1,721,082 research outputs found
Information, accounting, and the regulation of concessioned infrastructure monopolies
Economists often characterize the regulation of monopolies as a"game"(between the regulator and the service provider) in which the two players do not share the same information. The regulator is assumed to have poorer information than the service provider about the scope of future efficiency gains and the size and timing of future investment plans. Over time, the regulator must increase its information base so that regulatory targets become more realistic - but this is a costly process. The authors examine the ways such information can and should be generated, especially throughthe accounting requirements a regulator can impose on private operators of infrastructure concessions. (They view concessioning and regulation as complementary, not substitute, activities.) Concessionaires should provide regulators with the information they need to: 1) Compare outcomes with expectations. 2) Evaluate the cost of adverse shocks that may warrant relaxed regulations. 3) Evaluate whether lower costs than expected are the result of better performance or diminished output. 4) Properly evaluate the asset base and charge for the consumption of capital. Information that regulators get from private operators of infrastructure monopolies should be used to make both regulators and concessionaires accountable. In Chile, for example, the privatization of monopolies led to significant efficiency gains, but it took a long time for these gains to be passed on to users because neither the firms nor the regulators were held accountable - until Congress expressed reluctance to endorse further privatization because earlier waves of privatization had not benefited consumers. In other words, information should be used to make regulatory decisions more transparent and to reduce the risk of the private providers"capturing"the regulators.Labor Policies,International Terrorism&Counterterrorism,Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research,Decentralization,Financial Intermediation,Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research,International Terrorism&Counterterrorism,Banks&Banking Reform
An Interim Evaluation of Sulfur Dioxide Emissions Trading
This paper summarizes recent empirical research on compliance costs and strategies and on permit market performance under the U.S. acid rain program, the first large-scale, long-term program to use tradeable emissions permits to control pollution. An efficient market for emissions permits developed in a few years, and this program more than achieved its early goals on time, and it cost less than had been projected. Because of expectation errors, however, investment was excessive, and permit prices substantially understate abatement costs. The tradeable permits approach has worked well, but it is not a miracle cure for environmental problems. Coauthors are Paul L. Joskow, A. Denny Ellerman, Juan Pablo Montero, and Elizabeth M. Bailey. </jats:p
An Interim Evaluation of Sulfur Dioxide Emissions Trading
This paper summarizes recent empirical research on compliance costs and strategies and on permit market performance under the U.S. acid rain program, the first large-scale, long-term program to use tradeable emissions permits to control pollution. An efficient market for emissions permits developed in a few years, and this program more than achieved its early goals on time, and it cost less than had been projected. Because of expectation errors, however, investment was excessive, and permit prices substantially understate abatement costs. The tradeable permits approach has worked well, but it is not a miracle cure for environmental problems. Coauthors are Paul L. Joskow, A. Denny Ellerman, Juan Pablo Montero, and Elizabeth M. Bailey.
Reforming institutions for service delivery : a framework for development assistance with an application to the health, nutrition, and population portfolio
World Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World (report no. 17300) argued that institutions-the rules of the game that govern production and exchange-shape a country's prospects for sustained market-led growth. The author provides an institutional framework for service delivery, an essential component of state capability. He applies this framework to an evaluation of Bank support for service delivery in the health, nutrition, and population sector. He argues for greater institutional pluralism in the ways the World Bank does business in infrastructure, rural, and social sectors, but cautions against making efficient service delivery an issue of"state versus market."The Bank and its clients face the challenge of fitting menus of"better practice"delivery options to maps of institutional reality. In the health, nutrition, and population sector, the Bank should (1) unbundle and categorize essential health and clinical services according to goods characteristics and (2) integrate country knowledge into operations through upstream assessments of state, political, and social institutions. Overall, the Bank has made progress toward a"goods characteristics"approach, particularly in infrastructure and some rural services-but it has lagged in the social sectors, where support remains largely technocratic. Cross-sector comparisons reveal four generations of support for service delivery. First-generation support focused mainly on physical implementation of projects. Second-generation interventions, which characterized most social service interventions, focused on improving the financial and organizational viability of implementing agencies through technical assistance. Third-generation support was marked by significant unbundling of service delivery activities and clearer links to goods characteristics. In irrigation (1982-94), telecommunications (1980s-present), and transport (1990s), the one-size-fits-all monopoly model gave way to a range of options based on greater private sector and citizen participation in delivery. These included leases, concessions, outsourcing, and contracting as well as building, operating, transfer, and turnover schemes. Fourth-generation interventions are works-in-progress and represent efforts to develop new governance arrangements that systematically combine competition, voice, and hierarchy in the design, delivery, and monitoring of Bank projects. The Bank has a poor track record building country knowledge of institutional endowments that affect service delivery. The author identifies concepts and tools valuable for sector specialists'operations.Enterprise Development&Reform,Public Health Promotion,Health Economics&Finance,Decentralization,Health Monitoring&Evaluation,Governance Indicators,Poverty Assessment,Environmental Economics&Policies,Health Monitoring&Evaluation,Health Economics&Finance
Minimills and flat-rolled steel products
Thesis (M.S.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 1996.Includes bibliographical references (leaves 101-105).by Hiroyuki Kato.M.S
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
The present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
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