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Should experts influence citizens’ judgment?
No full textThe problem of the proper role of knowledge in political decision-making is a traditional and major concern for political philosophers. In the last years, such debate has found a renewed interest and the focus has been cast on the role of experts within democratic societies: does making room for experts in policy-making amount to a loss of democracy, whose core value is that of political equality? The problem is particularly thorny if we consider the fact that, given the complexity of contemporary societies, not only it is simply impossible for every citizen to participate intelligently on each and every political issue, but also that it is necessary to rely on experts to reach sound political decisions. For these reasons, it has been argued for a division of labour between experts and citizens (Dewey 1927; Christiano 1996; 2012; Urbinati 2006). According to this view, citizens can set an agenda for pursuing social problems, that need to be identified by experts, and specify the aims of the policies that cope with these problems, while experts define the means and strategies to pursue such aims. The integration between these processes is grounded by political deliberation that facilitates a reasoned exchanged between the facts provided by experts and the values developed by citizens. In this sense, the division of labour is usually based on the assumption that experts should (and can) provide neutral, apolitical, technical advice to representatives and citizens, so to be, as Winston Churchill famously stated, “on tap but not on top”. In this paper, we challenge this view by claiming that it is grounded on problematic epistemological and political premises. Our aim is to evaluate and provide a better understanding of the role of experts within democratic societies, and to understand whether, how, and to what extent experts’ judgments should influence citizens’ political judgments. We start by arguing that the division of labour perspective relies on a simplistic conception of the fact/value distinction and of the division between science and politics. Indeed, not only judgments of value are deeply embedded in the practice of science (Kitcher 2001), but also science is never the pursuit of truth full stop, but the pursuit of those truths scientists find significant (Dewey 1988). Moreover, the common idea which distinguishes science, intended as the realm of agreement, from ethics, intended as the realm of disagreement, is flawed. Scientists and technical experts disagree strongly about states of affairs, levels of risk and uncertainty, policy efficiency, etc. Finally, to ground the division of labour on the distinction is controversial also because of the difficulties citizens have in evaluating the claims of experts (Brewer 1997), and because it is not at all clear whether and how laypeople can identify experts (Goldman 1999; 2001). Given this simplistic epistemological framework, division of labour accounts are not able to describe and guide the political role of experts, the values that are conveyed by their proposals, and the normative standards against which these claims should be assessed. Since experts exercise a political role and their proposals convey values, their claims should not only be evaluated for their correctness but for their political viability and legitimacy as well. A proper account of the role of experts within democratic society should then provide standards to assess whether their claims are politically justified (Bertram 1997; White and Ypi 2011), namely grounded on reasons that can be accepted by a political community. The role of political deliberation is not only to facilitate experts in enabling citizens to make sensible political judgements but to allow members of the demos to critically assess if the proposals of experts are politically justifiable. References Bertram, C. (1997) “Political Justification, Theoretical Complexity, and Democratic Community”, Ethics, 107(4), 563-583. Brewer, S. (1997) “Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process”, Yale Law Journal, 107, pp. 1535–679. Christiano, T. (1996) The Rule of the Many Fundamental Issues in Democratic Theory, Boulder: Westview Press. ------------------ (2012) “Rational deliberation among experts and citizens”, in J. Parkinson & J. Mansbridge [eds.] Deliberative Systems, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 27-51. Dewey, J. (1927) The Public and Its Problems, New York: Henry Holt. ------------ (1988) “Experience and Nature”, in J. A. Boydston [ed.] The Later Workds vol. 1, Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois Press. Goldman, A. I. (1999) Knowledge in a Social World, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
------------------- (2001) “Experts: Which Ones should You Trust?”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 63, pp. 85-110. Kitcher, P. (2001) Science, Truth, and Democracy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Urbinati, N. (2006) Representative Democracy: Principles and Genealogy, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. White, J. and Ypi, L. (2011) “On Partisan Political Justification”, American Political Science Review, 105 (2), pp. 381-96
Should experts influence citizens’ judgment?
