21,873 research outputs found
"The Real Thing:" Nominal Price Rigidity of the Nickel Coke, 1886-1959
No full textWe report that the price of a 6.5oz Coke was 5¢ from 1886 until 1959. Thus, we are documenting a nominal price rigidity that lasted more than 70 years! The case of Coca-Cola is particularly interesting because during the 70-year period there were substantial changes in the soft drink industry as well as two World Wars, the Great Depression, and numerous regulatory interventions and lawsuits, which led to substantial changes in the Coca-Cola market conditions. The nickel price of Coke, nevertheless, remained unchanged. We find that this unusual rigidity is best explained by (1) a contract between the Company and its parent bottlers that encouraged retail price maintenance, (2) a single-coin vending machine technology, which limited the Company's price adjustment options due to limited availability and unreliability of the existing flexible price adjustment technologies, and (3) a single-coin monetary transaction technology, which limited the Company's price adjustment options due to the customer "inconvenience cost." We show that these price adjustment costs are of a different nature than the standard menu cost, and their estimates exceed the existing estimates by an order of magnitude. A possible broader relevance of the nickel Coke phenomenon is discussed in the context of Nickel and Dime Stores, which were popular in the US in the late 1800s and the early 1900s.Sticky Prices, Cost of Adjustment, Menu Cost, Retail Price Maintenance, Single-Coin Vending Machine, Customer Inconvenience Cost, Coca-Cola, Coke, Nickel Coke, Pepsi, Nickel and Dime Stores
Explicit Evidence on an Implicit Contract
No full textWe offer the first direct evidence of an implicit contract in a goods market. The evidence we offer comes from the market for Coca-Cola. We demonstrate that the Coca-Cola Company left a substantial amount of written evidence of its implicit contract with its consumers—a very explicit form of an implicit contract. The contract represented the promise of a five cent (nominal) price and adherence to the “Secret Formula”. In general, the implicit nature of such contracts makes observation difficult. To overcome this difficulty, we adopt a narrative approach. Based on the analysis of a large number of historical documents obtained from the Coca-Cola Archives and other sources, we offer evidence of the Coca-Cola Company both acknowledging and acting on this implicit contract. We also make another unique contribution by exploring quality as a margin of adjustment available to Coca-Cola. The implicit contract included a promise not only of a constant nominal price but also a constant quality (i.e., 6.5 oz. of the Secret Formula). During a period of over 70 years, we find evidence of only a single case of true quality change. By studying the margin of adjustment the Coca-Cola Company chose in response to changes in market conditions, we demonstrate that the perceived costs of breaking the implicit contract were large. We argue that one piece of direct evidence on the magnitude of these costs is the aftermath “New Coke’s” introduction in 1985.Implicit Contract, Explicit Contract, Invisible Handshake, Customer Market, Long- Term Relationship, Price Rigidity, Nickel Coke, Coca-Cola
Explicit Evidence on an Implicit Contract
No full textWe offer the first direct evidence of an implicit contract in a goods market. The evidence we offer comes from the market for Coca-Cola. We demonstrate that the Coca-Cola Company left a substantial amount of written evidence of its implicit contract with its consumers—a very explicit form of an implicit contract. In general, observing implicit contracts directly is difficult because of their implicit nature. In the case of Coca-Cola, however, we are able to document the Company not only saying that it had an important implicit contract with its consumers, but also acting on it. This study makes an additional and unique contribution by exploring quality as a margin of adjustment available to Coca-Cola. We present evidence that the implicit contract included a promise not only of a constant nominal price but also a constant quality. We document the dedication to a 6.5oz serving of the "Secret Formula." Indeed, during a period of over 70 years, we find evidence of only a single case of true quality change. By studying the margin of adjustment the Coca-Cola Company chose in response to changes in market conditions, we demonstrate that the perceived costs of breaking the implicit contract were large. In addition, we are able to offer one piece of direct evidence on the magnitude of these costs by studying the events surrounding the failed introduction of the New Coke in 1985.Implicit Contract, Explicit Contract, Invisible Handshake, Customer Market, Long-Term Relationship, Price Rigidity, Coca-Cola, Nickel Coke
Explicit Evidence on an Implicit Contract
