204,242 research outputs found
Deterministic Chance
No full textI argue that there are non-trivial objective chances (that is, objective chances other than 0 and 1) even in deterministic worlds. The argument is straightforward. I observe that there are probabilistic special scientific laws even in deterministic worlds. These laws project non-trivial probabilities for the events that they concern. And these probabilities play the chance role and so should be regarded as chances as opposed, for example, to epistemic probabilities or credences.
The supposition of non-trivial deterministic chances might seem to land us in contradiction. The fundamental laws of deterministic worlds project trivial probabilities for the very same events that are assigned non-trivial probabilities by the special scientific laws. I argue that any appearance of tension is dissolved by recognition of the level-relativity of chances. There is therefore no obstacle to accepting non-trivial chance-role-playing deterministic probabilities as genuine chances
Nonprobabilistic chance?
No full text"Chance" crops up all over philosophy, and in many other areas.
It is often assumed -- without argument -- that chances are probabilities.
I explore the extent to which this assumption is really sanctioned
by what we understand by the concept of chance
REVIEW OF D. H. Mellor, 'The Matter of Chance'
No full textThough almost forty years have elapsed since its first publication, it is a testament to the philosophical acumen of its author that 'The Matter of Chance' contains much that is of continued interest to the philosopher of science. Mellor advances a sophisticated propensity theory of chance, arguing that this theory makes better sense than its rivals (in particular subjectivist, frequentist, logical and classical theories) of ‘what professional usage shows to be thought true of chance’ (p. xi)–in particular ‘that chance is objective, empirical and not relational, and that it applies to the single case’ (ibid.). The book is short and dense, with the serious philosophical content delivered thick and fast. There is little by way of road-mapping or summarising to assist the reader: the introduction is hardly expansive and the concluding paragraph positively perfunctory. The result is that the book is often difficult going, and the reader is made to work hard to ensure correct understanding of the views expressed. On the other hand, the author’s avoidance of unnecessary use of formalism and jargon ensures that the book is still reasonably accessible. In the following, I shall first summarise the key features of Mellor’s propensity theory, and then offer a few critical remarks
When "hope springs eternal": The role of chance in risk taking
No full textIn most naturally occurring situations, success depends on both skill and chance. We contrast experimental market entry decisions where payoffs depend on skill as opposed to combinations of skill and chance. Our data show differential attitudes toward chance by those whose self-assessed skills are low and high. Making chance more important induces greater optimism for the former who start taking more risk, while the latter maintain a belief that high levels of skill are sufficient to overcome the vagaries of chance. Finally, although we observed “excess entry” (i.e., too many participants entered markets), this could not be attributed to overconfidence.Skill, chance, overconfidence, optimism, competition, risk taking, gender differences
The Conflation of "Chance" in Evolution
No full textDiscussions of “chance” and related concepts (such as “stochasticity,” “randomness,” “indeterminism,” etc.) are found throughout philosophical work on evolutionary theory. By drawing attention to three very commonly-recognized distinctions, I separate four independent concepts falling under the broad heading of “chance”: randomness (as a property of sequences), epistemic unpredictability, causal indeterminism, and probabilistic causal processes. Far from a merely semantic distinction, however, it is demonstrated that conflation of these obviously distinct notions has an important bearing on debates at the core of evolutionary theory, particularly the debate over the interpretation of fitness, natural selection, and genetic drift
The Early History of Chance in Evolution
No full textWork throughout the history and philosophy of biology frequently employs 'chance', 'unpredictability', 'probability', and many similar terms. One common way of understanding how these concepts were introduced in evolution focuses on two central issues: the first use of statistical methods in evolution (Galton), and the first use of the concept of "objective chance" in evolution (Wright). I argue that while this approach has merit, it fails to fully capture interesting philosophical reflections on the role of chance expounded by two of Galton's students, Karl Pearson and W.F.R. Weldon. Considering a question more familiar from contemporary philosophy of biology – the relationship between our statistical theories of evolution and the processes in the world those theories describe – is, I claim, a more fruitful way to approach both these two historical actors and the broader development of chance in evolution
The Third Way on Objective Probability: A Skeptic's Guide to Objective Chance
No full textThe goal of this paper is to sketch and defend a new interpretation or theory of objective chance, one that lets us be sure such chances exist and shows how they can play the roles we traditionally grant them. The subtitle obviously emulates the title of Lewis seminal 1980 paper A Subjectivist s Guide to Objective Chance while indicating an important difference in perspective. The view developed below shares two major tenets with Lewis last (1994) account of objective chance: (1) The Principal Principle tells us most of what we know about objective chance; (2) Objective chances are not primitive modal facts, propensities, or powers, but rather facts entailed by the overall pattern of events and processes in the actual world. But it differs from Lewis’ account in most other respects. Another subtitle I considered was A Humean Guide ... But while the account of chance below is compatible with any stripe of Humeanism (Lewis , Hume s, and others ), it presupposes no general Humean philosophy. Only a skeptical attitude about probability itself is presupposed (as in point (2) above); what we should say about causality, laws, modality and so on is left a separate question. Still, I will label the account to be developed “Humean objective chance”
Safe Approximations of Chance Constraints Using Historical Data
No full textThis paper proposes a new way to construct uncertainty sets for robust optimization. Our approach uses the available historical data for the uncertain parameters and is based on goodness-of-fit statistics. It guarantees that the probability that the uncertain constraint holds is at least the prescribed value. Compared to existing safe approximation methods for chance constraints, our approach directly uses the historical-data information and leads to tighter uncertainty sets and therefore to better objective values. This improvement is significant especially when the number of uncertain parameters is low. Other advantages of our approach are that it can handle joint chance constraints easily, it can deal with uncertain parameters that are dependent, and it can be extended to nonlinear inequalities. Several numerical examples illustrate the validity of our approach.robust optimization;chance constraint;phi-divergence;goodness-of-fit statistics
The Third Way on Objective Probability: A Skeptic's Guide to Objective Chance
No full textThe goal of this paper is to sketch and defend a new interpretation or ‘theory’ of objective chance, one that lets us be sure such chances exist and shows how they can play the roles we traditionally grant them. The account is ‘Humean’ in claiming that objective chances supervene on the totality of actual events, but does not imply or presuppose a Humean approach to other metaphysical issues such as laws or causation. Like Lewis (1994) I take the Principal Principle to be the key to understanding objective chance. After describing the main features of Humean objective chance (HOC), I deduce the validity of PP for Humean chances, and end by exploring the limitations of Humean chance
Spontaneous Symmetry Breaking and Chance
No full textIn this paper I explore the nature of spontaneous symmetry breaking in connection with a cluster of interrelated concepts such as Curie's symmetry principle, chance, and stability
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