608 research outputs found
FGV/EPGE - 2014 Workshop on Economic Theory - David Martimort (Paris School of Economics)
No full textImportant economic theorists such as David Martimort (Paris School of Economics), Alessandro Pavan (Northwestern University), David Rahman (University of Minnesota), Yuliy Sannikov (Princeton University), Federico Echenique (California Institute of Technology), Muhamet Yildiz (MIT) and Roland Strausz (University of Berlim) presented their work. This workshop represents a great opportunity to disseminate some of the recent developments in the field. The workshop was organized by the FGV/EPGE and sponsored by the FGV EPGE "Mestrado em Economia e Finanças Empresariais
FGV/EPGE - 2014 Workshop on Economic Theory - David Rahman (University of Minnesota)
No full textImportant economic theorists such as David Martimort (Paris School of Economics), Alessandro Pavan (Northwestern University), David Rahman (University of Minnesota), Yuliy Sannikov (Princeton University), Federico Echenique (California Institute of Technology), Muhamet Yildiz (MIT) and Roland Strausz (University of Berlim) presented their work. This workshop represents a great opportunity to disseminate some of the recent developments in the field. The workshop was organized by the FGV/EPGE and sponsored by the FGV EPGE "Mestrado em Economia e Finanças Empresariais
David MARTIMORT, Lauréat du prix de la Revue économique 2016
No full textDirecteur d'études à l'École des hautes études en sciences sociales et professeur à la Paris School of Economics, David Martimort conduit des recherches en économie consacrées à la théorie des incitations, la régulation, l’organisation industrielle et l’économie politique. À l’occasion de la remise du prix de la Revue économique 2016 à David Martimort, une journée sera consacrée au thème "Les nouvelles frontières de l’État", le mardi 24 janvier 2017, de 9 h 30 à 18 h, suivi d'un cocktail. RSV..
Incitations et gouvernance publique
No full textDavid Martimort, directeur d’études Le séminaire doctoral « Incitations et gouvernance publique » a été inclus dans le cycle d’enseignement du master 2 EITER de l’Université de Toulouse. Il a été ouvert aux étudiants déjà inscrits en thèse ainsi qu’à de nombreux post-doctorants en visite dans nos murs pour l’année. Ce séminaire s’est articulé autour de deux axes principaux. Dans un premier temps, j’ai présenté une revue des principaux résultats de la littérature concernant la « régulation inc..
FGV/EPGE - 2014 Workshop on Economic Theory - Federico Echenique (Caltech)
No full textImportant economic theorists such as David Martimort (Paris School of Economics), Alessandro Pavan (Northwestern University), David Rahman (University of Minnesota), Yuliy Sannikov (Princeton University), Federico Echenique (California Institute of Technology), Muhamet Yildiz (MIT) and Roland Strausz (University of Berlim) presented their work. This workshop represents a great opportunity to disseminate some of the recent developments in the field. The workshop was organized by the FGV/EPGE and sponsored by the FGV EPGE "Mestrado em Economia e Finanças Empresariais
Renégotiation de contrats dans l'industrie du transport urbain en France
No full textCet article analyse la renégociation des contrats de gestion déléguée dans le secteur du transport en France. Nous décrivons tout d'abord brièvement le secteur, puis nous présentons dans ses grandes lignes un modèle théorique de renégociation des contrats expliquant les évolutions dynamiques des subventions en direction des opérateurs et notamment leur profil croissant au cours du temps. Ce modèle est ensuite estimé. L'analyse économétrique montre que l'hypothèse consistant à supposer que les autorités ont une forte capacité d'engagement conduit à surestimer l'efficacité des firmes du secteur.
Workshop on Economic Theory
No full textImportant economic theorists such as David Martimort (Paris School of Economics), Alessandro Pavan (Northwestern University), David Rahman (University of Minnesota), Yuliy Sannikov (Princeton University), Federico Echenique (California Institute of Technology), Muhamet Yildiz (MIT) and Roland Strausz (University of Berlim) presented their work. This workshop represents a great opportunity to disseminate some of the recent developments in the field. The workshop was organized by the FGV/EPGE and sponsored by the FGV EPGE "Mestrado em Economia e Finanças Empresariais
Direct Mechanisms, Menus and Latent Contracts
No full textIn common agency games, one cannot characterize all equilibria by considering only direct mechanisms. In an attempt to overcome this difficulty, Peters [Econometrica, 2001]and Martimort and Stole [Econometrica, 2002] identified a class of indirect mechanisms (namely, menus) which are able to characterize every equilibrium. Unfortunately, menus are difficult to handle, and several methodologies have been proposed in the literature. Here, it is shown that, even if authors consider menus rather than simpler mechanisms, many equilibria described in the literature could have been characterized by direct incentive compatible mechanisms. Use of more sophisticated mechanisms was not necessary in these cases.Common Agency, Revelation Principle, Delegation Principle, Direct Mechanisms, Menus, Latent Contracts
The agency cost of internal collusion and Schumpeterian growth
No full textThis paper analyses the link between the internal organization of the firm and the growth process. We present a Schumpeterian growth model in which monopoly firms face agency costs due to collusion between managers insidethe organization. These costs affect incentives to invest and the rate of innovation in the economy. When collusion is self-enforcing, higher growth andmore creative destruction shortens in turn the time horizon of colluding agents in the organization and makes internal collusion more difficult tosustain. We analyse this two-way mechanism between growth and agency problems and show how the transaction costs of side-contracting within the firm and the growth rate of the economy are simultaneously derived
- …
