408 research outputs found
Are Judges Harsher with Repeat Offenders?
No full textAlthough in the last decade an increasing number of studies have tried to deepen the understanding of judicial-decision making and generally the working of courts, there is still a substantial theoretical and empirical gap to be investigated. The present research attempts to advance the understanding of judicial decision-making in the rarely investigated field of international courts’. The international setting, representing the intersection of several national politics’ agendas, supplies results even more obscure to be interpreted than national courts. The main research question raised is whether the usual theoretical pillars guiding damages awarding in judicial decision-making still applies herewith or whether a different approach should be adopted for international courts and specifically for the European Court of Human Rights the subject matter of the current study, in which for example the defendant is very often states rather than individuals. The empirical investigation shows patterns and regularities that might offer a reasonable explanation on how the international court decides and what is the likely meaning of the peculiar damages awarding scheme that seems mainly to go in the direction of performing an expressive function
Défaut de paiement stratégique et loi sur les défaillances d’entreprises
No full textL’enseignement qui est habituellement retenu des travaux empiriques réalisés à la suite de La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer et Vishny (1997), est qu’il convient de promouvoir un haut niveau de protection juridique des créanciers. A l’inverse de cette recommandation, certains pays européens (Royaume-Uni, Allemagne) ont pourtant récemment réformé leurs dispositifs touchant au droit des défaillances dans un sens qui les rapprochent de pays qui traditionnellement privilégient la préservation des emprunteurs (Etats-Unis, France). Ce papier propose une analyse du bénéfice social d’une telle orientation du droit de la défaillance, dans un modèle stylisé où la capacité de remboursement de l’emprunteur est une information privée. On étudie tout d’abord l’effet de l’orientation des règles juridiques (système pro-créanciers versus pro-débiteurs) sur le comportement des parties au contrat en fonction du type de concurrence bancaire. Nous discutons ensuite les instruments à la disposition des autorités judiciaires afin de garantir que l’évolution d’un système pro-créanciers vers un système pro-débiteurs dégage un bénéfice social. Nos résultats suggèrent qu’il existerait, en fonction de l’objectif assigné au droit, une cohérence entre l’orientation des dispositifs encadrant la défaillance et l’intensité de la concurrence bancaire.
Strategic default and bankruptcy law
No full textWe compare the influence of bankruptcy law on the risk of default and the rate of liquidation by banks. We show that it depends on whether it is pro-creditors or pro-debtors oriented, and on the intensity of competition between banks. Then , we analyse the various tools at the disposal of public authority in order to accomdate the transition from a pro-creditors regime to a pro-debtors one. In a sense, our results suggest that there may exist a kind of consistency between the aims assigned to law, the orientation of bankruptcy law and the level of competition in the banking system.default risk, law & finance, bankruptcy law
An analysis of bounded rationality in judicial litigations: the case with loss/disappointment averses plaintiffs
No full textFor psychologists, bounded rationality reflects the presence of cognitive dissonance and/or inconsistency, revealing that people use heuristics (Tversky and Kahneman (1974)) rather than sophisticated processes for the assessment of their beliefs. Recent research analyzing litigations and pretrial negotiations also focused on boundedly rational litigants (Bar-Gill (2005), Farmer and Peccorino (2002)) relying on a naïve modelling of the self-serving bias. Our paper in contrast introduces the case for disappointment averse litigants, relying on the axiomatic of Gull (1991). We show that this leads to a richer analysis in comparative statics; at the same time, this proves to be … disappointing: for the purposes of public policies in favour of the access to justice, recommendations are quite ambiguous.conflicts, litigation, negotiation, disappointment aversion.
L'analyse géométrique de l'épargne de précaution. Des résultats complémentaires
No full textThe geometrical analysis of precautionary saving revisited
In this paper, we introduce the concept of degree of prudence proposed by Kimball [1990], in order to give explicit foundations to the geometrical analysis of precautionary saving described by Eeckhoudt, Sneessens & Calcoen [1989]. We then obtain the specific properties of the « certainty-equivalent budget constraint », and of the income and substitution effects produced by income risk.L'analyse géométrique de l'épargne de précaution : des résultats complémentaires
Dans cet article, nous précisons les fondements de l'approche géométrique de l'épargne de précaution proposée par Eeckhoudt, Sneessens & Calcoen [1989], en y intégrant le concept de coefficient de prudence proposé par Kimball [1990]. Nous obtenons alors une caractérisation précise des propriétés de « l'équivalent-certain de la courbe de budget en incertitude », ainsi que des effets revenu et de substitution engendrés par le risque de revenu.Langlais Eric. L'analyse géométrique de l'épargne de précaution. Des résultats complémentaires. In: Revue économique, volume 44, n°1, 1993. pp. 95-116
Aversion au risque et prudence : le cas d'un risque de taux d'intérêt.
