4,980 research outputs found
CK-Equilibria and Informational Efficiency in a Competitive Economy
No full textWe consider a very simple competitive economy with infinitesimal agents and asymmetric information. We define a Common Knowledge (CK hereafter) Equilibrium as a price distribution compatible with CK of market clearing and rationality. At equilibrium, expectational mistakes and incorrect information revelation by price are possible. But, whenever unique, the CK equilibrium is a fully revealing Rational Expectations Equilibrium. Hence uniqueness of equilibrium means market informational efficiency. We give different conditions of uniqueness of equilibrium bearing on the information structure. The first ones emphasize that many informed agents are required for market efficiency. Agents need not be perfectly informed, but each "piece" of information has to be known by a large enough proportion of the population. The main result is a characterization of the information structures allowing for local uniqueness: multiplicity of equilibria obtains when all the agents have to extract information from the price to obtain information about the same event. We show that this result holds in an exchange economy with finitely many goods and generic preferences. Finally, we provide a simple market game in which the CK-equilibria obtain through infinitely repeated elimination of weakly dominated strategies.
Gabriel Ajak Lat
No full textabstract: Gabriel was ten years old when he left his village.
“Lost Boys Found” is an ongoing, interdisciplinary project that is collecting, recording and archiving the oral histories of the Lost Boys/Girls of Sudan. The collection is a work-in-progress, seeking to record the oral history of as many Lost Boys/Girls as are willing, and will be used in a future book.Age: 27Region: Bahr al GhazalThis picture and bio was donated to the Lost Boys Found project from The Arizona Lost Boys Cente
Strongly rational expectations equilibria with endogenous acquisition of information
No full textThis paper analyzes conditions for existence of a strongly rational expectations equilibrium (SREE) in models with private information, where the amount of private information is endogenously determined. It is shown that the conditions for existence of a SREE known from models with exogenously given private information do not change as long as it is impossible to use the information transmitted through market prices. In contrast, these conditions are too weak, when there is such learning from prices. It turns out that the properties of the function which describes the costs that are associated with the individual acquisition of information are important in this respect. In case of constant marginal costs, prices must be half as informative than private signals in order for a SREE to exist. An interpretation of this result that falls back on the famous Grossman– Stiglitz–Paradox is also given.Eductive Learning, Private Information, Rational Expectations, Strongly Rational Expectations Equilibrium
Providence College Faculty Author Series 2013-2014: Fr. Gabriel Pivarnik
No full textIn this installment, Fr. Gabriel Pivarnik discusses his book Toward a Trinitarian Theology of Liturgical Participation and his reflections on the history of active participation within the Catholic Church
Providence College Faculty Author Series 2013-2014: Fr. Gabriel Pivarnik
No full textIn this installment, Fr. Gabriel Pivarnik discusses his book Toward a Trinitarian Theology of Liturgical Participation and his reflections on the history of active participation within the Catholic Church
Manuscript Poem "John Keats" by Dante Gabriel Rossetti
No full textabstract: Concerning the manuscript for "John Keats".Publication Details: Not the same version as some published versions of "John Keats."Curator's Note: Handwriting in upper right corner reads "Rossetti's Handwriting." Writing on verso reads "Dante Gabriel Rossetti. Mss.
British Museum Reader's Ticket of Dante Gabriel Rossetti
No full textabstract: Concerning a Reader's Ticket of Dante Gabriel Rossetti.Transcription Details: Card reads:
Poet's article 8 {? Nap.} /661
{?dilk Gllucci}
Aug 10 DG RossettiCreation Date Details: Undated range is the author's lifespan. Date and month listed on ticket read "Aug 10.
Suplemento 32. Gabriel Moedano Navarro. 75 (2005) abril. Diario de Campo. Boletín Interno de los investigadores del área de Antropología
No full text- Gabriel Moedano Navarro un hombre de su tiempo por Benjamín Muratalla. - Gabriel Moedano explorador gozoso de inframundos por Andrés Medina Hernández. - Hasta pronto, Gabriel por Jesús Montoya. - Homenaje a Gabriel Moedano por Cristina Barros. - Gabriel Moedano, el amigo por Jesús Monjarás Ruiz. - A Gabriel por Amparo Sevilla. - Algunas remembranzas en torno al maestro Gabriel Moedano por Norma Lazcano Arce. - Gabriel Moedano por Marco Buenrostro. - Gabriel Moedano por Katrin S. Flechsig. - A mi maestro con cariño por Yolanda Torres Martínez. - Corazón gigante por María Cristina Díaz Pérez
Open Doors presents, Nasario Garcia, E. A. Mares, Gabriel Melendez, and Jane Young
No full textThe Open Doors series presents a conversation about writing on New Mexican culture with Nasario Garcia, author of ""Brujas, Bultos y Brazaz: Tales of witchcraft and the supernatural in the Pecos Valley,"" E. A. Mares, author of ""Padre Martinez: a new perspective on Taos,"" and Gabriel Melendez and Jane Young, co-authors of ""Multicultural Southwest: A Reader."
The public and private faces of the friendship between Fidel Castro and Gabriel Garcia Marquez
No full textNobel Prize-winning Colombian author, Gabriel Garcia Marquez, is one of the most widely read Latin American authors in the world. His novels One Hundred Years of Solitude and Love in the Time of Cholera are among many people’s favourite books. But, despite loving his books, many of his readers have found it difficult to understand his political views – especially his support and friendship for the recently deceased former president of Cuba, Fidel Castro
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