1,721,060 research outputs found
Auctions and barters
No full textIn this technical report we describe a certain number of models of auctions barters and propose the associated procedures. In this way we face the problem of the fair sharing of goods, bads and possibly services (also collectively termed as) among a set of players that cannot or do not want to use a common cardinal scale for the evaluation of the items owing to the very qualitative and non economical nature of the items themselves
A purely probabilistic candle auction
No full textCandle auctions have been used in the past as a variant of the English auction with a random termination time associated either to the going out of a candle or to the falling of a needle inserted in a random position in a burning candle.In this case such auctions are used by the auctioneer A for the allocation of a good to one of the n bidders bi of the set B.Our basic motivation for the use of this type of auctions is the following.We are planning to use such auctions for the allocation of a chore at one bi from the set B whose members have been selected by A using a set of private criteria that do not depend on the willingness to attend of the single bidders.The to be selected bidder has to be chosen from the set B given that the available information about these bidders are imprecise or fuzzy. These features prevent the profitable and direct selection of a suitable bidder with the guarantee of choosing the best one.For this reason we plan to adopt an auction mechanism where the bidders pay for not getting the chore but one of them has to get it though he also receives a compensation for being the wining bidder.The compensation to the winning bidder derives him form the other bidders, the so called losing bidders, and is accumulated during the various steps or rounds on which the auction is based.<p /
Using a hierarchical properties ranking with AHP for the ranking of electoral systems
No full textElectoral systems are complex entities composed of a set of phases that form a process to which performance parameters can be associated.
One of the key points of every electoral system is represented by the electoral formula that can be characterized by a wide spectrum of properties that, according to Arrow's Impossibility Theorem and other theoretical results, cannot be all satisfied at the same time. Starting from these basic results the aim of this paper is to examine such properties within a hierarchical framework, based on {Analytic Hierarchy Process} proposed by T. L. Saaty, performing pairwise comparisons at various levels of a hierarchy so to get a global ranking of such properties. Since any real electoral system is known to satisfy some of such properties but not others it should be possible, in this way, to get a ranking of the electoral systems according also to the political goals both of the voters and the candidates. In this way it should be possible to estimate the relative importance of each property with respect to the final ranking of every electoral formula
An iterative procedure for the Paretian ranking of competing projects
No full textIn this Technical Report we present an iterative procedure for the evaluation, from a set of decsion makers, of a set of projects according to a given set of criteria. The proposed procedure uses Pareto principles and a Borda classical voting method and aimsat attaining fair allocations whenever this is possible
Particular order
No full textThis technical report presents a new partial order of a set A of alternatives according to a set of criteria C.The order is based on a binary strict preference relation that is not transitive but that satisfies asymmetry.
The order corresponds to a directed graph as an aiding tool to allow the single decision maker to select the best alternative from the set A
A few notes on the Borda and Condorcet methods
No full textThe present Technical Report contains a short analysis of both the Borda and the Condorcet methods. We start with a description of both methods in their twofold roles: of methods for defining a winning alternative from a set of available alternatives,} of possible outranking methods over a set of alternatives. We then discuss the properties of each method and analyze them with regard to the conditions posed by the Arrow's impossibility theorem. The last step, that represents the core part of the Technical Report, is represented by the search of possible relations between the two methods. The Technical Report closes with the proposal of a composed outranking method based on both the Borda and the Condorcet methods executed on the same profiles of preferences. As usual, reports of errors and inaccuracies are gratefully appreciated
Participative methods and consensus theory
No full textThe present Technical Report contains a concise analysis of some participatory methods and a discussion of the bold;method of consensusas a formal tool for decisionmaking.The treatment is kept at an informal and colloquial level with the aim to be precise and concise.Thei Technical Report relies mainly on classical results, so that it may be considered as a real primer on these topics, but contains also novel materials and results.Reports of errors and inaccuracies are greatefully appreciated
An inverse or negative auction
No full textIn this Technical Report we describe a type of auction mechanism where the auctioneer A wants to auction an item among a certain number of bidders of a set B that submit bids in the auction with the aim of not getting that item. Owing to this feature we call this mechanism an inverse or negative auction. The main motivation of this mechanism is that both the bidders and the auctioneer give a negative value to the auctioned item (and so they see it as a bad rather than a good). The mechanism is presented in its basic simple version and with some possible extensions that account for the payment of a fee for not attending the auction, the interactions among the bidders and the presence of other supporting actors
Models of interaction
No full textThe present Technical Report contains two papers that have been accepted at the S.I.N.G. 4 Conference, Wroklav, Poland, 26-28 June 2008. Both papers have been also presented in seminars at the Computer Science Department, the former on June 3 2008 and the latter on January 23 2008. The first paper presents the use of auction mechanisms for the allocation of chores instead of goods. The latter paper presents and analyzes a small set of models that can be used by two players for the barter of goods without the intervention of any numerary good
Merawti: a method for the ranking of the alternatives with ties
No full textIn this technical report we present a method that can be used by a set of decison makers in order to rank a certain number of alternatives according to a given set of criteria. The method aims at producing a directed multigraph involving all the alternatives so that it is possible for the decison makers to identify the worst alternatives and the best alternatives. The worst alternatives are never selected by the decision makers that perform their final selection among teh best aletrnatives. <br /
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