1,721,125 research outputs found
Product differentiation, price discrimination and collusion
No full textThe existing literature which analyses the relationship between the product differentiation degree and the sustainability of a collusive agreement on price assumes that firms cannot price discriminate, and concludes that there is a negative relationship between the product differentiation degree and the critical discount factor. This paper, in contrast, assumes that firms are able to price discriminate. Within the Hotelling framework, three different collusive schemes are studied: optimal collusion on discriminatory prices; optimal collusion on a uniform price; collusion not to discriminate. We obtain that the critical discount factor of the first and the third collusive scheme does not depend on the product differentiation degree, while the critical discount factor of the second collusive scheme depends positively on the product differentiation degree. Moreover, we show that suboptimal collusion is more difficult to sustain than optimal collusion
Firms' symmetry and sustainability of collusion in a Hotelling duopoly
No full textWe use a differentiated duopoly a la Hotelling to assess the impact of firms symmetry on the sustainability of a tacit collusive agreement. We obtain that the smaller firm has the greater incentive to deviate and that symmetry helps collusion for any possible differentiation degree
Discriminatory prices, predation and signal-jamming in a horizontal differentiation model
No full text
Direct price discrimination in the Hotelling model: competition and collusion
No full textThis paper reviews the main contributions of literature about the effects of direct price discrimination within the Hotelling model. Moreover, we introduce an asymmetric Hotelling model and we show that the assumption of spatial asymmetry between firms is likely to alter the implications of price discrimination
Spatial Cournot competition with non-extreme directional constraints
No full textThe circular city model and the linear city model are extended to allow for asymmetric directional transportation costs. A two-stage location-then-quantity model is proposed. We show that in the circular city model maximal dispersion arises in equilibrium, while in the linear city model the unique equilibrium is represented by both firms agglomerating in a non-central point of the segment
Predation in space
No full textIn a spatial economic context, we analyse the incentive to prey of an incumbent facing the potential entrance by a rival. We show that the existence of space modifies the incentive to prey of the incumbent and the resulting equilibrium
Differentiated Bertrand markets: restoring the Minimum Differentiation Principle
No full textI introduce non-perfect substitutability between products into the spatial Bertrand model. I show that if goods are complements, the firms always agglomerate. If goods are substitutes, the firms agglomerate if the transportation costs are not too high
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