291 research outputs found
NA62 cavern and sub-detectors 2017
No full textThe NA62 cavern, with the completed detector, during breaks in data taking in July 2017. Pictures from 05-07-17 by Dan Protopopescu and pictures from 08-07-17 by Connor Graham (Both Glasgow-affiliated). Includes pictures of the whole experiment, safety systems and sub-detector elements
Nash Equilibrium Strategies in Discrete-Time Finite-Horizon Dynamic Games with Risk-and Effort-Averse Players
No full textThe objective of this paper is to re-examine the risk-and effort attitude in the context of strategic dynamic interactions stated as a discrete-time finite-horizon Nash game. The analysis is based on the assumption that players are endogenously risk-and effort-averse. Each player is characterized by distinct risk-and effort-aversion types that are unknown to his opponent. The goal of the game is the optimal risk-and effort-sharing between the players. It generally depends on the individual strategies adopted and, implicitly, on the the players' types or characteristics.Dynamic Nash game, optimal path, closed-loop control, endogenous risk-and effort-aversion, adaptive risk-and effort management, optimal risk-and effort-sharing.
Improving the Effort Concept: A Revision of the Traditional Approach in the Context of Controlled Dynamic Stochastic Environments
No full textThe objective of this paper is to re-evaluate the attitude to effort of a risk-averse decision- maker in an evolving environment. In the classical analysis, the space of efforts is generally discretized. More realistic, this new approach employes a continuum of effort levels. The pres- ence of multiple possible efforts and performance levels provide a better basis for explaining real economic phenomena. In the context of a principal-agent relationship, not only the incentives of the Principal can determine the private agent to exert a good effort, but also the evolution of the dynamic system. The dynamic incentives can be ineffective when the environment does not sufficiently incite the agent to allocate effort. This possible scenario explains why some efficient strategic incentive-compatible constraints that cover the entire period of contract do not generally exist. The proposed approach offers an elegant study of the close relationship between behavior, attitude and effort allocation.Rational decision-maker, endogenous dynamic learning, adaptive effort management, optimal effort threshold, effort aversion, excessive effort behavior.
Optimal Feedback Control Rules Sensitive to Controlled Endogenous Risk-Aversion
No full textThe objective of this paper is to correct and improve the results obtained by Van der Ploeg (1984a, 1984b) and utilized in the literature related to feedback stochastic optimal control sensitive to constant exogenous risk-aversion (Karp 1987; Whittle 1989, 1990; Chow 1993, amongst others). More realistic, the proposed approach deals with endoge- nous risks that are under the control of the decision-maker. It has strong implications on the policy decisions adopted by the decision-maker during the entire planning horizon.Controlled stochastic environment, rational decision-maker, adaptive control, optimal path, feedback optimal strategy, endogenous risk-aversion, dynamic active learning.Controlled stochastic environment, rational decision-maker, adaptive control, optimal path, feedback optimal strategy, endogenous risk-aversion, dynamic active learning.
