795 research outputs found
Computation Tree Logic for Synchronization Properties
We present a logic that extends CTL (Computation Tree Logic) with operators that express synchronization properties. A property is synchronized in a system if it holds in all paths of a certain length. The new logic is obtained by using the same path quantifiers and temporal operators as in CTL, but allowing a different order of the quantifiers. This small syntactic variation induces a logic that can express non-regular properties for which known extensions of MSO with equality of path length are undecidable. We show that our variant of CTL is decidable and that the model-checking problem is in Delta_3^P = P^{NP^{NP}}, and is hard for the class of problems solvable in polynomial time using a parallel access to an NP oracle. We analogously consider quantifier exchange in extensions of CTL, and we present operators defined using basic operators of CTL* that express the occurrence of infinitely many synchronization points. We show that the model-checking problem remains in Delta_3^P. The distinguishing power of CTL and of our new logic coincide if the Next operator is allowed in the logics, thus the classical bisimulation quotient can be used for state-space reduction before model checking
Combinations of Qualitative Winning for Stochastic Parity Games
We study Markov decision processes and turn-based stochastic games with parity conditions. There are three qualitative winning criteria, namely, sure winning, which requires all paths to satisfy the condition, almost-sure winning, which requires the condition to be satisfied with probability 1, and limit-sure winning, which requires the condition to be satisfied with probability arbitrarily close to 1. We study the combination of two of these criteria for parity conditions, e.g., there are two parity conditions one of which must be won surely, and the other almost-surely. The problem has been studied recently by Berthon et al. for MDPs with combination of sure and almost-sure winning, under infinite-memory strategies, and the problem has been established to be in NP cap co-NP. Even in MDPs there is a difference between finite-memory and infinite-memory strategies. Our main results for combination of sure and almost-sure winning are as follows: (a) we show that for MDPs with finite-memory strategies the problem is in NP cap co-NP; (b) we show that for turn-based stochastic games the problem is co-NP-complete, both for finite-memory and infinite-memory strategies; and (c) we present algorithmic results for the finite-memory case, both for MDPs and turn-based stochastic games, by reduction to non-stochastic parity games. In addition we show that all the above complexity results also carry over to combination of sure and limit-sure winning, and results for all other combinations can be derived from existing results in the literature. Thus we present a complete picture for the study of combinations of two qualitative winning criteria for parity conditions in MDPs and turn-based stochastic games
Average Case Analysis of the Classical Algorithm for Markov Decision Processes with Büchi Objectives
We consider Markov decision processes (MDPs) with specifications given as Büchi (liveness) objectives. We consider the problem of computing the set of almost-sure winning vertices from where the objective can be ensured with probability 1. We study for the first time the average case complexity of the classical algorithm for computing the set of almost-sure winning vertices for MDPs with Buchi objectives. Our contributions are as follows:
First, we show that for MDPs with constant out-degree the expected number of iterations is at most logarithmic and the average case running time is linear (as compared to the worst case linear number of iterations and quadratic time complexity). Second, for the average case analysis over all MDPs we show that the expected number of iterations is constant and the average case running time is linear (again as compared to the worst case linear number of iterations and
quadratic time complexity). Finally we also show that given that all MDPs are equally likely, the probability that the classical algorithm requires more than constant number of iterations is exponentially small
Faster Algorithms for Alternating Refinement Relations
One central issue in the formal design and analysis of reactive systems is the notion of refinement that asks whether all behaviors of the implementation is allowed by the specification. The local interpretation of behavior leads to the notion of simulation. Alternating transition systems (ATSs) provide a general model for composite reactive systems, and the simulation relation for ATSs is known as alternating simulation. The simulation relation for fair transition systems is called fair simulation. In this work our main contributions are as follows: (1) We present an improved algorithm for fair simulation with Büchi fairness constraints; our algorithm requires O(n^3 * m) time as compared to the previous known O(n^6)-time algorithm, where n is the number of states and m is the number of transitions. (2) We present a game based algorithm for alternating simulation that requires O(m^2)-time as compared to the previous known O((n*m)^2)-time algorithm, where n is the number of states and m is the size of transition relation. (3) We present an iterative algorithm for alternating simulation that matches the time complexity of the game based algorithm, but is more space efficient than the game based algorithm
What is Decidable about Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes with omega-Regular Objectives
We consider partially observable Markov decision processes (POMDPs) with omega-regular conditions specified as parity objectives. The qualitative analysis problem given a POMDP and a parity objective asks whether there is a strategy to ensure that the objective is satisfied with probability 1 (resp. positive probability). While the qualitative analysis problems are known to be undecidable even for very special cases of parity objectives, we establish decidability (with optimal EXPTIME-complete complexity) of the qualitative analysis problems for POMDPs with all parity objectives under finite-memory strategies. We also establish optimal (exponential) memory bounds
The Evolutionary Price of Anarchy: Locally Bounded Agents in a Dynamic Virus Game
The Price of Anarchy (PoA) is a well-established game-theoretic concept to shed light on coordination issues arising in open distributed systems. Leaving agents to selfishly optimize comes with the risk of ending up in sub-optimal states (in terms of performance and/or costs), compared to a centralized system design. However, the PoA relies on strong assumptions about agents' rationality (e.g., resources and information) and interactions, whereas in many distributed systems agents interact locally with bounded resources. They do so repeatedly over time (in contrast to "one-shot games"), and their strategies may evolve.
