1,720,971 research outputs found

    Enforcement and Environmental Quality in a Decentralized Emission Trading System

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    This paper addresses the issue of whether the powers of monitoring compliance and allocating tradeable emissions allowances within a federation of countries should be appointed to a unique federal regulator or decentralized to several local regulators. To this end, we develop a two stage game played by environmental regulator(s) and the polluting industries of two countries. Regulator(s) choose the amount of emission allowances to be issued and set the level of monitoring effort to achieve full compliance, while regulated firms choose actual emissions and the number of permits to be held. We identify various, possibly conflicting, spillovers among states in a decentralized setting. We show that cost advantage in favor of local regulators is not sufficient to justify decentralization. Nevertheless, cost differential in monitoring violations can imply lower emissions and greater welfare under a decentralized institutional setting than under a centralized one. However, while a better environmental quality under decentralization is a sufficient condition for higher welfare under the same regime, it is not also a necessary condition.Emissions Trading, Environmental Federalism, Enforcement, Monitoring Cost

    Il Green Deal europeo per la lotta al cambiamento climatico e per uno sviluppo economico sostenibile: alcuni spunti di riflessione in una prospettiva economica

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    Il Green Deal europeo rappresenta il più importante intervento di politica di contrasto al cambiamento climatico a livello mondiale. Con esso l’Unione Europea (UE) prevede di destinare circa un terzo del suo bilancio pluriennale (2021-2028) e del programma NextGenerationEU (NGEU) a investimenti sostenibili. L’obiettivo è quello di rendere l’Europa il primo continente a impatto climatico zero entro il 2050, garantendo al contempo una maggiore crescita economica e occupazionale (European Commission, 2021). Con il presente articolo proviamo ad analizzare criticamente alcuni risvolti del Green Deal europeo, in particolare – ma, più in generale, anche di tutte le politiche di contrasto al cambiamento climatico – al fine di comprendere se, e come, è possibile perseguire congiuntamente l’obiettivo di mitigazione del cambiamento climatico e quello della crescita economica e, quali elementi potrebbero mettere a rischio la capacità politica dell’UE di difendere agli occhi dei cittadini europei la sua strategia di politica ambientale. Infatti, sebbene i più recenti sviluppi tecnologici rendano possibile il decoupling fra la crescita economica e quella delle emissioni dei gas responsabili del cambiamento climatico, la transizione energetica, necessaria per garantire uno sviluppo economico che sia anche sostenibile dal punto di vista climatico, ha bisogno di scelte politiche coraggiose che andranno inevitabilmente a toccare specifici interessi economici e che, pertanto, necessitano di un forte sostegno da parte dell’opinione pubblica

    Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis

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    The present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed

    Variations on the Author

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    “Variations on the Author” discusses two of Eduardo Coutinho’s recent films (Um Dia na Vida, from 2010, and Últimas Conversas, posthumously released in 2015) and their contribution to the general question of documentary authorship. The director’s filmography is characterized by a consistent yet self-effacing form of authorial self-inscription: Coutinho often features as an interviewer that rather than express opinions propels discourses; an interviewer that is good at listening. This mode of self-inscription characterizes him as an author who is not expressive but who is nonetheless markedly present on the screen. In Um Dia na Vida, however, Coutinho is completely absent form the image, while Últimas Conversas, on the contrary, includes a confessional prologue that moves the director from the margins to the center of his films. This article examines the ways in which these works stand out in the filmography of a director who offers new insights into the notion of cinematic authorship

    Appropriate Similarity Measures for Author Cocitation Analysis

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    We provide a number of new insights into the methodological discussion about author cocitation analysis. We first argue that the use of the Pearson correlation for measuring the similarity between authors’ cocitation profiles is not very satisfactory. We then discuss what kind of similarity measures may be used as an alternative to the Pearson correlation. We consider three similarity measures in particular. One is the well-known cosine. The other two similarity measures have not been used before in the bibliometric literature. Finally, we show by means of an example that our findings have a high practical relevance.information science;Pearson correlation;cosine;similarity measure;author cocitation analysis

    Regulating unverifiable quality by fixed-price contracts

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    We apply the idea of relation contracting to a very simple problem of regulating a single-product monopolistic firm when the regulatory instrument is a fixed-price contract, and quality is endogenous and observable, but not verifiable. We model the interaction between the regulator and the firm as a dynamic game, and we show that, provided both players are sufficiently patient, there exist self-enforcing regula- tory contracts in which the firm prefers to produce the quality man- dated by the regulator, while the regulator chooses to leave the firm a positive rent as a reward to its quality choice. We also show that the socially optimal self-enforcing contract implies a distortion from the second best, which is greater the more impatient is the firm and the larger is the (marginal) effect of the contractual price on the profits the firm would make by deviating from the offered contract. Whenever the punishment profits are strictly positive, even if the firm were infinitely patient, the optimal contract would ensure a Ramsey condition but with positive profits to the firm. Our result also illustrates that, whenever the firm's output has some unverifiable component, optimal regulatory lag in fixed-price contract should be reduced to limit the reward of the firm's opportunistic behaviour.Quality regulation, relational contracts
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