97 research outputs found
On Uneven Ground: How Corporate Governance Prioritizes Short-term Speculative Investments, Impedes Productive Investments, and Jeopardizes Productivity Growth
No full textThe economic recovery after the Great Recession highlighted a continuous divergence between soaring profits and lagging investment. These trends are related at the corporate level, where corporate managers have stronger incentives to pursue short-term profit-seeking activities than to invest in longer-term productive activities, such as hiring and training people and investment in physical infrastructure. This prioritization results because the corporate governance system is biased towards the short run. The policy goals that we discuss aim to find a better economic balance between short-run and long-run goals by defining long-term performance measures and finding a better balance in the incentives of short-run and long-run oriented corporate stakeholders.Business investment; corporate governance; short-term speculation; long-term productivity growth
ERTS-1 imagery of village and cultivation sites in Niger and Upper Volta
No full textThere are no author-identified significant results in this report
Earth Resources Technology Satellite-1 (ERTS-1) data and anthropology: Use of these data in carrying capacity estimates for sites in Upper Volta and Niger
No full textThe author has identified the following significant results. Repetitively derived multispectral band imagery from ERTS-1 is now available for many parts of the earth's land surface and represents major new data sources for anthropological work in habitat, land use, and settlement patterns. A completed first step test of ERTS-1 data is available in carrying capacity estimates for Mossi, Hausa, and Sonrai sites derived from: (1) field work; (2) aerial photography; and (3) ERTS-1. Data can test more than one carrying capacity formula
Our perfect wild: Ray and Barbara Bane's journeys and the fate of the Far North
No full textIncludes bibliographical references and index.Map -- Prologue -- "When are we going?" -- One year -- To the top of the world -- Going to the dogs -- Becoming Eskimo -- Ekak -- Learning to fly -- Hungry country -- Hog River Gary -- In the presence of wolves -- The 1200-mile journey -- Through ancient eyes -- A place apart -- Selby Lake -- Birth and trauma -- Line of fire -- Growing pains -- Keeper of the park -- Among bears -- Exxon Valdez -- Katmai carnival -- Reining in the rebel -- Citizens of the natural world -- Epilogue -- Afterward
A preliminary evaluation of dry season/drought status in the Sahelian zone of Mali, Mauritania and Senegal, based on ERTS-1 imagery
No full textThere are no author-identified significant results in this report
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Reining in Immigration Adjudicators
No full textFor decades, immigration officials have interpreted the law with the understanding that courts would rarely question their decisions. Now, two scholars challenge the logic behind having courts afford immigration officials such broad deference when reviewing their decisions. The court’s deference to immigration officials derives from a U.S. Supreme Court decision in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council. In Chevron, the Supreme Court established that agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory language should receive substantial deference when subject to judicial review. The Court justified this deference using a theory of delegation—that Congress intended to delegate to executive agencies the responsibility of resolving statutory ambiguity. Critics have called to eliminate Chevron deference throughout the past decade. Many academics and judges, including Supreme Court Justice Neil Gorsuch, argue that deferring to agencies on statutory interpretation is an “abdication of the judicial duty” to construe the law. Although the doctrine remains intact, some predict that it is in imminent danger, especially in light of Justice Amy Coney Barrett’s confirmation to the Supreme Court. In a recent paper, law professors Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia and Christopher J. Walker join the call to eliminate Chevron deference—but only in a narrow sense. They urge the “surgical” removal of Chevron deference for agency interpretations made in immigration adjudications, while preserving it for courts’ review of immigration rulemaking. Under their proposal, courts would more closely scrutinize immigration decisions made by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) and the Attorney General—the two main immigration adjudicators. To frame their critique, the authors identify the four primary rationales for delegation that justify Chevron deference: the comparative expertise of agencies, the flexible deliberative process agencies employ, political accountability of agencies, and national uniformity of law. The first three of these rationales, however, “collapse” in the immigration adjudication context. The primary rationale that Wadhia and Walker argue underlies the delegation