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Coalitional presidentialism in comparative perspective: minority executives in multiparty systems
No full textDocumentation and instructions are archived in PDF. Data files are stored as Excel (.xls). Interview transcripts are stored in Rich Text Format (.rtf)
African exceptions: democratic development in small island states
Full text linkSmall island states are much more likely to have democratic regimes than large continental states. This trend also holds across Africa, where the five island states with populations of 1.5 million or less are all rated at least ‘partly free’ by Freedom House. In this article we explore what it is about being a small island state that might explain this trend. Building on studies from other small island states, we find that the interaction between the two contextual factors is key to explaining their diversion from mainland trends in the African context. Specifically, ‘smallness’ leads to closer links between citizens and politicians in addition to more effective service delivery, while ‘islandness’ promotes community cohesion and provides a buffer against instability and conflict in neighbouring states. This results in a positive feedback loop that guards against authoritarian excess. Our focus on population size and geography thus adds to the existing studies of the contextual drivers of African democratisation.</p
Ethnic mobilisation and the Liberian civil war (1989-2003)
Full text linkThis thesis examines the relationship between ethnicity and violent group mobilisation in Liberia’s civil war (1989-2003). It focuses on Gio, Mano and Mandingo mobilisation to investigate how and why internal dynamics about moral norms and expectations motivated leadership calls for violence and ethnic support. Much of the existing literature interprets popular involvement in violent group mobilisation on the Upper Guinea Coast as a youth rebellion against gerontocracy. I argue that such an approach is incomplete in the Liberian case, and does not account for questions of ethnic mobilisation and the participation of groups such as the Gio, Mano and Mandingo. At the onset of hostilities, civilians in Liberia were not primarily mobilised to fight based on their age, but rather as members of ethnic communities whose membership included different age groups. I explore constructivist approaches to ethnicity to analyse mobilisation for war as the collective 'self-defence' of ethnic groups qua moral communities. In the prelude to the outbreak of civil war, inter-ethnic inequalities of access to the state and economic resources became reconfigured. Ethnic groups—as moral communities—experienced external 'victimisation' and a sense of internal dissolution, or threatened dissolution. In particular, the understanding of internal reciprocal relations between patrons and clients within ethnic groups was undermined. Internal arguments about morality, personal responsibility, social accountability/justice, increased the pressure on excluded elites and thus incentivised them to pursue violent political strategies. Mobilisation took on an ethnic form mainly because individuals believed that they were fighting to protect the moral communities that generate esteem and ground understandings of good citizenship. Therefore, ethnic participation in the Liberian countryside differed from the model peasant rebellion that seeks to overthrow the feudal elites. Rather than a revolution of the social order, individuals regarded themselves as protecting an extant ethnic order that provided rights and distributed resources. Even though some individuals fought for political power and resources, and external actors facilitated group organisation through the provision of logistical support, the violence was also an expression of bottom-up moral community crisis and an attempt by politico-military elites to keep their reputation and enforce unity
The political economy of institutions in Africa: Comparing authoritarian parties and parliaments in Tanzania and Uganda
Full text linkThis thesis presents an original theory of authoritarian party and legislative institutions in Africa, tracing their trajectories from an early period of regime consolidation through subsequent episodes of socio-economic and institutional change.
Contra a dominant rational choice literature on authoritarian institutions, as well as an Africanist analysis of âneo-patrimonialismâ, I demonstrate how institutional variation reflects differences in the underlying distribution of power across African regimes. I argue, first, that variation in legislative strength and assertiveness is a function of the institutional strength and cohesion of ruling parties. The institutional make-up of these parties varies, in turn, depending on the early strategies of âpoliticized accumulationâ and patronage distribution deployed by authoritarian leaders, as well as subsequent patterns of economic change. The legislature remains more marginal and subservient where authoritarian leaders work to centralise wealth accumulation, control patronage distribution and build up party institutions to channel and constrain elite contestation. By contrast, parliaments assert themselves where more diffuse patterns of accumulation fuel patron-client factionalism, undermine party cohesion and turn the legislature into an arena for intra-elite bargaining.
Beyond analysing when and how parliaments strengthen, I also reassess the significance of a more assertive legislature, particularly its implications for distributive outcomes. My explanation of institutional variation yields fresh insights regarding whose interests a stronger legislature is likely to represent. Once we appreciate the role of elite contestation in driving legislative activity, it follows that parliamentary interventions tend to serve elite interests, reinforcing an existing wealth inequality.
To demonstrate this argument, I use a combination of within- and cross-case analysis, drawing primarily on the Tanzanian and Ugandan cases with further reference to Kenya and Rwanda. I adopt a process tracing methodology to assess the validity of my causal argument and, for evidence, rely primarily on qualitative data drawn from elite interviews, archival work and observation of relevant party and legislative meetings. </p
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