No full textWe offer the first direct evidence of an implicit contract in a goods market. The evidence we offer comes from the market for Coca-Cola. We demonstrate that the Coca-Cola Company left a substantial amount of written evidence of its implicit contract with its consumers—a very explicit form of an implicit contract. In general, observing implicit contracts directly is difficult because of their implicit nature. To overcome the difficulty, we adopt a narrative approach. Based on the analysis of a large number of historical documents obtained from the Coca-Cola Archives and other sources, we offer evidence of the Coca-Cola Company not only saying that it had an important implicit contract with its consumers, but also acting on it. This study makes an additional and unique contribution by exploring quality as a margin of adjustment available to Coca-Cola. We present evidence that the implicit contract included a promise not only of a constant nominal price but also a constant quality. We document the dedication to a 6.5oz serving of the "Secret Formula." Indeed, during a period of over 70 years, we find evidence of only a single case of true quality change. By studying the margin of adjustment the Coca-Cola Company chose in response to changes in market conditions, we demonstrate that the perceived costs of breaking the implicit contract were large. In addition, we are able to offer one piece of direct evidence on the magnitude of these costs by studying the events surrounding the failed introduction of the New Coke in 1985.E12; E31; L14; L16; L66; M30; N80; A14
The Real Thing: Nominal Price Rigidity of the Nickel Coke, 1886–1959
No full textWe report that the price of a 6.5oz Coke was 5¢ from 1886 until 1959. Thus, we are documenting a nominal price rigidity that lasted more than 70 years! The case of Coca-Cola is particularly interesting because during the 70-year period there were substantial changes in the soft drink industry as well as two World Wars, the Great Depression, and numerous regulatory interventions and lawsuits, which led to substantial changes in the Coca-Cola market conditions. The nickel price of Coke, nevertheless, remained unchanged. We find that this unusual rigidity is best explained by (1) a contract between the Company and its parent bottlers that encouraged retail price maintenance, (2) a single-coin vending machine technology, which limited the Company’s price adjustment options due to limited availability and unreliability of the existing flexible price adjustment technologies, and (3) a single-coin monetary transaction technology, which limited the Company’s price adjustment options due to the customer “inconvenience cost.” We show that these price adjustment costs are of a different nature than the standard menu cost, and their estimates exceed the existing estimates by an order of magnitude. A possible broader relevance of the nickel Coke phenomenon is discussed in the context of Nickel and Dime Stores, which were popular in the US in the late 1800s and the early 1900s.Sticky Prices; Cost of Adjustment; Menu Cost; Retail Price Maintenance; Single-Coin Vending Machine; Customer Inconvenience Cost; Coca-Cola; Coke; Nickel Coke; Pepsi; Nickel and Dime Stores
"The Real Thing:" Nominal Price Rigidity of the Nickel Coke, 1886-1959
No full textWe report that the price of a 6.5oz Coke was 5¢ from 1886 until 1959. Thus, we are documenting a nominal price rigidity that lasted more than 70 years! The case of Coca-Cola is particularly interesting because during the 70-year period there were substantial changes in the soft drink industry as well as two World Wars, the Great Depression, and numerous regulatory interventions and lawsuits, which led to substantial changes in the Coca-Cola market conditions. The nickel price of Coke, nevertheless, remained unchanged. We find that this unusual rigidity is best explained by (1) a contract between the Company and its parent bottlers that encouraged retail price maintenance, (2) a single-coin vending machine technology, which limited the Company’s price adjustment options due to limited availability and unreliability of the existing flexible price adjustment technologies, and (3) a single-coin monetary transaction technology, which limited the Company’s price adjustment options due to the customer “inconvenience cost.” We show that these price adjustment costs are of a different nature than the standard menu cost, and their estimates exceed the existing estimates by an order of magnitude. A possible broader relevance of the nickel Coke phenomenon is discussed in the context of Nickel and Dime Stores, which were popular in the US in the late 1800s and the early 1900s.Sticky Prices, Cost of Adjustment, Menu Cost, Retail Price Maintenance, Single-Coin Vending Machine, Customer Inconvenience Cost, Coca-Cola, Coke, Nickel Coke, Pepsi, Nickel and Dime Stores
[Marx et Coca-Cola : photographies / Daniel Cande]
No full textAppartient à l’ensemble documentaire : PhoSpec
Cocaine Production and the Provision of Household Services: Evidence from Colombian Coca Farmers
