1,720,997 research outputs found
Culpepper, Pepper D., Hall, A. Peter, Palier, Bruno (dir.), La France en mutation, 1980-2005
No full textDupuy Claire, Pollard Julie. Culpepper, Pepper D., Hall, A. Peter, Palier, Bruno (dir.), La France en mutation, 1980-2005. In: Politiques et management public, vol. 24, n° 4, 2006. L'action publique au risque du client ? Client-centrisme et citoyenneté. Actes du quinzième Colloque international - Lille, jeudi 16 mars et vendredi 17 mars 2006 organisé en collaboration avec Sciences-Po Lille - Tome 2. pp. 160-165
Structural power and the study of business
No full textTo promote a unified conversation between international and comparative political economy, structural power is best conceptualized as a set of mutual dependencies between business and the state. A new generation of structural power research is more attentive to how the structure of capitalism creates opportunities for some companies (but not others) vis-à-vis the state, and the ways in which that structure creates leverage for some states (but not others) to play off companies against each other.-- Pepper D. Culpepper, Structural power and political science in the post-crisis era 391
-- Tasha Fairfield, Structural power in comparative political economy: perspectives from policy formulation in Latin America 411
-- Kevin Young, Not by structure alone: power, prominence, and agency in American finance 443
-- Patrick Emmenegger, The Long Arm of Justice: U.S. Structural Power and International Banking 473
-- William Kindred Winecoff, Structural power and the global financial crisis: a network analytical approach 495
-- Henry Farrell and Abraham L. Newman, Structuring power: business and authority beyond the nation state 527
-- Rawi Abdelal, The multinational firm and geopolitics: Europe, Russian energy, and power 553
-- David Marsh, Sadiya Akram and Holly Birkett, The structural power of business: taking structure, agency and ideas seriously 57
The Sources of Policy Innovation: Sub-National Constraints on Negotiated Reform
No full textThis paper argues that the principal avenue of policy innovation in the areas of economic and social policy in the advanced industrial countries is a function of the sub-national capacity of interest organizations. In policy areas where these organizations exercise high deliberative capacity, they have access to private information which allows them to be the most likely authors of reforms which many of their members may oppose. They also enjoy a capacity to mobilize their members around policy proposals, using both grassroots organizational strength and considerations of legitimacy, to convince their members to support (or not to obstruct) the reform. In policy areas in which groups possess these organizational strengths, then, the groups themselves (rather than political parties or bureaucrats) will be the most likely source of policy innovation. Where groups lack this capacity, the political system rather than interest groups will be the most likely source of policy innovation. This argument is supported by evidence from recent episodes of pension reform in Italy and France and of vocational training finance reform in Germany and France.
The Politics of Common Knowledge: Ideas and Institutional Change in Wage Bargaining
No full textDomestic economic institutions change through processes of conflict and bargaining. Why do the strongest groups in such conflicts ever change their minds about the acceptability of institutional arrangements they once opposed? Drawing on the cases of Ireland in 1986–87 and Italy in 1989–93, this article demonstrates how the process of common knowledge creation between employers and unions changed the course of negotiations over national wage bargaining institutions. Common knowledge creation happens when existing institutions are in crisis. The institutional experimentation that follows such crises, characterized by deep uncertainty, places a premium on persuasive argument. The ideas most likely to serve as the basis for newly common knowledge will have analytical and distributive appeal to both unions and employers, and they must be ratified in public agreements, which I call common knowledge events. Common knowledge events establish new social facts, which can change the payoffs associated with different institutional outcomes. This can lead even powerful actors to accept institutions they had previously opposed
Institutional Change in Contemporary Capitalism: Coordinated Financial Systems since 1990
No full textWhat happens when the unstoppable force of liberalization collides with the immovable object of national financial institutions in the advanced industrial democracies? To answer this question and evaluate alternative mechanisms to explain institutional change, this article examines the cases of the three large European economies with concentrated share ownership—France, Germany, and Italy. In the formal legal mechanism, interest coalitions adopt new laws, leading actors to deviate from formerly stable patterns of behavior in shareholding. In the joint belief shift mechanism, collective actors use a triggering event to jointly reevaluate their views of how the world works and thus how their interests can best be pursued. Using the metric of patient capital, this article shows that institutional change took place in France but not in Germany or Italy, despite the fact that Germany and Italy experienced significant regulatory change in the area of corporate governance while France did not. This evidence fits joint belief shift and is inconsistent with the formal legal mechanism. It is likely that the importance of the two mechanisms of institutional change depends on the degree of strategic interdependence among institutional actors: where it is high, the joint belief shift mechanism is likely to precipitate change; and where it is low, the formal legal mechanism is likely to precipitate change
