50 research outputs found
Cocrystal Growth in Organic Semiconductor Thin Films: Simulation of Pentacene, Perfluoropentacene, and Their 1:1 Blend Deposited On Graphite
No full textThe understanding of crystal formation in thin films and the precise knowledge of the relation between structure and surface diffusion are two important requirements for the efficient (nano)fabrication of organic electronic devices. Here a computational approach for simulating vapor-phase deposition is employed to obtain and investigate three types of crystalline thin films on graphite. All systems, namely pentacene, perfluoropentacene, and their 1:1 blend, which forms an alternate cocrystal, are constituted by recumbent molecules in accordance with experimental findings. The contributions of intermolecular interactions and of molecular rearrangements occurring during the deposition are analyzed to rationalize the final morphologies. Then, the generated structures are employed to evaluate the energy barriers that prevent molecular diffusion at terraces and step-edges, and to study the reorganization of the films upon high-temperature annealing. The broad agreement with experimental observations and the possibility of evaluating the potential energy surface at the molecular detail render the proposed approach a promising tool to make predictions for other systems
Delle fortificationi di Bvonaivto Lorini, nobile fiorentino, libri cinque : ne' qvali si mostra con le piv facili regole la scienza con la pratica, di fortificare le citta & altri luoghi sopra diuersi siti, con tvtti gli avvertimenti, che per intelligenza di tal materia possono occorrere ...
No full textIncludes index.Colophon date: 1596.Engraved t.p. vignette. Engraved port. of author. Numerous woodcut plans, tables, diagrams. Woodcut device at colophon. Initials.Mode of access: Internet.Centered on front pastedown is bookplate of Giovanni Muzio. Inscription on recto of 2nd front free endpaper: 1655 / Di Lelio Onetti.Binding: old vellum. Boards decorated in gilt with central oval and frame, both filled with arabesques. Author's name written on spine. The edges gilt
Il comportamento nomico degli animali non-umani. Verso un’etologia della normatività
No full textMan is not only a social and teleological animal: he is also a nomic animal that can act following rules. Starting from this new image of man, the author asks whether there are also nonhuman animals with this nomic capacity. Generally, the answer to this question is negative, but the author provides four affirmative answers deriving from the ethological, philosophical and legal investigation of normativity (C. Goretti, R. Sacco, F.B.M. de Waal, K. Andrews) that may pave the way for a new field of research: ethology of normativity
Corporeal drawn norms. An investigation of graphic normativity in the material world of everyday objects
No full textStarting from the ontological question of norms, namely from the question “What do we talk about when we talk about norms?”, the author highlights the existence of thetic norms, that is, norms established through an act of normative production, which have not been formulated linguistically. Notably, the author focuses on drawn (or graphic) norms, that is those norms that do not arise from a linguistic formulation or from a linguistic representation, but from a graphic representation, from a drawing (for example, Ikea’s diagram instruction manuals and traffic signs). In conclusion, the author examines a particular set of drawn norms, corporeal drawn norms, and investigates their essentially deictic nature
Animal norms: an investigation of normativity in the non-human social world
No full textA human being is not only a social and teleological animal, she/he is also a nomic animal, a creature that can act in light of rules. Starting from this new image of humankind, the author extends the investigation of normativity to other members of the animal kingdom, posing the question of whether other nomic animals exist outside the human species. Generally, the consensus tends toward the idea that non-human animals are incapable of acting in light of rules, as if this capacity were a specific characteristic of humanity excluded to all other species. The author instead assembles three impactful answers that counter this consensus, posited respectively by a legal expert, an ethologist, and a philosopher, responses that may pave the way for a new field of research: the ethology of normativity. In conclusion, the author points out how these new inquiries advance novel ideas of normativity that deserve investigating further, such as a “normativity without language,” and a “normativity without norms.
Possono le regole costitutive creare una practice?
No full textThe author investigates the role of constitutive rules in the construction of social reality. He denies that constitutive rules are a sufficient condition of a practice such as a chess game. To create a new practice with rules, it is necessary that there already be the grammar of this practice, that is, the sense of this practice (for example, the sense of game). It is the grammar of a practice and not its constitutive rules that determines the nature of a practice. The sense of a practice cannot be created by constitutive rules
Questioning the Soul. On C. W. Dyck's "Kant and Rational Psychology"
No full textAmong the most recent examples of works dealing with the history of Kant’s sources,
the work by C. Dyck deserves a special place both for his ambitious goal and the breadth of
the historical analysis that accompanies this goal. he author’s basic assumption is that, “In
contrast to the narrowly rationalistic approach to the soul which would proceed completely
independently of experience, the rational psychology pioneered by the theorists of the German
tradition relies essentially upon empirical psychology”. Indeed, according to Wolf, when our
investigation comes to the soul it “is to be considered rationalistic only in a much broader sense
in that [... it] is not limited to what can be directly known through experience” (p. 9).
