1,721,038 research outputs found
Votes and Violence: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Nigeria
Full text linkFollowing the wave of democratization during the 1990s, elections are now common in low-income societies. However, these elections are frequently flawed. We investigate the Nigerian general election of 2007, which is to date the largest election held in Africa and one seriously marred by violence. We designed and conducted a nationwide field experiment based on randomized anti-violence grassroots campaigning. We find direct effects on violence outcomes from exploring both subject-surveying and independent data sources. Crucially, we establish that voter intimidation is effective in reducing voter turnout, and that the violence was systematically dissociated from incumbents. We suggest that incumbents have a comparative advantage in alternative strategies, vote buying and ballot fraud. Voter intimidation may be a strategy of the weak analogous to terrorism.Violence, Conflict, Electoral Politics, Political Economy, Randomized Experiment, Field Experiment, Nigeria, West Africa
Carbon pricing and social acceptability: Using EU ETS auction revenues for social expenditures in a changing world
No full textKnowledge is Power - A Theory of Information, Income, and Welfare Spending
Full text linkNo voters cast their votes based on perfect information, but better educated and richer voters are on average better informed than others. We develop a model where the voting mistakes resulting from low political knowledge reduce the weight of poor voters, and cause parties to choose political platforms that are better aligned with the preferences of rich voters. In US election survey data, we find that income is more important in affecting voting behavior for more informed voters than for less informed voters, as predicted by the model. Further, in a panel of US states we find that when there is a strong correlation between income and political information, Congress representatives vote more conservatively, which is also in line with our theory.redistribution, welfare spending, information, income, voting, political economics
War and Natural Resource Exploitation
Full text linkAlthough the relationship between natural resources and civil war has received much attention, little is known about the underlying mechanisms. Controversies and contradictions in the stylized facts persist because resource extraction is treated as exogenous while in reality fighting affects extraction. We study endogenous fighting, armament, and extraction method, speed and investment. Rapacious resource exploitation has economic costs, but can nevertheless be preferred to balanced depletion due to lowered incentives for future rebel attacks. With private exploitation, rebels fight more than the government if they can renege on the contract with the mining company, and hence government turnover is larger in this case. Incentive-compatible license fees paid by private companies and mining investment are lower in unstable countries, and increase with the quality of the government army and office rents. This implies that privatised resource exploitation is more attractive for governments who have incentives to fight hard, i.e., in the presence of large office rents and a strong army. With endogenous weapon investments, the government invests more under balanced than under rapacious or private extraction. If the government can commit before mining licenses are auctioned, it will invest more in weapons under private extraction than under balanced and rapacious nationalized extraction.conflict, natural resources, private resource exploitation, mining investment, license fee
Knowledge is power: a theory of information, income, and welfare spending
Full text linkNo voters cast their votes based on perfect information, but better educated and richer voters are on average better informed than others. We develop a model where the voting mistakes resulting from low political knowledge reduce the weight of poor voters, and cause parties to choose political platforms that are better aligned with the preferences of rich voters. In US election survey data, we find that income is more important in affecting voting behavior for more informed voters than for less informed voters, as predicted by the model. Further, in a panel of US states we find that when there is a strong correlation between income and political information, Congress representatives vote more conservatively, which is also in line with our theory.Redistribution, welfare spending, information, income, voting, political economics
Can power-sharing foster peace? Evidence from Northern Ireland
No full textIn the absence of power-sharing, minority groups in opposition have powerful incentives to substitute the ballot with the bullet. In contrast, when power is shared among all major groups in society, the relative gains of sticking to electoral politics are larger for minority groups. After making the theoretical argument, we provide in the current paper an empirical analysis of the impact of power-sharing at the local level, making use of fine-grained data from Northern Ireland’s 26 local district councils over the 1973–2001 period. We find that power-sharing has a sizable and robust conflict-reducing impact.Hannes Mueller acknowledges financial support from Grant number ECO2015-66883-P, the Ramon y Cajal programme and the Severo Ochoa Programme, and Dominic Rohner is grateful for financial support from the ERC Starting Grant 677595 "Policies for Peace".Peer reviewe
The Effects of Conflict on the Structure of the Economy
Full text linkThe presence of conflict affects peoples economic incentives. Some sectors of activity flourish, while others suffer. For understanding structural problems in developing countries and designing appropriate post-conflict reconstruction policies, it is essential to understand in what ways conflict affects the structure of the economy. We develop a simple model of conflict and multiple sectors of activity, where conflict efforts, the allocation of factor endowments and the production outputs are endogenous. We predict that for moderately destructive conflicts labor-intensive sectors are most affected by fighting, while for highly destructive conflicts capital-intensive sectors suffer most. In the latter case, under some conditions it is also possible that in the presence of endogenous conflict - an increase in the price of the capital-intensive commodity reduces the output of this same good. The model further predicts that export-sectors and sectors that require inter-temporal investments are particularly exposed to conflict activity. In the empirical part of the paper, we study the impact of various forms of conflict, separately and as an aggregate conflict index constructed with principal component analysis. We present some basic stylized facts about the effect of conflict on the productive structure of the economy. Conflict reduces the share of the manufacturing sector in the GDP, increases the exploitation of some simple natural resources (i.e. forestry) and reduces the production of crops. Using industrial level data for developing countries we study the channels through which conflict affects the manufacturing sector. As expected, we find that industries that are more institutional/transaction intensive are the ones that suffer most in conflictive societies. Laborintensive sectors are also negatively affected by conflict. It is also found that exporting industries and sectors requiring external financing suffer more during conflict. Our results are robust to sensitivity analysis. --Conflict,Production Structure,Resource Curse,Post-Conflict Reconstruction
Biased Experts, Costly Lies, and Binary Decisions
Full text linkDecision makers lacking crucial specialist know-how often consult with better informed but biased experts. In our model the decision maker’s choice problem is binary and her preferred option depends on the state of the world unknown to her. The expert observes the state and sends a report to the decision maker. His bias is such that he prefers the same decision for all states. Lying about the state leads to a cost that increases in the size of the lie. As a function of the size of the expert’s bias and the decision maker’s prior about the underlying state, three kinds of equilibrium behavior occur. In each case equilibrium consists of separating and pooling segments, and the decision maker takes the expert’s preferred decision for some states for which she would not take this decision had she observed the state herself. The model has a variety of applications and extends to situations in which the decision maker may be naive and take the report by its face value, and to situations with multiple experts and uncertainty about the size of the expert’s bias.
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
Full text linkThe present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
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