theory is that federal agencies possess expertise—both technical and legislative—that the courts do not. Agencies often fill statutory gaps that demand “scientific, technical, economic, or other subject-matter expertise,” which fall outside a judge’s traditional skillset. Immigration adjudication requires no such expertise. Rather, it demands that adjudicators employ rigorous legal interpretation of complex statutes and regulation, which is “precisely the sort of expertise that federal courts have.” Even more, the hiring requirements for the BIA—the primary immigration adjudicators—do not require substantive experience, much less any subject-matter expertise. As for legislative expertise, agencies frequently possess “special insight” into the goals behind legislation, which weighs in favor of deferring to their interpretation. Although this may be true in rulemaking, it is less so in agency adjudication. Indeed, neither the BIA nor the Attorney General—another key immigration adjudicator—consults with agency legislative experts when interpreting statutes in adjudication. The second rationale underlying the delegation theory that Wadhia and Walker suggest is that agencies engage in a wide-ranging deliberative process that “incorporates all stakeholders,” but courts can only consider the cases before them. Because of this process, the argument goes, agencies should be entitled to substantial deference when their decisions are reviewed. That unique deliberative process, however, is only apparent in agency rulemaking, a process that proceeds entirely in the public eye and welcomes input from relevant stakeholders. Immigration adjudication stands in stark contrast. For one, immigration adjudication offers few procedural protections for immigrants. In addition, politics have overtaken the immigration adjudication system. As a former BIA chair explained, “the BIA is not a court anymore. It’s an enforcement mechanism.” These are hardly the features of a deliberative process deserving of the substantial deference afforded by Chevron, Wadhia and Walker conclude. The third reason Wadhia and Walker pose for delegation is the comparative political accountability of agencies relative to courts. Conventional wisdom assumes that agencies are more politically accountable than a federal court, so deferring to agencies reduces partisanship in judicial decision-making. Although it may not be their most powerful point, Wadhia and Walker argue that such wisdom applies more forcefully to rulemaking than it does to adjudication. Indeed, immigration adjudication often “lacks the hallmarks of public engagement and transparency that is commonplace in rulemaking.” Finally, Wadhia and Walker propose that a desire to promote national uniformity in federal law partly motivates Chevron deference. Here, agency adjudication may better promote this goal than the judiciary, but this preference for legal uniformity is only one of four factors. When considering the other three, “the case against Chevron deference in immigration adjudication becomes so clear as to justify some course correction to narrow Chevron’s domain.” In turn, Wadhia and Walker identify three potential institutions that could bring about this reform: the Supreme Court, Congress, and the executive branch itself. The Supreme Court, for its part, could simply decide to exclude immigration adjudication from Chevron deference. Alternatively, Congress could pass legislation that requires courts to review immigration decisions with less deference, which Congress has done in the context of some consumer financial laws. By requiring a more exacting review of immigration adjudication, “the BIA and Attorney General will face greater incentives to exercise expertise and engage in reasoned decision-making.” And finally, the executive branch could unilaterally implement this change by affirmatively seeking less deference from courts reviewing immigration decisions. In fact, the U.S. Department of Justice has recently taken similar action in the context of agency guidance. Whether an agency can unilaterally waive Chevron deference is unsettled, but an agency should at least adjudicate as if it will face minimal deference. Several lawmakers have warned that restricting the scope of Chevron deference will have “titanic real-world implications.” From Wadhia and Walker’s perspective, however, narrowing Chevron is “more consistent with Chevron’s theoretical foundations.” But perhaps even more importantly, requiring courts to scrutinize the decisions of immigration adjudicators could result in fairer outcomes for immigrants to the United States
Reining in Immigration Adjudicators
