828 research outputs found
Algorithm-driven information gatekeepers: Conflicts of interest in the digital platform business models
No full textThis chapter explores the increasing adoption of platform business models in the banking and financial sector. Digital platforms operate in two-sided markets where they deal with both users of content and commercial customers that have diverging interests. This study examines how the law and regulation shall apprehend the related issue of conflicts of interest. It is argued that digital platforms perform a gatekeeping function by playing a role as information intermediaries. Challenges are posed to corporate governance. Amending the legal and regulatory framework is necessary to the extent that existing mechanisms fail to protect important stakeholders that are beneficiaries of information
Conclusion to Data Governance in AI, FinTech and LegalTech: Law and Regulation in the Financial Sector
No full textRegulating credit rating agencies /
No full text'Aline Darbellay analyzes the obvious system relevance of credit rating agencies in depth and assesses the possible options for regulatory responses to this systemic issue. Thereby, the book is based on a fruitful comparative legal approach and formulates guidance principles for regulators, particularly addressing alternatives for restoring competition in the credit rating industry.' - Rolf Weber, The University of Zurich, Switzerland. This highly topical book examines how the leading credit rating agencies - Moody's, Standard & Poor's and Fitch - have risen to prominence in the wake of the financial crisis. It investigates how the Big Three have become ever more profitable even though the quality of their ratings has declined and rating scandals have tarnished their reputation. After a century of being left quasi-unregulated the rating industry is now subject to sweeping reforms. This informative study analyzes the post-crisis overhaul in the United States and the European Union. The focus lies on the interactions between regulatory intervention and competitive incentives among the Big Three. This book highlights the challenges faced by policymakers trying to regulate the rating industry and simultaneously decrease over-reliance on ratings. Regulating Credit Rating Agencies will appeal to academics in law and economics, practitioners, policymakers, lawmakers and regulators
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Regulating credit rating agencies /
No full text'Aline Darbellay analyzes the obvious system relevance of credit rating agencies in depth and assesses the possible options for regulatory responses to this systemic issue. Thereby, the book is based on a fruitful comparative legal approach and formulates guidance principles for regulators, particularly addressing alternatives for restoring competition in the credit rating industry.' - Rolf Weber, The University of Zurich, Switzerland. This highly topical book examines how the leading credit rating agencies - Moody's, Standard & Poor's and Fitch - have risen to prominence in the wake of the financial crisis. It investigates how the Big Three have become ever more profitable even though the quality of their ratings has declined and rating scandals have tarnished their reputation. After a century of being left quasi-unregulated the rating industry is now subject to sweeping reforms. This informative study analyzes the post-crisis overhaul in the United States and the European Union. The focus lies on the interactions between regulatory intervention and competitive incentives among the Big Three. This book highlights the challenges faced by policymakers trying to regulate the rating industry and simultaneously decrease over-reliance on ratings. Regulating Credit Rating Agencies will appeal to academics in law and economics, practitioners, policymakers, lawmakers and regulators
Data production by market infrastructures and AI developments
No full textFinancial market infrastructures, including stock exchanges and other trading platforms, produce and distribute large parts of data needed by the financial community. Such data may refer to trading activity, to listed companies as well as to indexes and benchmarks widely adopted by investors. The demand for these data is rapidly soaring, thanks also to the development of AI financial applications. This chapter shed light on how data are produced and distributed, which limitations and privacy rules apply, how their ownership is regulated, what kind of pricing policies are applied and how the access is guaranteed to different types of market players. The final aim is to deepen the understanding of the economics of data production and vending in the light of AI developments, their potential opportunities and drawbacks
Agences de notation et conflits d’intérêts
Full text linkCredit Rating Agencies and Conflicts of Interest.
