163,221 research outputs found
Risk Aversion and Income Tax Enforcement
No full textThis paper characterizes optimal income tax and audit schemes in the presence of costly enforcement when the agent is risk averse and not necessarily risk neutral. It is shown that the results under risk-neutrality (Chander and Wilde (1998)) largely hold under risk aversion. We first show that in an optimal scheme the tax evasion decision of the agent is equivalent to risking his entire income against a possible gain in terms of lower tax payment. We then introduce a measure of aversion to such large risks. In contrast, the Arrow-Pratt coefficients of risk aversion measure aversion to small risks only. We show that the optimal tax function is non-decreasing and concave if the agent’s aversion to large risks, as defined in terms of our measure, is decreasing with income. The optimal audit function is non-increasing and the audits may be random or deterministic.expected utility, risk aversion, principal-agent, adverse selection
The Gamma-Core and Coalition Formation
No full textThis paper reinterprets the gamma-core (Chander and Tulkens (1995, 1997)) and justifies it as well as its prediction that the efficient coalition structure is stable in terms of the coalition formation theory. It is assumed that coalitions can freely merge or break apart, are farsighted (that is, it is the final and not the immediate payoffs that matter to the coalitions) and a coalition may deviate if and only if it stands to gain from it. It is then shown that subsequent to a deviation by a coalition, the nonmembers will have incentives to break apart into singletons, as is assumed in the definition of the gamma-characteristic function, and that the grand coalition is the only stable coalition structure.strategic games, coalition formation, farsighted, core, characteristic function
The Core of a Normal Form Game
No full textDue to the externalities, in normal form games a deviation changes the payoff of all players inducing a retaliation by the remaining or residual players. The stability of an outcome depends on the expectations potential deviators have about this reaction, but so far no satisfactory theory has been provided. The present paper continues the work of Chander and Tulkens (1997) where deviators consider residual equilibria, but we allow coalitions to form, moreover introduce consistency between the residual solution and the solution of the original game. Optimistic and pessimistic considerations produce a pair of cores. These cores are compared to some existing cooperative concepts such as the gamma- and r-cores and the equilibrium binding agreements. In our final section we discuss the predominance of the grand coalition and suggest a generalisation of the normal form where such a precedence can be removed.externalities, residual game, cohesiveness, partition function
Philosophy and Culture
No full textThis volume of Romantic Circles Praxis Series includes an editor's introduction by Rei Terada, with essays by Manu Chander, Ted Underwood, Thomas Pfau, J. Hillis Miller, and Daniel Tiffany.
This volume addresses a perceived opposition between philosophy and critical theory on the one hand, and culture and cultural studies on the other. It seeks to revalidate critical work that develops a philosophy of culture and a culturally historical philosophy. The contributors develop such cultural work by comparing Romantic, modern, and/or contemporary notions of individuality and society and by considering ways of thinking about the dynamics of autonomy and collectivity on which culture depends. Manu Chander discusses the perpetual antagonism of Kant's philosophical aesthetic and Bourdieu's cultural sociology; J. Hillis Miller examines contrasting sense of the performative in cultural studies and philosophy; Thomas Pfau explores the contrary relationship between nineteenth-century European liberalism and pessimistic notions of freedom; and Daniel Tiffany argues that an affinity-based model of culture may be understood through a dialogue between Leibniz's monadic thought and the "placeless places" of modern nightlife. All of these contributions suggest that culture is less about intentionality or a coherent group of people and more about a network of habits, ideas, and enigmatic affliations. The difficulty of construing the relations between deliberate practices and their non-deliberate outcomes underlies each of the papers in this volume; a philosophy of culture and a culturally historical philosophy best address such difficulty.</p
[Report to Chief J. E. Curry, by an unknown author #1]
No full textReport to Chief J. E. Curry, by an unknown author. The report contains a list of officers who gave depositions to the United States Attorney
[Report to Chief J. E. Curry, by an unknown author #2]
No full textReport to Chief J. E. Curry, by an unknown author. The report contains a list of officers who gave depositions to the United States Attorney
Cooperation, Stability and Self-Enforcement in International Environmental Agreements: A Conceptual Discussion
No full textIn essence, any international environmental agreement (IEA) implies cooperation of a form or another. The paper seeks for logical foundations of this. It first deals with how the need for cooperation derives from the public good aspect of the externalities involved, as well as with where the source of cooperation lies in cooperative game theory. In either case, the quest for efficiency is claimed to be at the root of cooperation. Next, cooperation is considered from the point of view of stability. After recalling the two competing concepts of stability in use in the IEA literature, new insights on the nature of the gamma core in general are given as well as of the Chander-Tulkens solution within the gamma core. Free riding is also evaluated in relation with the alternative forms of stability under scrutiny. Finally, it is asked whether with the often mentioned virtue of “self enforcement” any conceptual gain is achieved, different from what is meant by efficiency and stability. A skeptical answer is offered, as a reply to Barrett’s (2003) attempt at giving the notion a specific content.International Environmental Agreements, Cooperation, Stability, Self-enforcement
Preliminary Studies in Light Weight Turkey Syndrome
No full textCalvert, A.; Noll, S.; Goyal, S.; Chander, Y.; Logue, C.; Sherwood, J.; Johnson, T.; Nagaraja, K.; Ziegler, A.. (2011). Preliminary Studies in Light Weight Turkey Syndrome. Retrieved from the University Digital Conservancy, https://hdl.handle.net/11299/204255
sj-docx-1-ine-10.1177_15910199241247886 - Supplemental material for The effect of actuation frequency on clot integration with the Tigertriever device: A preliminary in vitro study
No full textSupplemental material, sj-docx-1-ine-10.1177_15910199241247886 for The effect of actuation frequency on clot integration with the Tigertriever device: A preliminary in vitro study by Chander Sadasivan, Nakisa Dashti, Megha Gopal, Rowan J Serna and David Fiorella in Interventional Neuroradiology</p
Murder on the mountain: author talk with Peter J. Wosh
No full textAuthor talk by Peter J. Wosh on May 5th, 2022, on his book, "Murder on the Mountain: crime, passion, and punishment in gilded age New Jersey.
- …
