26 research outputs found
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[Review] Trenton Merricks (2015) Propositions
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Knowledge of logical generality and the possibility of deductive reasoning
No full textI address a type of circularity threat that arises for the view that we employ general basic logical principles in deductive reasoning. This type of threat has been used to argue that whatever knowing such principles is, it cannot be a fully cognitive or propositional state, otherwise deductive reasoning would not be possible. I look at two versions of the circularity threat and answer them in a way that both challenges the view that we need to apply general logical principles in deductive reasoning and defuses the threat to a cognitivist account of knowing basic logical principles
Logical expressivism and Carroll’s Regress
No full textIn this paper, I address a key argument in favour of logical expressivism, the view that knowing a logical principle such as Modus Ponens is not a cognitive state but a pro-attitude towards drawing certain types of conclusions from certain types of premises. The argument is that logical expressivism is the only view that can take us out of Lewis Carroll’s Regress – which suggests that elementary deductive reasoning is impossible. I show that the argument does not hold scrutiny and that logical cognitivism can be vindicated. In the course of the discussion, I draw substantially on a comparison with a similar argument in meta-ethics, for moral expressivism
Norms, reasons and reasoning: a guide through Lewis Carroll’s regress argument
No full textThis chapter concerns the connection between knowledge of a logical principle, such as Modus Ponens, and actions of reasoning with it. Contemporary discussions of this issue typically mention Lewis Carroll’s regress. There is widespread agreement that the regress shows something important about the connection between knowing logical principles and reasoning with them—and, more generally, between knowing epistemic or practical principles and actions involving them. My first aim is to address key interpretations of Carroll’s regress in order to assess its relevance to the question of how knowing logical principles connects to reasoning with them, and, more generally, of how knowing epistemic or practical principles might be action-guiding. My second aim is to show that the regress fails to establish anything of substance about such connections unless substantive, contentious, and typically undefended assumptions are made
[Review] Amirouch Moktefi and Francine F. Abeles (2016) What the tortoise said to Achilles: Lewis Carroll's Paradox of Inference
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Understanding the logical constants and dispositions to infer
No full textMany philosophers claim that understanding a logical constant (e.g. ‘if, then’) fundamentally consists in having dispositions to infer according to the logical rules (e.g. Modus Ponens) that fix its meaning. This paper argues that such dispositionalist accounts give us the wrong picture of what understanding a logical constant consists in. The objection here is that they give an account of understanding a logical constant which is inconsistent with what seem to be adequate manifestations of such understanding. I then outline an alternative account according to which understanding a logical constant is not to be understood dispositionally, but propositionally. I argue that this account is not inconsistent with intuitively correct manifestations of understanding the logical constants
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XIII - Knowing how to reason logically
No full textIn this paper, I examine Gilbert Ryle's claim that ordinary competence with logical principles or rules is a kind of knowing how, where such knowledge is understood as a skill, a multi-track disposition. Ryle argues that his account of ordinary logical competence helps avoid Lewis Carroll's famous regress argument (Carroll 1895), which suggests that elementary deductive reasoning might be impossible. Indeed, Carroll's regress is the central motivation for Ryle's account. I argue that this account is inadequate on two counts: it cannot serve to articulate the way ordinary reasoners might exercise their knowledge in reasoning and it does not do much to help us avoid Carroll's regress. I sketch an alternative view, still Rylean in spirit, that fares better on both counts.</p
Norms, reasons and reasoning: a guide through Lewis Carroll’s regress argument
No full textThis chapter concerns the connection between knowledge of a logical principle, such as Modus Ponens, and actions of reasoning with it. Contemporary discussions of this issue typically mention Lewis Carroll’s regress. There is widespread agreement that the regress shows something important about the connection between knowing logical principles and reasoning with them—and, more generally, between knowing epistemic or practical principles and actions involving them. My first aim is to address key interpretations of Carroll’s regress in order to assess its relevance to the question of how knowing logical principles connects to reasoning with them, and, more generally, of how knowing epistemic or practical principles might be action-guiding. My second aim is to show that the regress fails to establish anything of substance about such connections unless substantive, contentious, and typically undefended assumptions are made
Logical expressivism and Carroll’s Regress
No full textIn this paper, I address a key argument in favour of logical expressivism, the view that knowing a logical principle such as Modus Ponens is not a cognitive state but a pro-attitude towards drawing certain types of conclusions from certain types of premises. The argument is that logical expressivism is the only view that can take us out of Lewis Carroll’s Regress – which suggests that elementary deductive reasoning is impossible. I show that the argument does not hold scrutiny and that logical cognitivism can be vindicated. In the course of the discussion, I draw substantially on a comparison with a similar argument in meta-ethics, for moral expressivism