How Should Research Performance Be Measured? A Study of Swedish Economists
No full textBillions of euros are allocated every year to university research. Increased specialisation and international integration of research and researchers has sharply raised the need for comparisons of performance across fields, institutions and individual researchers. However, there is still no consensus regarding how such rankings should be conducted and what output measures are appropriate to use. We rank all full professors in a particular discipline, economics, in one European nation using seven established, and some of them commonly used, measures of research performance. Our examination shows both that the rank order can vary greatly across measures, and that depending on the measure used the distribution of total research out-put is valued very differently. The renowned KMS measure in economics stands out among the measures analysed here. It exhibits the weakest correlation with the others used in our study. We conclude by giving advice to funding councils and others assessing research quality on how to think about the use of both quantitative and qualitative measures of performance.Impact of research; Ranking; Research productivity; Bibliometrics; Impact Factor
How Should Research Performance be Measured? A Study of Swedish Economists
No full textBillions of dollars are allocated every year to university research. Increased specialisation and international integration of research and researchers has sharply raised the need for comparisons of performance across fields, institutions and individual researchers. However, there is still no consensus regarding how such rankings should be conducted and what output measures are appropriate to use. We rank all full professors in a particular discipline, economics, in one country using seven established, and some of them commonly used, meas-ures of research performance. Our examination shows both that the rank order can vary greatly across measures, and that depending on the measure used the distribution of total research output is valued very differently.Impact of Research; Ranking; Research Output; Research Productivity; Bibliometrics; Google Scholar; h-index; Impact Factor; SSCI
Improving the Risk Concept: A Revision of Arrow-Pratt Theory in the Context of Controlled Dynamic Stochastic Environments
No full textIn the literature on risk, one generally assume that uncertainty is uniformly distributed over the entire working horizon, when the absolute risk-aversion index is negative and constant. From this perspective, the risk is totally exogenous, and thus independent of endogenous risks. The traditional measures of risk-aversion are generally too weak for making comparisons between risky situations. This can be highlighted in concrete problems in finance and insurance, context for which the Arrow-Pratt measures of risk-aversion give ambiguous results (Ross 1981). We improve the Arrow-Pratt approach (1964, 1971a, 1971b), which takes into account only attitudes towards small exogenous risks, by integrating in the analysis potentially high endogenous risks that are under the control of the agent. Based on multiple theoretical and empirical arguments, this new approach offers an elegant study of the close relationship between behavior, attitude and perceived risk.Endogenous risk-aversion, adaptive risk management, optimal risk-aversion threshold, excessive risk-averse behavior, risk perception, changing risk behavior.
Nash Equilibrium Strategies in Discrete-Time Finite-Horizon Dynamic Games with Risk-and Effort-Averse Players
No full textJEL classification: C71; C73; D81; D82The objective of this paper is to re-examine the risk-and effort attitude in the context of strategic dynamic interactions stated as a discrete-time finite-horizon Nash game. The analysis is based on the assumption that players are endogenously risk-and effort-averse. Each player is characterized by distinct risk-and effort-aversion types that are unknown to his opponent. The goal of the game is the optimal risk-and effort-sharing between the players. It generally depends on the individual strategies adopted and, implicitly, on the the players' types or characteristics.MEC PTA-2003-02-00877 y FEDERPeer reviewe
Optimal Feedback Control Rules Sensitive to Controlled Endogenous Risk-Aversion
No full text42 p.The objective of this paper is to correct and improve the results obtained by Van der Ploeg (1984a, 1984b) and utilized in the theoretical literature related to feedback stochastic optimal control sensitive to constant exogenous risk-aversion (see, Jacobson, 1973, Karp, 1987 and Whittle, 1981, 1989, 1990, among others) or to the classic context of risk-neutral decision-makers (see, Chow, 1973, 1976a, 1976b, 1977, 1978, 1981, 1993). More realistic and attractive, this new approach is placed in the context of a time-varying endogenous risk-aversion which is under the control of the decision-maker. It has strong qualitative implications on the agent's optimal policy during the entire planning horizon
Improving the Risk Concept: A Revision of Arrow-Pratt Theory in the Context of Controlled Dynamic Stochastic Environments
No full textSubmitted for publication to 'The Economic Journal'.In the literature on risk, one generally assume that uncertainty is uniformly distributed over the entire working horizon, when the absolute risk-aversion index is negative and constant. From this perspective, the risk is totally exogenous, and thus independent of endogenous risks. The classic procedure is "myopic" with regard to potential changes in the future behavior of the agent due to inherent random fluctuations of the system. The agent's attitude to risk is rigid. Although often criticized, the most widely used hypothesis for the analysis of economic behavior is risk-neutrality. This borderline case must be envisaged with prudence in a dynamic stochastic context. The traditional measures of risk-aversion are generally too weak for making comparisons between risky situations, given the dynamic complexity of the environment. This can be highlighted in concrete problems in finance and insurance, context for which the Arrow-Pratt measures (in the small) give ambiguous results (see Ross, 1981).This article is based on research undertaken with support from the European Community's PHARE ACE Programme 1998 under grant P98-2103-S.Peer reviewe
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