1,720,970 research outputs found
Cutting Provincial Corporate Income Tax Rates to Promote Investment, Employment and Economic Growth
Full text linkThis communiqué is based on the following paper: The Costliest Tax of All: Raising Revenue Through Corporate Tax Hikes can be Counter-Productive for the Provinces by Ergete Ferede and Bev Dahlby
What Does it Cost Society to Raise a Dollar of Tax Revenue? The Marginal Cost of Public Funds
Full text linkThe marginal cost of public funds measures the welfare loss a society incurs in raising an additional dollar of tax revenue. Tax increases distort economic decisions and erode tax bases because of tax avoidance and tax evasion by taxpayers. This Commentary uses econometric estimates of the effects of higher provincial tax rates on the provinces’ corporate income tax, personal income tax, and sales tax bases to calculate the marginal cost of public funds (MCF) for these taxes. The results indicate that the cost of increasing provincial tax revenues through a corporate tax rate increase is very high, and in some provinces, corporate tax rate reductions in 2006 would have increased the present value of the provincial government’s total tax revenues. The results also suggest that significant welfare gains would accrue from reducing provincial corporate income tax rates. As well, increasing provincial corporate and personal income tax rates can cause significant reductions in federal tax revenues because the federal and provincial governments levy taxes on the same tax bases. Finally, Canada’s system of the equalization grants might reduce the perceived MCF of recipient provinces.Fiscal and Tax Competitiveness, marginal cost of public funds (MCF)
Four Studies on the Canadian Equalization System
Full text linkOn January 28 and 29, 2014, the University of Calgary’s School of Public Policy (SPP) sponsored a conference on equalization reform. The event provided a forum for current and former federal and provincial officials, academics from Canadian, Spanish and German universities, as well as students from the Master of Public Policy program at the SPP, to explore the issues surrounding this often-contentious program. Four leading Canadian academics in the field, Bev Dahlby, Jim Feehan, Ergete Ferede and Marcelin Joanis, delivered papers at the conference, each advocating a particular path forward for Canada’s equalization system. This commentary provides a summary of their proposals and arguments for reform
Lagging Behind: Productivity and the Good Fortune of Canadian Provinces
Full text linkThe good fortune of bountiful natural resources is not enough to ensure rising incomes for Canadians in the long term. Growing labour productivity is the most important determinant of future economic welfare and on that measure, Canada is falling behind its major trading partners. Increasing labour productivity does not mean workers working harder for less money, a common canard. It means more investment in one of three factors: 1) human capital (education or other learning); 2) physical capital (plants or other infrastructure); or 3) technology. Just as an individual’s income is in the long-run dependent on how productive he or she is, so too is that of the nation as a whole. If Canada fails to improve its productivity, the incomes of both individual Canadians and the nation as a whole will fall behind those of other developed countries.Economic Growth and innovation, Canadian provinces, labour productivity
The Marginal Cost of Public Funds and the Laffer Curve: Evidence from the Canadian Provinces
No full textAlberta’s Fiscal Responses to Fluctuations in Non-Renewable-Resource Revenue
Full text linkWe investigate how successive Alberta governments have responded to shocks in non-renewable resource revenue over the period 1970 to 2017. Our results show that Alberta governments have increased spending by 63 cents in the fiscal year following a one dollar increase in real per capita non-renewable resource revenues. On the other hand, when non-renewable resource revenues have declined year over year, Alberta governments have not adjusted spending or other own source tax revenues. As a result of these asymmetric responses to fluctuations in resource revenues, the province’s stock of financial assets has declined and its net debt has increased by 46 billion dollars. The policy implication of our results is that provincial governments should put increases in non-renewable resource revenues in a fiscal stabilization fund or Alberta Heritage Saving Trust Fund rather than spending two-thirds of any short-term increase in revenues. This would result in a less volatile spending pattern and a sustainable fiscal policy with better services and lower tax rates
The Incentive Effects of Equalization Grants on Fiscal Policy
Full text linkThe equalization system has long been considered a vital underpinning of the Canadian federation: a means to create some purported fairness or justice among the provinces, by redistributing the wealth of provinces with larger fiscal capacities to allow those with weaker fiscal capacities to provide roughly equivalent services to their citizens. However, the mechanics of the equalization formula have long been suspected of being flawed. Since grant-receiving provinces can adjust the way their fiscal capacities are calculated and reflected in the equalization formula — by adjusting tax rates and spending, for instance — governments are confronted with incentives to design their fiscal regimes in ways that maximize the size of the grants they receive, even if the fiscal policies are designed for less-than-optimal economic efficiency. The incentive for grant-receiving governments to “game” the formula, even unconsciously, is apparent; what has remained largely unresolved is to what extent is it actually occurring. This analysis shows that indeed it is occurring, and to a measurable degree. It finds that equalization grants provide recipient provinces with incentive to raise their business and personal tax rates. This is because when a government raises its own tax rate, it raises the national standard average tax rate, which is used in the equalization allocation formula. That, in turn, raises the individual “have-not” province’s equalization-grant entitlement. Exacerbating the problem is that the tax-raising provincial governments tend to underestimate the deadweight cost that the tax hikes will have, potentially worsening the fiscal situation of a province that already faces difficult economic challenges. This analysis also finds that the equalization-grant allocation system encourages spending among recipient provinces, particularly on health-care services, resource conservation, industrial assistance, environment and housing. Results show that for every 0.64 in total expenditure. Neither effect necessarily furthers the equalization program’s idealistic intent. The promotion of higher tax rates especially would seem to work at odds with the program’s conceptualization of a federal redistribution model. By potentially further repelling business and taxpayers from “have-not” provinces, the result could be making those provinces increasingly needy while continually reducing their citizens’ wealth. The equalization formula is not unfixable. The arrangement can be made to work even better, in a way that maintains the principle of redistributing wealth from more privileged provinces to less privileged ones, while avoiding the perverse incentives that motivate “have-not” provinces to raise taxes. If equalization grants were substituted with block grants that are unrelated to taxing capacity, taxes in grant-receiving provinces may actually decline. A $100 per capita increase in block grants is potentially associated with an up to 2.6 percentage points drop in business tax and an up to 0.26 percentage point drop in personal income tax. The result would be an equalization arrangement that could help increase, rather than decrease, competitiveness in the very “have-not” provinces that most urgently need to attract investment. Switching to block grants would not only keep the integrity of the principles behind equalization in tact, it would actually make equalization work better for all provinces
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
Full text linkThe present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
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