1,721,020 research outputs found
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
Full text linkThe present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
Risky Business: Multinationals, uncertainty and asymmetric Insurance
Full text linkRisk management is vital to multinational enterprises (MNEs) facing
uncertainty in foreign markets. One strand of the MNE literature
demonstrates this by showing how various risks for which insurance does
not exist
alters MNEs’ international production decisions compared with
when they operate under certainty. Other work deals with sources of
uncertainty against which firms can hedge in financial markets.
In this paper
MNE behaviour is examined in the presence of risks for which insurance
markets are missing but public insurance schemes are available instead. Such
insurance schemes differ in one important respect from the coverage
mechanisms available in financial markets. In forward and futures markets,
firms can typically hedge without restrictions. By contrast, owing to the
government’s involvement, public insurance alternatives tend to lack the
global character of financial markets and often include explicit support for
domestic economic activities
Verzerkering als slagkracht bij expot oner onzekerheid
Full text linkDe getransformeerde Oost-Europese markt en-de snelgroeiende Aziatische "tiger"-economieen vormen nieuwe afzetmarkten voor Wet-Europese exporteurs. In deze markten worden exporteurs echter vaak geconfronteerd met onzekerheid over hun ontvangsten. Het beslissingsprobleem van de onderneming onder onzekerheid wordt uitgebreid behandeld in de theoretische literatuur. Van cruciaal belang voor de exportbesissling van de internationale onderneming is het bestaan van verzerkeringsmechanismen. In vele OESO-landen spelen officiele exportverzenkaars vaak eb essentiele rol in exportrisicobeheer. Het belang van deze spezieke vorm van risicodekking wordt geillustreerd aan de hand von enkele kenmerken van deze instituties en empirisch materiaal.
The transformed Eastern European market and the rapidly growing Asian tiger economies hold potential as new export markets for Western European firms. However, exporters often face uncertainty about their revenues in these markets. The decision problem of the firm under uncertainty has been extensively addressed in the theoretical literature. The existence if insurance facilities is of crucial importance for the export decision of the internationally active enterprise. In most OECD countries official export insurers play an essential role in export risk management. The importance of this specific type of risk coverage is illustrated with the key institutional features and some empirical evidenc
Investment timing under uncertainty in oligopoly: Symmetry or leadership?
Full text linkThis paper examines firms’ investment-timing decisions in an oligopolistic set-up. Facing demand uncertainty,
firms decide whether to invest early or wait until uncertainty has been resolved. We show that the
precise form that investment commitment takes matters for the investment-timing outcomes that emerge.
When firms can commit immediately to the final investment level, investment leadership may occur and early
investment is referred to as being primarily “aggressive”. By contrast, the presence of a time lag between
when and how much firms invest yields symmetric investment-timing outcomes only; we argue that early
investment is mainly “defensive” in that case
Export Promotion Via Official Export Insurance
Full text linkProponents of free trade argue that export promotion distorts competition and undermines the
multilateral trade system. In most countries export insurance is provided by the government and,
consequently, is driven more by a broad range of policy objectives than purely insurance principles.
This paper, however, shows that export promotion does not necessarily imply trade distortions and
that most export destinations do not benefit from insurance premium subsidies. A significant policy
implication of these findings is that the WTO and the EU are correct not to banish completely official
export insurance
Intervention in risky export markets: insurance, strategic action or aid?
Full text linkBecause the use of trade policy is limited by international institutional arrangements,
governments pursuing a policy of export promotion may want to use more indirect
instruments to achieve their objectives. In that context, this paper focuses on the public
provision of export insurance. While the prime objective is insurance against the risk of
default faced by firms exporting to risky markets, these insurance programmes are often
embedded in more global policy objectives of the exporting country’s government. This
paper investigates how premium rating of official export insurance is affected by strategic
export promotion and the pursuit of other political objectives
Credibility and Reputation Building in the Developmental State: A Model with East Asian Applications
Full text linkWe use a game-theoretic model to analyze the role of credibility, reputation and
investment coordination in a developmental state. Our model focuses on why a ``soft'' state serving
narrow social groups so often obtains in less-developed countries and under what conditions a
``hard'' or developmental state can emerge. The model highlights the dilemma that although state
and private sector alike may want economic growth, both must simultaneously invest to achieve it.
But the equilibrium outcome analogous to the prisoner's dilemma is investment by neither.
Even when initial conditions are favorable and a state is potentially developmental with the genuine
capability to elicit private sector investment, this may not materialize and an equilibrium of low, or
no, investment will prevail. To avoid this deadlock and foster growth, the successful developmental
state must demonstrate commitment by promoting its ``developmental'' credentials through a
process of reputation building. A consequent incentive to act ``tough'' together with seeming
advantages of authoritarianism in implementing the developmental state may help to explain why it
is often associated with an authoritarian political system
Verzekering als slagkracht bij export onder onzekerheid
Full text linkThe abstract is included in the text
Rivalry in uncertain export markets: commitment versus flexibility
Full text linkThis paper examines optimal trade policy in a two-period oligopoly model, with a home and a
foreign firm choosing capital and output. Demand uncertainty, resolved in period two, gives rise to a
trade-off between strategic commitment and flexibility in the firms’ investment decisions. Firms’
investment timing is endogenous and can be manipulated by the home government, which sets a
subsidy before firms decide when to invest. We show that when the government wishes to
manipulate investment timing, it will choose its policy to deter investment commitment by the home
or the foreign firm
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