56 research outputs found
O CONSEQUENCIALISMO KANTIANO DE DAVID CUMMISKEY NA FÓRMULA DA LEI UNIVERSAL : uma análise das divergências epistemológicas da ética consequencialista e da ética kantiana
This article aims to reproduce David Cummiskey’s first argument in Kantian Consequentialism, and then make a critical evaluation of it. This evaluation is made through two objections which resort to Kantian epistemology: the first objection demonstrates that the imperative provided by Cummiskey appeals to the empiric; the second explains the condition present in the presupposition of that imperative. This second objection bifurcates into two arguments: the first is against moral intuitions, and the second is a hypothetical counterexample. In this sense, examples and thought experiments are used throughout the text as complementary arguments. It follows that the attempt of a Kantian consequentialism is in fundamental opposition to its epistemology and, thus, must be rejected.Neste artigo, busca-se reproduzir o primeiro argumento de David Cummiskey em Kantian Consequantialism e, em seguida, realizar uma avaliação crítica dele. Tal avaliação é realizada através de duas objeções que recorrem à epistemologia kantiana: a primeira objeção demonstra que o imperativo fornecido pelo autor recorre à empiria; a segunda explicita a condição contida no pressuposto do imperativo. Esta segunda objeção bifurca-se em dois argumentos: o primeiro é contra as intuições morais, e o segundo figura como um contraexemplo hipotético. Nesse sentido, exemplos e experimentos mentais são utilizados ao longo do texto como argumentos complementares. Conclui-se que a tentativa de um consequencialismo kantiano está em fundamental oposição com sua epistemologia e, portanto, deve ser rejeitada
Reconsidering David Cummiskey's 'Kantian Consequentialism'
En este trabajo hemos tratado de evaluar el ‘consecuencialismo kantiano’ quedefiende David Cummiskey. La inspiración kantiana de esta particular lectura esinnegable. Parte de una teoría del valor moral muy semejante a la del filósofo deKönigsberg, trata muchas de las cuestiones textuales de las principales obraskantianas pero llega a conclusiones radicalmente distintas. En esto último radica elprincipal atractivo de una interpretación consecuencialista de Kant. Mientras queuno podría sugerir que la tradición leyó incorrectamente a Kant y que laperspectiva de Cummiskey es la mejor reconstrucción del pensamiento de estefilósofo, hay elementos para poner esto en duda.In this paper we asses the 'kantian consequentialism' defended by David Cummiskey. The kantian scent of this particular reading is undeniable. While it starts from a theory of value very similar to that of the philosopher from Königsberg and incorporates many of the textual elements of the kantian work, it arrives at radically different conclusions. In this last fact, we posit, it is to be found the main interest in a consequentialist reading of Kant. Ultimately, even though one could suggest that the tradition has read Kant poorly and that Cummiskey's interpretation is the best reconstruction of Kant's work, there are elements to assert it is not.Fil: Oliveira, Martín. Centro de Investigaciones Filosóficas. Instituto de Filosofía "Ezequiel de Olaso" - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Ciudad Universitaria. Instituto de Filosofía "Ezequiel de Olaso"; Argentin
Kant and Consequentialism (Reflections on Cummiskey’s Kantian Consequentialism)
In his article, the author considers possible forms of relationship between
Kant’s ethics and consequentialism. In this context, he analyses David
Cummiskey’s views which are expressed in his book, Kantian Consequentialism
(1996). He demonstrates the possibility of justifying the consequentialism on
the basis of Kant’s ethics and its values. Likewise, several other authors (such
as Scott Forschler, Philipp Stratton-Lake, Michael Ridge) are of the opinion of
the possible compatibility of Kant’s ethics and consequentialism. On the other
hand, however, Christine M. Korsgaard is an example of a strict rejection of the
similarity between Kant and the consequentialist ethics. The author based on
the ethics of social consequences as a form of non-utilitarian consequentialism
claims (like Cummiskey), that there are similarities between Kant’s ethics
and consequentialism. Unlike Cummiskey, however, he sees similarity in the
Kant’s formula of humanity and the understanding of humanity in ethics of social
consequences, especially in the form of additional moral value
Kant and Consequentialism (Reflections on Cummiskey’s Kantian Consequentialism)
In his article, the author considers possible forms of relationship between
Kant’s ethics and consequentialism. In this context, he analyses David
Cummiskey’s views which are expressed in his book, Kantian Consequentialism
(1996). He demonstrates the possibility of justifying the consequentialism on
the basis of Kant’s ethics and its values. Likewise, several other authors (such
as Scott Forschler, Philipp Stratton-Lake, Michael Ridge) are of the opinion of
the possible compatibility of Kant’s ethics and consequentialism. On the other
hand, however, Christine M. Korsgaard is an example of a strict rejection of the
similarity between Kant and the consequentialist ethics. The author based on
the ethics of social consequences as a form of non-utilitarian consequentialism
claims (like Cummiskey), that there are similarities between Kant’s ethics
and consequentialism. Unlike Cummiskey, however, he sees similarity in the
Kant’s formula of humanity and the understanding of humanity in ethics of social
consequences, especially in the form of additional moral value
Joseph Mendola, Goodness and Justice: A Consequentialist Moral Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. ix + 326.
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