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Dascal, Marcelo. Interpretaçao e compreençao
No full textDascal, Marcelo. Interpretaçao e compreençao, trad. Márcia Heloisa Lima da Rocha, supervisada por el autor. São Paulo: Ed. Unisinos, 2005
The Malthus-Ricardo Correspondence: Sequential structure, argumentative patterns, and rationality
No full textAlthough the controversy between Malthus and Ricardo has long been considered to be an important source for the history of economic thought, it has hardly been the object of a careful study qua controversy, i.e. as a polemical dialogical exchange. We have undertaken to fill this gap, within the framework of a more ambitious project that places controversies at the center of an account of the history of ideas, in science and elsewhere. It is our contention that the dialogical co-text is essential for reconstructing the meaning and the evolution of science. In the present paper we try to substantiate this contention by means of a pragma-rhetorical study of this particular controversy. First, we reconstruct, through an analysis of a chunk of the correspondence, a micro-level of specific moves and countermoves which constitute a sequential structure within which also meta-scientific and meta-controversial considerations play a role. We then move to a macro-level of analysis, looking for recurrent patterns of argumentation. Finally, we draw epistemological conclusions on the nature of rationality and progress as manifested in actual scientific controversies
The Unitarian Connection and Ricardo's Scientific Style
Full text linkWe reply to Philippe Depoortère’s paper “On Ricardo’s method: The Unitarian influence examined. Some comments on Cremaschi and Dascal’s article ‘Malthus and Ricardo on Economic Methodology’”. Depoortère asks two questions: (1) was Ricardo’s ‘conversion’ to Unitarianism sincere? (2) did Ricardo follow the methodologies of Priestley and Belsham? His answers are that he was a ‘religious skeptic’ and he was not an ‘empiricist’ like Priestley and Belsham. We reply that the sincerity of Ricardo’s religious beliefs is irrelevant since we start with the evidence that he was exposed for a long time to the intellectual influence of Belsham, primarily in matters of philosophy, and to deny this would imply a negative answer to a different question, namely, did Ricardo attend Unitarian meetings for 15 years? Then we reply that Ricardo inherited Belsham’s version of Newtonian methodology which omitted the fourth rule, that is the most anti-Cartesian and anti-systematic rule, and this has little to do with empiricism but instead with apriorism
Persuasion and Argument in the Malthus-Ricardo Correspondence
Full text linkWe reconstruct the text, that is, we analyse the development of the discussion between Malthus and Ricardo both in the correspondence and in published works, paying special attention to (a) the use of methodological statements, (b) some pragmatic features of the controversy, (c) considerations pertaining to the meta-level of the controversy (assessments of the status of the controversy, of ways of solving it, etc.); then, we reconstruct the co-text, that is, unpublished papers by each opponent that were not made available to the other, records of exchanges between each of these and third parties, etc.; thirdly, we describe the essential features of the context, focusing on events that influenced the course of the controversy; (iv) we draw lessons from our case study on the role of co-text and context, on pragmatic and semantic interpretation, and on "casts of mind”
Can Wittgenstein help free the mind from rules? The philosophical foundations of connectionism
No full textThe question whether the construct 'rule' is essential or not for cognition is one of the main divisions between connectionist and rival approaches in cognitive science. In this paper, the philosophical significance of this division is examined, and its implications for cognitive research, in the light of several possible interpretations of Wittgenstein's paradox of following a rule are considered. The conclusion is that the rejection of rules by connectionism makes it philosophically incompatible with the symbolic rule-governed approach; however, the rejection of rules does not necessarily lead, on its own, to a single way of conceptualizing the mind and its place in nature. Wittgenstein's notions of 'form of life' and 'language games' are used as an aid in forming the philosophical foundations of connectionism
Language and reason in Kant's epistemology
No full textabstract : This is a reply to Lia Formigari 's doubts about the main thesis argued for in my previous papers-namely, the claim that language plays an important role in Kant's epistemology. In the present paper, I discuss Formigari' s objection, and add further evidence in support of my thesis. By contrasting Kant's statements on language in the first and second editions of the Critique of Pure Reason, I argue that their very inconsistence shows that Kant was aware of role of language in his transcendental enterprise, but refrained from developing an account of this role, presumably out of concern for the damaging consequences it might have had for the alleged purity of 'pure Reason'.résumé : Nous répondons ici aux doutes de Lia Formigari au sujet de la thèse que nous avions défendue sur l'important rôle du langage dans l'épistémologie kantienne. Outre la discussion de l'objection de Lia Formigari, nous ajoutons ici d'autres arguments en faveur de notre thèse. En contrastant les affirmations sur le langage dans la première et deuxième éditions de la Critique de la Raison Pure, nous montrons que leur inconsistance logique même indique que Kant était conscient du rôle du langage dans son entreprise transcendentale, mais qu'il n'a pas développé une explication de ce rôle, probablement à cause des conséquences dangereuses que cela aurait eu pour la 'pureté' de la Raison.Senderowicz Yaron, Dascal Marcelo. Language and reason in Kant's epistemology. In: Histoire Épistémologie Langage, tome 19, fascicule 1, 1997. Construction des théories du son [Première partie] pp. 135-148
O LUGAR DA PRAGMATICA NA TEORIA DA LINGUAGEM
No full textThe author discusses the inclusion of a pragmatic component in the theory of language.The nature of pragmatics and its relation to semiotics are considered, followed by ananalysis of triadic relations in the signs ad the influence of context in the evaluationof utterances (relationship between semantics and pragmatics). The position of pragmaticsin relation to the langue/parole and competence/performance dichotomies isconsidered, and recent attempts towards the definition of the scope of pragmaticsare analyzed in detail
Interpretaçao e compreençao
Full text linkTrad. Márcia Heloisa Lima da Rocha, supervisada por el autor. São Paulo: Ed. Unisinos, 2005. 729 p
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