While the creation of the credit rating industry traces back to the beginning of the twentieth century, conflicts of interest have emerged particularly since the 1970s, and they escalated in the run-up to the subprime mortgage crisis. In the 1970s, the leading credit rating agencies shifted from an investor-pays to an issuer-pays business model, i. e. issuers that were willing to be rated started to hire the agencies. This shift has been best explained by the quasi-regulatory role given to the leading agencies by regulators in the United States and later worldwide. Consequently, the leading credit rating agencies Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s and Fitch have become increasingly profitable. However, numerous rating scandals during the recent financial crisis highlighted the fact that credit ratings have in fact little informational value as compared to the significant revenues they generate. This paradoxal situation gives rise to concern about the lack of regulatory oversight in the credit rating industry and the need of monitoring conflicts of interest. In the United States, the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 partly addresses these concerns in its credit rating agency reform.
Classification JEL : G01, G24, G28.Alors que la création des agences de notation financière remonte au début du XX e siècle, le problème des conflits d’intérêts a tout particulièrement émergé dans les années 1970, et s’est intensifié à l’aube de la crise des subprimes. Dans les années 1970, les principales agences de notation sont passées du modèle de l’investisseur-payeur au modèle de l’émetteur-payeur, c’est-à-dire que les émetteurs voulant être notés ont commencé à avoir recours aux services de ces agences. Ce changement s’explique essentiellement par le rôle de quasi-régulateur donné aux agences aux États-Unis, et plus tard, au niveau international. Par conséquent, les principales agences de notation Moody’s, Standard& Poor’s et Fitch sont devenues de plus en plus rentables. Cependant, au cours de la crise financière, de nombreux scandales ont dénoncé le fait que les notations de crédit ont peu de qualité informative par rapport aux revenus substantiels qu’elles génèrent. Cette situation paradoxale attire l’attention sur le manque de surveillance des agences de notation et le besoin de contrôler et minimiser les conflits d’intérêts. Aux États-Unis, le Dodd-Frank Act de 2010 répond en partie à ces problèmes dans le cadre de sa réforme des agences de notation.
Classification JEL : G01, G24, G28.Darbellay Aline, Partnoy Frank. Agences de notation et conflits d’intérêts. In: Revue d'économie financière, n°105, 2012. La nouvelle finance américaine. pp. 309-318
Data utility and data governance in cryptocurrencies
No full textThis chapter discusses three policy goals related to information generated by the cryptocurrency network: personal autonomy, development of the digital economy, and the prevention of crime. It explains how current data protection law and privacy rights can be assessed against these goals in the context of cryptocurrency. Analysis shows how unstable coins on the public chain, stable coins on the private chain, and state-backed currency on the private chain can benefit but also create risks to the three policy goals. It also assesses whether current data protection law and privacy law are able to address and mitigate any risks. There is a political dimension in cryptocurrency at the domestic level in terms of how citizens can participate in a more democratised space. At the international level, the data location requirement has also posted political challenges due to national security laws. While regulators focus on the economics of cryptocurrency, it is international politics that will set the standards, deciding how policy goals, such as these three, are to be fulfilled, what information amounts to public good to be shared by whom and with whom, and how data protection and privacy law will set the new international or regional standards. <br/
Data utility and data governance in cryptocurrencies
No full textThis chapter discusses three policy goals related to information generated by the cryptocurrency network: personal autonomy, development of the digital economy, and the prevention of crime. It explains how current data protection law and privacy rights can be assessed against these goals in the context of cryptocurrency. Analysis shows how unstable coins on the public chain, stable coins on the private chain, and state-backed currency on the private chain can benefit but also create risks to the three policy goals. It also assesses whether current data protection law and privacy law are able to address and mitigate any risks. There is a political dimension in cryptocurrency at the domestic level in terms of how citizens can participate in a more democratised space. At the international level, the data location requirement has also posted political challenges due to national security laws. While regulators focus on the economics of cryptocurrency, it is international politics that will set the standards, deciding how policy goals, such as these three, are to be fulfilled, what information amounts to public good to be shared by whom and with whom, and how data protection and privacy law will set the new international or regional standards. <br/
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