No full textThe problem of the proper role of knowledge in political decision-making is a traditional and major concern for political philosophers. In the last years, such debate has found a renewed interest and the focus has been cast on the role of experts within democratic societies: does making room for experts in policy-making amount to a loss of democracy, whose core value is that of political equality? The problem is particularly thorny if we consider the fact that, given the complexity of contemporary societies, not only it is simply impossible for every citizen to participate intelligently on each and every political issue, but also that it is necessary to rely on experts to reach sound political decisions. For these reasons, it has been argued for a division of labour between experts and citizens (Dewey 1927; Christiano 1996; 2012; Urbinati 2006). According to this view, citizens can set an agenda for pursuing social problems, that need to be identified by experts, and specify the aims of the policies that cope with these problems, while experts define the means and strategies to pursue such aims. The integration between these processes is grounded by political deliberation that facilitates a reasoned exchanged between the facts provided by experts and the values developed by citizens. In this sense, the division of labour is usually based on the assumption that experts should (and can) provide neutral, apolitical, technical advice to representatives and citizens, so to be, as Winston Churchill famously stated, “on tap but not on top”. In this paper, we challenge this view by claiming that it is grounded on problematic epistemological and political premises. Our aim is to evaluate and provide a better understanding of the role of experts within democratic societies, and to understand whether, how, and to what extent experts’ judgments should influence citizens’ political judgments. We start by arguing that the division of labour perspective relies on a simplistic conception of the fact/value distinction and of the division between science and politics. Indeed, not only judgments of value are deeply embedded in the practice of science (Kitcher 2001), but also science is never the pursuit of truth full stop, but the pursuit of those truths scientists find significant (Dewey 1988). Moreover, the common idea which distinguishes science, intended as the realm of agreement, from ethics, intended as the realm of disagreement, is flawed. Scientists and technical experts strongly disagree about states of affairs, levels of risk and uncertainty, policy efficiency, etc. Finally, to ground the division of labour on the distinction is controversial also because of the difficulties citizens have in evaluating the claims of experts (Brewer 1997), and because it is not at all clear whether and how laypeople can identify experts (Goldman 1999; 2001). Given this simplistic epistemological framework, division of labour accounts are not able to describe and guide the political role of experts, the values that are conveyed by their proposals, and the normative standards against which these claims should be assessed. Since experts exercise a political role and their proposals convey values, their claims should not only be evaluated for their correctness but for their political viability and legitimacy as well. A proper account of the role of experts within democratic society should then provide standards to assess whether their claims are politically justified (Bertram 1997; White and Ypi 2011), namely grounded on reasons that can be accepted by a political community. The role of political deliberation is not only to facilitate experts in enabling citizens to make sensible political judgements but to allow members of the demos to critically assess if the proposals of experts are politically justifiable
Quale filosofia politica? : Note su Rawls e Cohen
No full textSi esamina la critica di G.A Cohen alla concezione di filosofia politica difesa da John Rawls, mostrando quali sono i suoi principali punti di forza, ma anche evidenziando come lo stesso Cohen non scommetta abbastanza sulla sua tesi
Cittadini, partiti ed esperti: una relazione complicata
Get PDFThe role of experts within contemporary democracies has become one the most politicised and pressing topics of our time. On one hand, democratic governments need expert advice for effective governance, leading towards forms of technocratic politics; on the other, the spread of populist movements has undermined popular trust in experts. Since these phenomena are troublesome for a democratic polity, we propose a new understanding of the division of labour between experts and citizens. Drawing from a deliberative perspective, we contend that intermediaries between citizens and experts are in order, and political parties, if properly constrained, can provide this function. We claim that if intra-party deliberation between managing party members and experts is granted, then citizens have control over the proposals of experts without needing to directly engage with them. Our perspective recognises the epistemic superiority of experts, unlike populism, but ensures, unlike technocracy, that only citizens can authorise policies
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
Get PDFThe present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
Variations on the Author
Get PDF“Variations on the Author” discusses two of Eduardo Coutinho’s recent films (Um Dia na Vida, from 2010, and Últimas Conversas, posthumously released in 2015) and their contribution to the general question of documentary authorship. The director’s filmography is characterized by a consistent yet self-effacing form of authorial self-inscription: Coutinho often features as an interviewer that rather than express opinions propels discourses; an interviewer that is good at listening. This mode of self-inscription characterizes him as an author who is not expressive but who is nonetheless markedly present on the screen. In Um Dia na Vida, however, Coutinho is completely absent form the image, while Últimas Conversas, on the contrary, includes a confessional prologue that moves the director from the margins to the center of his films. This article examines the ways in which these works stand out in the filmography of a director who offers new insights into the notion of cinematic authorship
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