1,721,248 research outputs found
Reciprocity in Groups and the Limits to Social Capital.
No full textRobert Putnam defines social capital as “features of social organization, such as networks, norms and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation” (Putnam 1995: 67). Such networks are typically associated with norms that pro-mote coordination, cooperation and reciprocity for the mutual benefit of network members. These norms, coupled with the appropriate use of sanctions in case of noncompliance, are often thought to enable these groups to deal smoothly and effectively with multiple social and economic issues. At the same time, some au-thors have noted that strongly bonded groups may have adverse consequences for others (see, for instance Alejandro Portes and Patricia Landolt, 1996) or even for themselves (see for instance George Akerlof, 1976, or Kaushik Basu, 1986). It is this latter aspect that we wish to emphasize in these notes. Based on our earlier work on risk sharing in groups and networks (Garance Genicot and Debraj Ray, 2003, 2005 and Francis Bloch, Garance Genicot and Debraj Ray, 2006), this paper proposes a simple model of mutual help in groups and networks. We argue that, if social capital can promote cooperation among groups of indi
Updating Validations and Stochastic Dynamics on Coordination
Full text linkThis work studies an equilibrium selection of infinitely repeated symmetric 2x2 coordination games that show a tension between Pareto efficiency and risk dominance, in which bounded rational agents adopt the following simple behavior rule: each agent has a valuation of actions, and chooses the highest one. Valuations are updated according to the sign of the difference between the current valuation and the realized payoff. By applying techniques from stochastic stable states (Kandori et al. 1993 and Young 1993), it is shown that the risk dominant outcome is selected; that is, it is realized more frequently in the long run.
Uneven Growth: A Framework for Research in Development Economics
Full text linkThe textbook paradigm of economywide development rests on the premise of "balanced growth": that is, on the presumption that all sectors will grow in unison over time as a country gets richer. Of course, we would all agree that balanced growth is an abstraction. In many developing countries, economic growth has been fundamentally uneven. The question really is not whether growth is balanced -- it isn't -- but whether the abstraction is a useful one. For many important development questions, I believe the answer is no. This is why I would like to take the reality of "uneven growth" seriously and use it as an organizing device for a research program. I divide my research agenda into roughly two parts: the sources and nature of uneven growth, and the reactions to uneven growth -- how forces are set in motion to restore balance or perhaps even to thwart the growth process. To help us think about the effects of uneven growth, I present a version of Albert Hirschmann's tunnel parable: You're in a multi-lane tunnel, all lanes in the same direction, and you're caught in a serious traffic jam. After a while, the cars in the other lane begin to move. Do you feel better or worse? At first, movement in the other lane may seem like a good sign: you hope that your turn to move will come soon, and indeed that might happen. However, if the other lane keeps whizzing by, with no gaps to enter and with no change on your lane, your reactions may well become quite negative. Unevenness without corresponding redistribution can be tolerated or even welcomed if it raises expectations everywhere, but it will be tolerated for only so long. Thus, uneven growth will set forces in motion to restore a greater degree of balance, even (in some cases) actions that may thwart the growth process itself.
The Land Acquisition Bill-- A Critique and a Proposal
Full text linkThe new Bill on land acquisition recently tabled in Parliament is well intentioned but seriously flawed. Its principal defect is that it attaches an arbitrary mark-up to the historical market price to determine compensation amounts. This will guarantee neither social justice nor the efficient use of resources. The Bill also places unnecessary and severe conditions on land acquisition, such as restrictions on the use of multi-cropped land and insistence on public purpose, all of which are going to stifle the pace of development without promoting the interests of farmers. We present an alternative approach that will allow farmers to choose compensation in either land or cash, determine their own price instead of leaving it to the government’s discretion, and also reallocate the remaining farmland in the most efficient manner. Our proposed method involves a land auction covering not only the project site but also the surrounding agricultural land.
Moral hazard and private monitoring
Full text link1This paper incorporates earlier work by Bhaskar [4] and unpublished notes by van Damme. We are grateful to Tilman Börgers, Dilip Mookherjee, Debraj Ray, an anonymous referee, an associate editor, and numerous seminar audiences for useful comments. The first author thanks the CentER for Economic Research (Tilburg) for its hospitality while some of this research was carried out
Moral hazard and private monitoring
No full text1This paper incorporates earlier work by Bhaskar [4] and unpublished notes by van Damme. We are grateful to Tilman Börgers, Dilip Mookherjee, Debraj Ray, an anonymous referee, an associate editor, and numerous seminar audiences for useful comments. The first author thanks the CentER for Economic Research (Tilburg) for its hospitality while some of this research was carried out
Moral hazard and private monitoring.
Full text link1This paper incorporates earlier work by Bhaskar [4] and unpublished notes by van Damme. We are grateful to Tilman Börgers, Dilip Mookherjee, Debraj Ray, an anonymous referee, an associate editor, and numerous seminar audiences for useful comments. The first author thanks the CentER for Economic Research (Tilburg) for its hospitality while some of this research was carried out.
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
Full text linkThe present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
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