his lets the author formulate his main tenet, namely that in diferent senses both Kant’s
pre-Critical (1770s) and Critical (Paralogisms) dealings with rational psychology can only be
understood through abandoning a traditional interpretative scheme aiming at identifying the
target of the Paralogisms only with the Cartesian-Leibnizian position. he author maintains
indeed that actually Kant does not mainly victimize the rational psychologists for taking the
soul as given in a merely intelligible form instead of through a sensible intuition. Rather,
since Kant’s main polemical target is represented by the German (basically, Wolian) tradition
immediately before him, his main concern is to detect the mistakes within the pretended
empirical intuition through which the soul is supposed to be given within this tradition. Such
a position was at least partially embraced by Kant himself in the middle 1770s
Questioning the Soul. On C. W. Dyck's "Kant and Rational Psychology"
No full textAmong the most recent examples of works dealing with the history of Kant’s sources,
the work by C. Dyck deserves a special place both for his ambitious goal and the breadth of
the historical analysis that accompanies this goal. he author’s basic assumption is that, “In
contrast to the narrowly rationalistic approach to the soul which would proceed completely
independently of experience, the rational psychology pioneered by the theorists of the German
tradition relies essentially upon empirical psychology”. Indeed, according to Wolf, when our
investigation comes to the soul it “is to be considered rationalistic only in a much broader sense
in that [... it] is not limited to what can be directly known through experience” (p. 9).
his lets the author formulate his main tenet, namely that in diferent senses both Kant’s
pre-Critical (1770s) and Critical (Paralogisms) dealings with rational psychology can only be
understood through abandoning a traditional interpretative scheme aiming at identifying the
target of the Paralogisms only with the Cartesian-Leibnizian position. he author maintains
indeed that actually Kant does not mainly victimize the rational psychologists for taking the
soul as given in a merely intelligible form instead of through a sensible intuition. Rather,
since Kant’s main polemical target is represented by the German (basically, Wolian) tradition
immediately before him, his main concern is to detect the mistakes within the pretended
empirical intuition through which the soul is supposed to be given within this tradition. Such
a position was at least partially embraced by Kant himself in the middle 1770s
L’uomo e le sue norme. Per un’antropologia delle regole costitutive. Commento a: Gaetano Carcaterra, Le norme costitutive, Torino: Giappichelli, 2014
No full textOn again reading Gaetano Carcaterra’s book Le norme costitutive, published in 2014, forty years after its first provisional edition in 1974, the author proposes a new key to the reading of the book. The new key focuses on the anthropology, on the image of man, presupposed by Carcaterra’s theory of normativity. A twofold image of man emerges: (i) man as a “nomic animal”, i.e. an animal with the capacity to act in light of rules, and (ii) man as a “symbolic animal”, i.e. an animal with the capacity to make something symbolize (or mean) something beyond itself
Meta-institutional concepts. A new category for social ontology
No full textNella sua ontologia sociale, John Searle definisce “fatti istituzionali” quei fatti la cui natura è costituita da regole che, per questa ragione, egli chiama “costitutive”. In altri termini, secondo Searle, i fatti istituzionali presuppongono, per la loro esistenza, la presenza di istituzioni umane intese come sistemi di regole costitutive. Searle propone, quindi, una ontologia a due livelli della realtà istituzionale: (i) il livello dei fatti istituzionali e (ii) il livello delle istituzioni e delle regole costitutive. Partendo dall’analisi dei due fatti istituzionali “Kasparov ha vinto a scacchi” e “Kasparov sta giocando a scacchi”, l’autore propone di estendere questa ontologia a due livelli della realtà istituzionale, sottolineando la necessità di un ulteriore livello per l’analisi delle condizioni di possibilità dei fatti istituzionali, oltre al livello delle istituzioni e delle regole costitutive. I due fatti istituzionali presi in esame, infatti, necessitano per la loro esistenza non soltanto delle regole degli scacchi, ma anche dei due concetti di “gioco” e di “vittoria”, che non sono, a loro volta, costituiti dalle regole degli scacchi. Essi non sono “concetti istituzionali” degli scacchi come i concetti di “scaccomatto” e di “arrocco”. Ci troviamo di fronte a due “concetti meta-istituzionali”, cioè a concetti che vanno oltre (in greco antico: metá) le istituzioni delle quali sono condizione di possibilità. In conclusione, l’autore propone una ontologia a tre livelli della realtà istituzionale, nella quale (i) il primo livello è quello dei fatti istituzionali, (ii) il secondo è quello delle istituzioni e delle regole costitutive, (iii) il terzo è il livello dei concetti meta-istituzionali.In "Speech Acts", John Searle argues that institutional facts presuppose, for their existence, the existence of certain institutions (understood as systems of constitutive rules). The author extends Searle’s theory of institutional facts arguing that a further level is needed for the investigation of the structure of institutional reality: the level of meta-institutional concepts. The meta-institutional concepts are concepts that go beyond (Greek: metá) the institutions of which they are conditions of possibility. An example of meta-institutional concept is the concept of game. In a culture which does not have the concept of game, we could move the chess-men according to the rules of chess, we could also perform a castling, but it would be impossible to play chess