No full textFor decades, immigration officials have interpreted the law with the understanding that courts would rarely question their decisions. Now, two scholars challenge the logic behind having courts afford immigration officials such broad deference when reviewing their decisions. The court’s deference to immigration officials derives from a U.S. Supreme Court decision in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council. In Chevron, the Supreme Court established that agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory language should receive substantial deference when subject to judicial review. The Court justified this deference using a theory of delegation—that Congress intended to delegate to executive agencies the responsibility of resolving statutory ambiguity. Critics have called to eliminate Chevron deference throughout the past decade. Many academics and judges, including Supreme Court Justice Neil Gorsuch, argue that deferring to agencies on statutory interpretation is an “abdication of the judicial duty” to construe the law. Although the doctrine remains intact, some predict that it is in imminent danger, especially in light of Justice Amy Coney Barrett’s confirmation to the Supreme Court. In a recent paper, law professors Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia and Christopher J. Walker join the call to eliminate Chevron deference—but only in a narrow sense. They urge the “surgical” removal of Chevron deference for agency interpretations made in immigration adjudications, while preserving it for courts’ review of immigration rulemaking. Under their proposal, courts would more closely scrutinize immigration decisions made by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) and the Attorney General—the two main immigration adjudicators. To frame their critique, the authors identify the four primary rationales for delegation that justify Chevron deference: the comparative expertise of agencies, the flexible deliberative process agencies employ, political accountability of agencies, and national uniformity of law. The first three of these rationales, however, “collapse” in the immigration adjudication context. The primary rationale that Wadhia and Walker argue underlies the delegation theory is that federal agencies possess expertise—both technical and legislative—that the courts do not. Agencies often fill statutory gaps that demand “scientific, technical, economic, or other subject-matter expertise,” which fall outside a judge’s traditional skillset. Immigration adjudication requires no such expertise. Rather, it demands that adjudicators employ rigorous legal interpretation of complex statutes and regulation, which is “precisely the sort of expertise that federal courts have.” Even more, the hiring requirements for the BIA—the primary immigration adjudicators—do not require substantive experience, much less any subject-matter expertise. As for legislative expertise, agencies frequently possess “special insight” into the goals behind legislation, which weighs in favor of deferring to their interpretation. Although this may be true in rulemaking, it is less so in agency adjudication. Indeed, neither the BIA nor the Attorney General—another key immigration adjudicator—consults with agency legislative experts when interpreting statutes in adjudication. The second rationale underlying the delegation theory that Wadhia and Walker suggest is that agencies engage in a wide-ranging deliberative process that “incorporates all stakeholders,” but courts can only consider the cases before them. Because of this process, the argument goes, agencies should be entitled to substantial deference when their decisions are reviewed. That unique deliberative process, however, is only apparent in agency rulemaking, a process that proceeds entirely in the public eye and welcomes input from relevant stakeholders. Immigration adjudication stands in stark contrast. For one, immigration adjudication offers few procedural protections for immigrants. In addition, politics have overtaken the immigration adjudication system. As a former BIA chair explained, “the BIA is not a court anymore. It’s an enforcement mechanism.” These are hardly the features of a deliberative process deserving of the substantial deference afforded by Chevron, Wadhia and Walker conclude. The third reason Wadhia and Walker pose for delegation is the comparative political accountability of agencies relative to courts. Conventional wisdom assumes that agencies are more politically accountable than a federal court, so deferring to agencies reduces partisanship in judicial decision-making. Although it may not be their most powerful point, Wadhia and Walker argue that such wisdom applies more forcefully to rulemaking than it does to adjudication. Indeed, immigration adjudication often “lacks the hallmarks of public engagement and transparency that is commonplace in rulemaking.” Finally, Wadhia and Walker propose that a desire to promote national uniformity in federal law partly motivates Chevron deference. Here, agency adjudication may better promote this goal than the judiciary, but this preference for legal uniformity is only one of four factors. When considering the other three, “the case against Chevron deference in immigration adjudication becomes so clear as to justify some course correction to narrow Chevron’s domain.” In turn, Wadhia and Walker identify three potential institutions that could bring about this reform: the Supreme Court, Congress, and the executive branch