The economic footprint of its banks helped the U.S. to have a better bank bailout than the UK
No full textIn 2008 politicians in the UK and the U.S. put in place massive bailout programs worth billions of dollars to save their ailing financial institutions. Six years on, U.S. taxpayers have made nearly 14 billion. Pepper D. Culpepper writes that this difference is down to a combination of regulatory power and policy design. Regulators in the U.S. were able to require even those banks that were financially fit to accept money in exchange for stock because those banks earned the majority of their revenue locally. UK regulators on the other hand, were constrained by the vast market power of HSBC, which has only 20 percent of its business in the country, meaning that the bank was able to reject proposals that it take public money
Structural power and political science in the post-crisis era
Get PDFPublished Online: 22/08/2015This essay highlights productive ways in which scholars have reanimated the concept of structural power to explain puzzles in international and comparative politics. Past comparative scholarship stressed the dependence of the state on holders of capital, but it struggled to reconcile this supposed dependence with the frequent losses of business in political battles. International relation (IR) scholars were attentive to the power of large states, but mainstream IR neglected the ways in which the structure of global capitalism makes large companies international political players in their own right. To promote a unified conversation between international and comparative political economy, structural power is best conceptualized as a set of mutual dependencies between business and the state. A new generation of structural power research is more attentive to how the structure of capitalism creates opportunities for some companies (but not others) vis-à-vis the state, and the ways in which that structure creates leverage for some states (but not others) to play off companies against each other. Future research is likely to put agents – both states and large firms – in the foreground as political actors, rather than showing how the structure of capitalism advantages all business actors in the same way against non-business actors
Quiet Politics and Business Power: Corporate Control in Europe and Japan
No full textProfessor Pepper D. Culpepper, EUI, Department of Political and Social Sciences, was awarded the 2012 Stein Rokkan Prize in Comparative Social Science Research, for his work ‘Quiet Politics and Business Power: Corporate Control in Europe and Japan’.Does democracy control business, or does business control democracy? This study of how companies are bought and sold in four countries – France, Germany, Japan and the Netherlands – explores this fundamental question. It does so by examining variation in the rules of corporate control – specifically, whether hostile takeovers are allowed. Takeovers have high political stakes: they result in corporate reorganizations, layoffs and the unraveling of compromises between workers and managers. But the public rarely pays attention to issues of corporate control. As a result, political parties and legislatures are largely absent from this domain. Instead, organized managers get to make the rules, quietly drawing on their superior lobbying capacity and the deference of legislators. These tools, not campaign donations, are the true founts of managerial political influence.Tables and Figures
Abbreviations
Preface
1 Corporate Control and Political Salience
2 Patient Capital and Markets for Corporate Control
3 The Managerial Origins of Institutional Divergence in France and Germany
4 The Netherlands and the Myth of the Corporatist Coalition
5 Managers, Bureaucrats, and Institutional Change in Japan
6 The Noisy Politics of Executive Pay
7 Business Power and Democratic Politics
Bibliography
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Institutional Rules, Social Capacity, and the Stuff of Politics: Experiments in Collaborative Governance in France and Italy
No full textWhen are decentralized public institutions most likely to succeed in promoting effective public good provision or the emergence of local cooperation? Two influential literatures in political science, those on "empowered participatory governance" and on "market-preserving federalism," both emphasize that getting the rules right is the decisive factor in determining the success of decentralized public institutions. Yet their emphasis on institutional rules obscures the fact that the predatory politicians and adversarial organizations that the two literatures design rules to contain also represent the two factors that are most likely to influence the success or failure of these institutions. Through an examination of recent French and Italian experiments in decentralized collaborative governance, this article argues that the social capacities of secondary associations and the ties between local and central politicians are in fact the principal determinants of how well decentralized governance institutions function.
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