1,720,979 research outputs found

    Procedimento di protezione da attacchi informatici al veicolo e corrispondente dispositivo

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    Viene descritto un procedimento di protezione da attacchi informatici in una rete di comunicazione CAN (Controller Area Network) (20) di un veicolo comprendente un bus CAN (10) e una pluralità di nodi (11) associati a detto bus CAN (10) in rapporto di scambio di segnale e associati almeno in parte a unità di controllo di funzioni del veicolo, comprendente le operazioni di analizzare il contenuto di messaggi CAN (M) in transito fra nodi di detta pluralità di nodi (11) per identificare messaggi CAN non leciti (MF), bloccare (B1, B2) detti messaggi non leciti (MF), detta operazione di bloccare (B1, B2) comprendendo di rendere non validi (F1, F2) detti messaggi non leciti (MF) rispetto a una verifica di integrità eseguita da un controllore CAN (13) di detti nodi (11), inserendo (F1) una sequenza di bit (NV) di corruzione riconosciuta come un errore da detto controllore CAN (13), ottenendo un messaggio corrotto (MF’). Secondo la soluzione qui descritta è previsto di inserire (F1) detta sequenza di bit (NV) di corruzione in un campo di controllo integrità (S5), in particolare un campo CRC, del messaggio CAN non lecito (MF) a un tempo di bit (btj-5) il cui valore è tale da allineare temporalmente un campo separatore (ITM) del messaggio non lecito con un corrispondente campo separatore di un messaggio d’errore (EM) generato da un nodo della rete (20) che riceve detto messaggio non lecito (MF) comprendente detta sequenza di corruzione (NV). Al fine di garantire l’allineamento dei campi separatore (ITM) del messaggio non lecito (MF) e il messaggio d’errore (EM), la soluzione qui descritta prevede anche un’operazione di oscuramento (F2) atta a mascherare l’invio del/dei messaggio/i di errore (EM) e ad emulare la corretta ricezione (OR) del/dei messaggio/i non lecito/i. (Figura 6

    A Simulated Approach to Evaluate Side Channel Attack Countermeasures for the Advanced Encryption Standard

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    Modern networks have critical security needs and a suitable level of protection and performance is usually achieved with the use of dedicated hardware cryptographic cores. Although the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is considered the best approach when symmetric cryptography is required, one of its main weaknesses lies in its measurable power consumption. Side Channel Attacks (SCAs) use this emitted power to analyze and revert the mathematical steps and extract the encryption key. In this work we propose a simulated methodology based on Correlation and Differential Power Analysis. Our solution extracts the simulated power from a gate-level implementation of the AES core and elaborates it using mathematical-statistical procedures. An SCA countermeasure can then be evaluated without the need for any physical circuit. Each solution can be benchmarked during an early step of the design thereby shortening the evaluation phase and helping designers to find the best solution during a preliminary phase. The cost of our approach is lower compared to any kind of analysis that requires the silicon chip to evaluate SCA protection

    A Scalable and Configurable Architecture for Hardware Authenticated Encryption Modules Compliant with the CCSDS Security Specifications

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    Cybersecurity is one of the most challenging aspects in the modern Information and Communications Technology (ICT) era, including space applications. The Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems (CCSDS) is issuing and updating reports and standards to address this problem in the space sector. It defined the format of secure frames to protect data with different security features and the corresponding cryptographic algorithms to be applied. Among them, the Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is the only one that constitutes a comprehensive solution for the simultaneous confidentiality, integrity, and authentication of data (i.e. authenticated encryption). In this work, we present a configurable and scalable architecture for implementing hardware AES-GCM modules aimed at securing space applications compliant with the CCSDS specifications. The proposed architecture was designed using SystemVerilog and characterized in terms of trade-offs between resource utilization and maximum frequency by analyzing the implementation results on a space-grade KU060 FPGA. Indeed, the configurability at the synthesis level of the proposed architecture supports different approaches that can be exploited to find the most efficient solution for the target application. For this reason, we present two use cases for the integration of the proposed security module in a transmitter for CCSDS-compliant telemetry (TM) applications. The corresponding results confirm the adaptability of our solution in different application scenarios thanks to its configurability. In addition, they show that our module offers long-term protection in terms of classical and post-quantum security for modern space applications with a minimum resource cost of 672 Configurable Logic Blocks (CLBs), i.e. 1.6% of the FPGA resources