itself. The Supreme Court, for its part, could simply decide to exclude immigration adjudication from Chevron deference. Alternatively, Congress could pass legislation that requires courts to review immigration decisions with less deference, which Congress has done in the context of some consumer financial laws. By requiring a more exacting review of immigration adjudication, “the BIA and Attorney General will face greater incentives to exercise expertise and engage in reasoned decision-making.” And finally, the executive branch could unilaterally implement this change by affirmatively seeking less deference from courts reviewing immigration decisions. In fact, the U.S. Department of Justice has recently taken similar action in the context of agency guidance. Whether an agency can unilaterally waive Chevron deference is unsettled, but an agency should at least adjudicate as if it will face minimal deference. Several lawmakers have warned that restricting the scope of Chevron deference will have “titanic real-world implications.” From Wadhia and Walker’s perspective, however, narrowing Chevron is “more consistent with Chevron’s theoretical foundations.” But perhaps even more importantly, requiring courts to scrutinize the decisions of immigration adjudicators could result in fairer outcomes for immigrants to the United States
The SuLo Framework: A Systematic Literature Review of Drivers and Barriers to Sustainable Logistics Practices
No full textThis contribution presents the SuLo (Sustainable Logistics) framework developed through a systematic literature review of the drivers and barriers to implementing sustainable sustainability in logistics, with a focus on warehousing. As global trade expands, logistics operations face increasing pressure to balance economic efficiency with environmental and social responsibility. Warehousing plays a crucial role in supply chains, contributing significantly to energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions. Despite growing interest in sustainable logistics, research on sustainable warehousing remains fragmented. This paper synthesizes the existing literature to identify key drivers, barriers, and best practices for sustainable warehousing. The findings reveal that regulatory policies, cost savings, and stakeholder expectations are primary drivers, while high implementation costs, lack of awareness, and operational complexity hinder progress. A structured framework is proposed to guide sustainability integration, incorporating renewable energy, waste reduction, automation, and employee well-being initiatives. The study highlights the necessity of a holistic approach that aligns environmental, economic, and social dimensions. While challenges remain, sustainable warehousing offers long-term benefits, including reduced environmental impact, improved operational efficiency, and enhanced corporate reputation. In conclusion, future research should explore empirical case studies and technological innovations, particularly artificial intelligence, to further advance sustainability in warehousing
The impact of human-machine interaction on machine design in the Social Networked Industry
No full textDieser Beitrag beschreibt einen neuartigen Ansatz zum Rapid Physical Prototyping von Maschinenkomponenten in der Intralogistik. Zunächst werden aktuelle Maßgaben und Evaluationsmethoden zur Maschinengestaltung wie Gesetze, technische Normen und Industriestandards hinsichtlich ihrer Implikationen auf die Schnittstelle zum Menschen hin untersucht. Diesem Status Quo werden aus dem Leitgedanken der Social Networked Industry (SNI) bestimmte Anforderungen entgegengestellt und Forschungslücken abgeleitet. Die Anforderungen beziehen sich insbesondere auf die funktionale und ergonomische Gestaltung. Es wird ein Verfahren aufgezeigt, welches ein Motion Capturing System als Referenzwerkzeug nutzt, um eine quantitative Analyse der Wechselwirkung zwischen Maschinendesign und der Perspektive Mensch zu ermöglichen.This contribute describes a new approach for rapid physical prototyping of machine components in material flow systems. First, current stipulations and evaluation methods for machine design such as laws, technical norms and industry standards are examined with regards to their implications for the human factor. This status quo is contrasted with the requirements that result from the central ideas of the Social Networked Industry and research gaps are derived. The requirements take functional and ergonomic aspects into account. A procedure to use Motion Capturing as a reference tool is demonstrated. It enables a quantitative analysis of the interdependency of machine design and the human perspective
TOMIE (Tracking Of Multiple Industrial Entities) Dataset
No full textThis dataset is part of the publication "Semi-Automated Computer Vision based Tracking of Multiple Industrial Entities - A Framework and Dataset Creation Approach".
If you have any questions concerning this dataset, feel free to contact the corresponding author, Jérôme Rutinowski
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