No full textThis paper analyzes how coca cultivation affects the provision of basic household services in Colombia. In particular, I examine how different levels of government responded to an exogenous upsurge in coca cultivation in 1995. I use data from De- mographic Health Surveys to compare Colombian households’ access to electricity (overseen by the federal government) and water (overseen by municipal govern- ments) in coca growing areas relative to non-growing areas. I use both standard and generalized difference-in-differences models. My results indicate that after coca cultivation increased, electricity coverage increased by 7 percentage points more in coca growing departments than non-growing departments. In contrast, there were no differential trends in access to piped water between growing and non-growing departments
Determinantes sociales de la vulnerabilidad frente a los desastres en la provincia de Córdoba
No full textFil: Fernández, Alicia Ruth. Universidad Nacional de Villa María; Argentina.Fil: Coca, Silvia Mercedes. Universidad Nacional de Villa María; Argentina.Fil: Romero, Daniel. Universidad Nacional de Villa María; Argentina.Fil: Gili, Juan. Universidad Nacional de Villa María; Argentina.Fil: Burrone, María Soledad. Universidad Nacional de Villa María; Argentina.Fil: Abeldaño, Roberto Ariel. Universidad Nacional de Villa María; Argentina
Evaluación nutricional de la proteína de la hoja de coca ( Erythroxylum coca Lamarck var. Coca)
No full textSe ha estudiado el valor nutricional del contenido proteico de la hoja de coca (Erythroxylum coca Lamarck var. Coca). Para lograr éste objetivo se aislaron por precipitación a pH 5.1 y 4.0 dos fracciones proteicas de un extracto alcalino de ésta hoja preparado con una solución de “tocra” (sustancia alcalina utilizada con la coca en el hábito de su masticación).Después de una purificación parcial con solventes de extracción (éter dietílico ,acetona ,alcohol 96°) de la mezcla de ambas fracciones proteicas, se prepararon dos dietas Experimentales con diferentes niveles de proteína (FP COCA 4.5% y FP COCA 9.0%). De igual modo se prepararon dos dietas Controles a base de caseína (CAS 4.5% y CAS 9.0%). Estas dietas fueron administradas ad libitum por 10 días, a grupos de ratas (n=6-9) en desarrollo. Al término de éste periodo los animales fueron sacrificados ,determinándose los valores de los índices PER, las actividades de arginasa hepática y los pesos de los órganos y de sus contenidos proteicos. Los resultados mostraron que los índices PER fueron menores y las actividades de la arginasa hepática mayores en los animales de los grupos FP COCA ,que en los animales alimentados con caseína. En grupos mejor alimentados , FP COCA 9.0% y CAS 9.0% estos valores fueron PER:1.4 ; arginasa 63.6±14.6 μmoles de ornitina/mg de proteína hepática y PER: 3.8 ; arginasa 51.4±9.6 μmoles de ornitina /mg de proteína hepática respectivamente. Los pesos de los órganos fueron igualmente menores en los grupos FP COCA pero sus contenidos proteicos fueron semejantes al de los grupos controles. Estos hallazgos sugieren que la proteína de la coca, cuando es dada en un valor del 9.0% tiene un valor importante el cual puede ser mejorado si se lograse suplementar con otras proteínas. Así mismo los resultados sugieren que se debe obtener fracciones proteicas de mayor pureza para determinar con mayor exactitud su calidad.NUTRITIONAL VALUE OF THE PROTEIN OF COCA LEAF(Erythroxylum coca)The study was designed to search the biological value of the protein contents in the coca leaf (Erythroxylum coca) .To aproach this two protein fractions were isolated from an alkaline coca leaves extract prepared with “tocra” (alkaline substance used with coca for chewing) by precipitating them at two different pH(5.1 and 4.0).After partial purification by extracting solvents (diethyl ether ,acetone and ethanol 96 °) of the mixture of both fractions two Experimental diets with different protein levels
(FP COCA 4.5% and FP COCA 9.0%) were prepared. Likewise two casein Control diets (CAS 4.5% and CAS 9.0%) were made. All diets were fed ad libitum for 10 days to groups (n=6-9) of growing rats. Ending this period protein efficiency ratio (PER) liver arginase activity , tissue weights and its protein contents were determined. Results show minor PER index values but major arginase activities in both Experimental groups than in Control groups .In FP COCA 9.0% group , PER 1.4;arginase 63.6 ±14.6 μmoles of ornitina/mg liver protein and in CAS 9.0% group, PER 3.8 ; arginase 51.4 ±9.6 μmoles of ornitina/mg liver protein. Tissue weights were also diminished but its protein contents were similar .These findings suggest that protein of coca leaf given at 9% has some important biological value wich could be improved by supplementation with other proteins. Moreover ,these results prompt also to us to obtein a more purified coca leaf protein for improving its utilization.Tesi
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