    Method and corresponding device for protecting vehicle from cyber attack

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    To protect a vehicle CAN communication network from cyber attacks, the network including a controller area network (CAN) bus and a plurality of nodes that relate to the CAN bus in a signal exchange relationship and at least partially relate to a unit for controlling a vehicle function.SOLUTION: A method includes the steps of: analyzing contents of a CAN message being transmitted between nodes among a plurality of nodes in order to identify an unauthorized CAN message (MF); and blocking the MF. The step of blocking disables the MF for an integrity check performed by a CAN controller of a node by inserting a corrupted bit sequence (NV) recognized as an error by the CAN controller to obtain a corrupted message (MF'

    Method for protecting a vehicle from network attacks and corresponding device

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    To protect a vehicle CAN communication network from cyber attacks, the network including a controller area network (CAN) bus and a plurality of nodes that relate to the CAN bus in a signal exchange relationship and at least partially relate to a unit for controlling a vehicle function.SOLUTION: A method includes the steps of: analyzing contents of a CAN message being transmitted between nodes among a plurality of nodes in order to identify an unauthorized CAN message (MF); and blocking the MF. The step of blocking disables the MF for an integrity check performed by a CAN controller of a node by inserting a corrupted bit sequence (NV) recognized as an error by the CAN controller to obtain a corrupted message (MF'

    Design Methodology and Metrics for Robust and Highly Qualified Security Modules in Trusted Environments

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    Cyberattacks and cybercriminal activities constitute one of the biggest threats in the modern digital era, and the frequency, efficiency, and severity of attacks have grown over the years. Designers and producers of digital systems try to counteract such issues by exploiting increasingly robust and advanced security mechanisms to provide secure execution environments aimed at preventing cyberattacks or, in the worst case, at containing intrusions by isolation. One of the most significative examples comes from General Purpose Processor (GPP) manufacturers such as Intel, AMD, and ARM, which in the last years adopted the integration of dedicated resources to provide Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) or secure zones. TEEs are built layer by layer on top of an implicitly trusted component, the Root-of-Trust (RoT). Since each security chain is only as strong as its weakest link, each element involved in the construction of a TEE starting from the RoT must be bulletproof as much as possible. In this work, we revise and propose a design methodology to implement in both hardware (HW) and software (SW) highly featured and robust security blocks by highlighting the key points that designers should take care of, and the key metrics that should be used to evaluate the security level of the developed modules. We also include an analysis of the state of the art concerning RoT-based TEEs, and we illustrate a case study that documents the implementation of a cryptographic coprocessor for the secure subsystem of the Rhea GPP from the European Processor Initiative (EPI) project, according to the presented methodology. This work can be used by HW/SW security module designers as a cutting-edge guideline

    Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis

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    The present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed

    Variations on the Author

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    “Variations on the Author” discusses two of Eduardo Coutinho’s recent films (Um Dia na Vida, from 2010, and Últimas Conversas, posthumously released in 2015) and their contribution to the general question of documentary authorship. The director’s filmography is characterized by a consistent yet self-effacing form of authorial self-inscription: Coutinho often features as an interviewer that rather than express opinions propels discourses; an interviewer that is good at listening. This mode of self-inscription characterizes him as an author who is not expressive but who is nonetheless markedly present on the screen. In Um Dia na Vida, however, Coutinho is completely absent form the image, while Últimas Conversas, on the contrary, includes a confessional prologue that moves the director from the margins to the center of his films. This article examines the ways in which these works stand out in the filmography of a director who offers new insights into the notion of cinematic authorship

    A Novel and Robust Security Approach for Authentication, Integrity, and Confidentiality of Lithium-ion Battery Management Systems

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    Battery management systems (BMSs) play a critical and crucial role in ensuring the safety and the efficiency of the batteries. The increasing BMS complexity, the expanding interconnections between batteries and applications, and the introduction of cloud-based energy storage system structures have led to growing concerns about battery cybersecurity. For instance, the data exchange between the local and remote BMS parts can be exposed to cybersecurity attacks. Classic BMSs are not equipped with security mechanisms that are instead essential to protect their integrity and reliability and prevent serious consequences such as loss of data, equipment damage, and counterfeiting of battery components. This work highlights the importance of securing BMSs against cyber threats and discusses the current state of the art of cybersecurity in BMSs. The main outcome is the proposal of a novel and robust security approach to design a BMS able to prevent misuse and undesired manipulation of battery equipment and data. The proposed design approach can be used as enabling technology to support the application to the BMSs of the most diffused security mechanisms adopted by the state of the art as cybersecurity protections
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