetary union does not deliver good economic performance. The political feasibility of this policy seems therefore to rest on the willingness to contribute by the core constituency supporting the euro
Statutory Discretion and Procedural Control of the European Commission’s Executive Functions
No full textBy delegating powers and designing administrative procedures, ministers of the Council, the legislators of the European Union, shape the boundaries of the EU administration. This article uses theories of executive politics to test the factors that affect the degree of statutory discretion delegated by the Council to the Commission in secondary legislation. It suggests that discretion increases with 1) the uncertainty facing legislators, 2) the convergence of preferences between the Commission and the pivotal legislator, 3) the use of qualified majority, and 4) policies that require limited involvement of national administrations. It also tests whether discretion is positively correlated with the stringency of procedural control. The article employs regression analysis and co-graduation tests on a sample of legislation and concludes that uncertainty, policy types and informal decision rules are statistically and substantively relevant in explaining discretion. Discretion is also significantly correlated with the stringency of control
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