54 research outputs found
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AI and Administrative Values
No full textDavid Freeman Engstrom (Stanford Law), moderator ; Sofia Ranchordas (Groningen/LUISS/Yale ISP), Ifeoma Ajunwa (U. of North Carolina Law), Kristin Johnson (Emory Law), and Thibault Schrepel (VU Amsterdam/Stanford Law), panelists
AI and Administrative Values
No full textDavid Freeman Engstrom (Stanford Law), moderator ; Sofia Ranchordas (Groningen/LUISS/Yale ISP), Ifeoma Ajunwa (U. of North Carolina Law), Kristin Johnson (Emory Law), and Thibault Schrepel (VU Amsterdam/Stanford Law), panelists
Accessing Justice Through Technology: An Interview with Professor David Engstrom
No full textDavid Freeman Engstrom is a nationally recognized expert and award-winning scholar in civil procedure, administrative law, and constitutional law. His current work focuses on the intersection of law and artificial intelligence. He is working on a project on the effects of continuing advances in “legal tech” on the civil justice system and the governance, lawyering, and access to justice challenges posed by AI. As part of that work, he is serving on the State Bar of California’s Closing the Justice Gap Working Group, tasked with proposing reforms to foster innovative legal service delivery systems. During 2018-2020, he served as a principal advisor to the Administrative Conference of the United States on the project, Government by Algorithm: Artificial Intelligence in Federal Administrative Agencies, which garnered national media attention and remains the most comprehensive treatment of the subject to date.
At Stanford, Professor Engstrom co-directs the Stanford Center on the Legal Profession. From 2018 to 2021, he served as an Associate Dean at Stanford Law School and led an initiative charting the school’s future work around digital technology. He is a faculty affiliate at CodeX: The Stanford Center for Legal Informatics, the Regulation, Evaluation, and Governance Lab (RegLab), and the Stanford Institute for Human-Centered AI, where he also chairs the Technology Policy Governance committee.
Beyond teaching and research, Engstrom has served as counsel or consultant to a wide range of public and private entities and is a frequent amicus before the U.S. Supreme Court. He is an elected member of the American Law Institute and a faculty affiliate at the Stanford Human-Centered AI Initiative and at CodeX: The Stanford Center for Legal Informatics. He holds a J.D. from Stanford Law School, an M.Sc. from Oxford University, and a Ph.D. from Yale University
Jacobins at Justice: The (Failed) Class Action Revolution of 1978 and the Puzzle of American Procedural Economy
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Legal tech and the future of civil justice /
No full textNew digital technologies, from AI-fired 'legal tech' tools to virtual proceedings, are transforming the legal system. But much of the debate surrounding legal tech has zoomed out to a nebulous future of 'robo-judges' and 'robo-lawyers.' This volume is an antidote. Zeroing in on the near- to medium-term, it provides a concrete, empirically minded synthesis of the impact of new digital technologies on litigation and access to justice. How far and fast can legal tech advance given regulatory, organizational, and technological constraints? How will new technologies affect lawyers and litigants, and how should procedural rules adapt? How can technology expand - or curtail - access to justice? And how must judicial administration change to promote healthy technological development and open courthouse doors for all? By engaging these essential questions, this volume helps to map the opportunities and the perils of a rapidly digitizing legal system - and provides grounded advice for a sensible path forward. This book is available as Open Access on Cambridge Core
Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: Empirical Analysis of DOJ Oversight of Qui Tam Litigation Under the False Claims Act
No full textIn recent years, a growing chorus of commentators has called on Congress to vest agencies with litigation “gatekeeper” authority across a range of regulatory areas, from civil rights and antitrust to financial and securities regulation. Agencies, it is said, can rationalize private enforcement regimes through the power to evaluate lawsuits on a case-bycase basis, blocking bad cases, aiding good ones, and otherwise husbanding private enforcement capacity in ways that conserve scarce public resources for other uses. Yet there exists strikingly little theory or evidence on how agency gatekeeper authority might work in practice. This Article begins to fill that gap by offering the first systematic study of an often invoked but little studied example: Department of Justice (DOJ) oversight of qui tam litigation brought pursuant to the False Claims Act (FCA). Using an original dataset encompassing some 4000 qui tam lawsuits filed between 1986 and 2011, this Article offers evidence on numerous issues that have occupied recent judicial, scholarly, and popular debate, including the extent to which DOJ utilizes its various oversight tools, the mix of factors that drives DOJ intervention decisions, and whether DOJ’s seemingly powerful impact on case outcomes can be ascribed to its merits-screening or meritsmaking role. The analysis mostly rejects heated claims that DOJ decisionmaking has a partisan political cast or is unconnected to case merit. At the same time, however, it uncovers substantial evidence that DOJ makes case decisions strategically, separate and apart from pure merits considerations, in response to simple resource constraints, judicial threats to its ability to police collusive relator–defendant settlements, and the identity (and corporate power) of the defendant. These findings have important implications for judicial evaluation of qui tam suits as well as leading FCA reform proposals. More broadly, the analysis opens up new theoretical and empirical avenues for thinking about optimal regulatory design at the border of litigation and administration, with applications well beyond the FCA
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