Using a more realistic evolutionary game model, this paper introduces a realized evolutionary Price of Anarchy (ePoA). The ePoA allows an exploration of equilibrium selection in dynamic distributed systems with multiple equilibria, based on local interactions of simple memoryless agents.
Considering a fundamental game related to virus propagation on networks, we present analytical bounds on the ePoA in basic network topologies and for different strategy update dynamics. In particular, deriving stationary distributions of the stochastic evolutionary process, we find that the Nash equilibria are not always the most abundant states, and that different processes can feature significant off-equilibrium behavior, leading to a significantly higher ePoA compared to the PoA studied traditionally in the literature
Faster Algorithms for Mean-Payoff Parity Games
Graph games provide the foundation for modeling and synthesis of reactive processes. Such games are played over graphs where the vertices are controlled by two adversarial players. We consider graph games where the objective of the first player is the
conjunction of a qualitative objective (specified as a parity condition) and a quantitative objective (specified as a mean-payoff condition). There are two variants of the problem, namely, the threshold problem where the quantitative goal is to ensure that the mean-payoff value is above a threshold, and the value problem where the quantitative goal is to ensure the optimal mean-payoff value; in both cases ensuring the qualitative parity objective. The previous best-known algorithms for game graphs with n vertices, m edges,
parity objectives with d priorities, and maximal absolute reward value W for mean-payoff objectives, are as follows: O(n^(d+1)·m·W) for the threshold problem, and O(n^(d+2)·m·W) for the value problem.
Our main contributions are faster algorithms, and the running times of our algorithms are as follows: O(n^(d-1)·m·W) for the threshold problem, and O(n^d·m·W·log(n·W)) for the value problem. For mean-payoff parity objectives with two priorities, our algorithms match the best-known bounds of the algorithms for mean-payoff games (without conjunction with parity objectives). Our results are relevant in synthesis of reactive systems with both functional
requirement (given as a qualitative objective) and performance requirement (given as a quantitative objective)
Stable strategies of direct and indirect reciprocity across all social dilemmas
Social dilemmas are collective-action problems where individual interests are at odds with group interests. Such dilemmas occur frequently at all scales of human interactions. When dealing with collective-action problems, people often act reciprocally. They adjust their behavior to match the previous behavior of the recipient. The literature distinguishes two kinds of reciprocity. According to direct reciprocity, individuals react to their immediate experiences with the recipient. They are more likely to cooperate if the recipient previously cooperated with them. According to indirect reciprocity, individuals react to the recipient's general behavior, irrespectively of whether or not they benefited directly. In practice, the two kinds of reciprocity are often intertwined; people typically base their decisions on both direct experiences and indirect observations. Yet only recently have researchers begun to explore how the two kinds of reciprocity interact. So far, this research only addresses a single type of social dilemma, the donation game, where the effects of individual behaviors are independent. Instead, here we allow for all pairwise social dilemmas. By applying novel techniques to generalize the theory of zero-determinant strategies, we establish an important proof of principle: In all social dilemmas, socially optimal outcomes can be sustained as an equilibrium, using either direct or indirect reciprocity, or arbitrary mixtures thereof. These results neither require games to be repeated infinitely often, nor that individual opinions are synchronized. In this way, we considerably generalize the scope of models of reciprocity, and we build further bridges between the literatures on direct and indirect reciprocity.
Entropic Risk for Turn-Based Stochastic Games
Entropic risk (ERisk) is an established risk measure in finance, quantifying risk by an exponential re-weighting of rewards. We study ERisk for the first time in the context of turn-based stochastic games with the total reward objective. This gives rise to an objective function that demands the control of systems in a risk-averse manner. We show that the resulting games are determined and, in particular, admit optimal memoryless deterministic strategies. This contrasts risk measures that previously have been considered in the special case of Markov decision processes and that require randomization and/or memory. We provide several results on the decidability and the computational complexity of the threshold problem, i.e. whether the optimal value of ERisk exceeds a given threshold. In the most general case, the problem is decidable subject to Shanuel’s conjecture. If all inputs are rational, the resulting threshold problem can be solved using algebraic numbers, leading to decidability via a polynomial-time reduction to the existential theory of the reals. Further restrictions on the encoding of the input allow the solution of the threshold problem in NP∩coNP. Finally, an approximation algorithm for the optimal value of ERisk is provided
LIPIcs
Graphical games are a useful framework for modeling the interactions of (selfish) agents who are connected via an underlying topology and whose behaviors influence each other. They have wide applications ranging from computer science to economics and biology. Yet, even though an agent’s payoff only depends on the actions of their direct neighbors in graphical games, computing the Nash equilibria and making statements about the convergence time of "natural" local dynamics in particular can be highly challenging. In this work, we present a novel approach for classifying complexity of Nash equilibria in graphical games by establishing a connection to local graph algorithms, a subfield of distributed computing. In particular, we make the observation that the equilibria of graphical games are equivalent to locally verifiable labelings (LVL) in graphs; vertex labelings which are verifiable with constant-round local algorithms. This connection allows us to derive novel lower bounds on the convergence time to equilibrium of best-response dynamics in graphical games. Since we establish that distributed convergence can sometimes be provably slow, we also introduce and give bounds on an intuitive notion of "time-constrained" inefficiency of best responses. We exemplify how our results can be used in the implementation of mechanisms that ensure convergence of best responses to a Nash equilibrium. Our results thus also give insight into the convergence of strategy-proof algorithms for graphical games, which is still not well understood
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