No full textThis paper deals with the precautionary saving motive in the face of interest rate uncertainty, in order to complete the results exhibited by Kimball [1990] for income risk. In comparative statics, the condition on the curvature of marginal utility is a no more/sufficient condition to give the adjustment of saving with interest rate uncertainty, although! it is a necessary and sufficient condition for a risky income. We propose a general definition for the concept of prudence introduced by Kimball, and define a precautionary premium for risky interest rate.Cet article analyse le motif d'épargne de précaution en présence d'un risque de taux d'intérêt, de façon à compléter les résultats de Kimball [1990] dans le cas du risque de revenu. En statique comparative, la condition sur la courbure de l'utilité marginale de la consommation n'est même plus suffisante pour déterminer le sens de l'ajustement de l'épargne avec le risque de taux d'intérêt, alors qu'elle est nécessaire et suffisante pour un risque de revenu. Nous proposons alors une généralisation du concept de prudence de Kimball, et définissons la prime de prudence pour risque de taux d'intérêt.Langlais Eric. Aversion au risque et prudence : le cas d'un risque de taux d'intérêt. In: Revue économique, volume 46, n°4, 1995. pp. 1099-1119
On unilateral divorce and the "selection of marriages" hypothesis
No full textThis paper revisits the issue of the unilateral divorce law, taking into account that: 1/ the decisions to engage in marriage and then to divorce or to stay married are fundamentally sequential decisions; 2/ household consumption has a large joint component, generating economies of scale. The unilateral divorce law is modelled through the combination of exclusive rights on the marriage dissolution and a monetary transfer to the parent having custody of the children. We analyze the influence of lternative compensation rules both in the short run (probability and efficiency of divorce) and in the long run (selection of marriages). We also show that a decrease in the costs of divorce proceedings has by no means commonplace consequences on marriage contracting; particularly when consideration of parents’ altruism and child support is introduced, more marriages are contracted when the cost of divorces decreases.marriage models, unilateral divorce law, the parents’ altruism and protective measures for children
L’effacement des dettes des particuliers surendettés : une étude empirique des décisions judiciaires
No full textAn Empirical Analysis of French Personal Bankruptcy Law.
This paper explores the mechanisms employed by French judges to discharge personal debts of over-indebted households in exchange for the liquidation of their assets. We use an original database consisting of judiciary decisions between 2003 and 2005. We highlight the determinants of selection between debtorswhose debts are cancelled and those who are ordered to repay them. Debtorswho are less able to repay have a greater chance of benefiting froma fresh start. If the repayment capacity increases by 1%, the predicted probability of debt discharge decreases by a little more than 1%. Overall, courts erase household debts in a rather restrictiveway, applying criteria not limited to an assessment of debtors’ financial situation.Cet article analyse le mécanisme judiciaire de traitement des situations de surendettement de ménages français. Nous étudions les conditions sous lesquelles un particulier bénéficie d’un effacement de ses dettes en échange d’une liquidation de son patrimoine. Nous réalisons un travail empirique sur la base d’observations issues d’une base de données originale de décisions judiciaires rendues par des tribunaux d’instance de 2003 à 2005. Une hausse de 1 % de la capacité de remboursement du débiteur diminue la probabilité de bénéficier d’une procédure de rétablissement personnel d’un peu plus de 1%. Au total, l’effacement du passif est décidé de manière assez restrictive par les tribunaux, sur la base de critères ne se limitant pas à une simple appréciation financière de la situation des débiteurs.Blazy Régis, Chopard Bertrand, Langlais Eric, Ziane Ydriss. L’effacement des dettes des particuliers surendettés : une étude empirique des décisions judiciaires. In: Économie & prévision, n°202-203, 2013. Economie du droit. pp. 81-99
On unilateral divorce and the "selection of marriages" hypothesis
No full textThis paper revisits the issue of the unilateral divorce law, taking into account that: 1/ the decisions to engage in marriage and then to divorce or to stay married are fundamentally sequential decisions; 2/ household consumption has a large joint component, generating economies of scale. The unilateral divorce law is modelled through the combination of exclusive rights on the marriage dissolution and a monetary transfer to the parent having custody of the children. We analyze the influence of lternative compensation rules both in the short run (probability and efficiency of divorce) and in the long run (selection of marriages). We also show that a decrease in the costs of divorce proceedings has by no means commonplace consequences on marriage contracting; particularly when consideration of parents’ altruism and child support is introduced, more marriages are contracted
when the cost of divorces decreases
- …
