1,720,971 research outputs found
Privacy and Social Media
No full textAt first glance, the concepts of privacy and social media appear somewhat at odds. Most people use social media, whether that be Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, LinkedIn or TikTok, to do what the term ‘social media’ suggests: to be social and share content with others. However, otwithstanding its social aims, many social media users may perceive they can manage their privacy concerns by merely selecting settings that control who can see their content and when. Unfortunately, as the passage of time has shown, this is not quite the case. Despite the façade of control, significant privacy concerns lurk beneath the glossy technological surface for social media users. These concerns are magnified by the fact that technology develops at a far more rapid pace than fit-for-purpose legal privacy protections.
This chapter addresses the awkward tensions in maintaining individual privacy rights within a social media context. The strains will be analysed under two broad classifications: privacy issues between commercial firms and private social media users, and privacy issues that arise between private users themselves on social media platforms. This chapter will define ‘social media’ and address the proliferation of social media use, which makes privacy concerns more acute
Privacy and Children
No full textThis chapter addresses the current sources of law for child privacy rights with a particular focus on privacy issues that arise when a child engages with the media. Specifically, this chapter will discuss the phenomenon of “sharenting” on social media. As we will see, international instruments are the most progressive in protecting child privacy rights. However, even then, to a large extent, legal and ethical governance frameworks have not caught up with child welfare concerns in the social media space. As a result, this chapter will also address reform options for New Zealand
Privacy Future Directions
No full textPrivacy law is in a precarious position. Scholars and commentators are unable to agree on a universal definition for what privacy entails and what interests or rights privacy law should protect when balanced against changing societal norms, rapid technological advancements and freedom of speech concerns. As Boyd aptly states “[n]either privacy nor publicity is dead, but technology will continue to make a mess of both.” In this respect, this chapter examines how the future of privacy law should take shape in New Zealand. It summarises important shortfalls in New Zealand’s current privacy laws and the improvements required to keep pace with international legal developments.
The first-named author, Daimhin Warner, first addresses the shortfalls and improvements needed in relation to the Privacy Act 2020. The second-named and third-named authors, Nikki Chamberlain and Stephen Penk, then address shortfalls and improvements needed in the common law
Privacy and Māori Concepts
No full textIn this chapter, we aim to present a Māori conception of privacy that may challenge some of the values discussed by other authors in this book. We want to explore the idea of privacy and what it means for Māori. As Māori, when we think about privacy, we think about tapu – a Māori concept that defines things that are special or restricted, including the human person, information, places and objects, and indicates sensitivity or risk. The value structure that defines and regulates tapu and
other Māori concepts is tikanga – Māori customary law, also known as the “first law” of Aotearoa. There are some similarities in Māori and Pākehā (European) concepts
of privacy, such as the desire to protect the physical person and the intangible essence of what it means to be human. Pākehā concerns regarding the holding and
dissemination of information also resonate with Māori values. However, there are also differences between Māori and Pākehā beliefs. The most significant of these, in our view, is the notion of collective privacy that demonstrates the Māori connection to group identity and living in a manner that maximises the collective good
The Common Law Tort of Invasion of Privacy in New Zealand
No full textAlthough the New Zealand Court of Appeal first recognised a public disclosure/private fact privacy tort in 2005, and the High Court an intrusion form of the tort in 2012, the genesis of the tort was an article written by two American authors in 1890, at a time when surreptitious photography and the unauthorised use of photographs were matters of concern. Warren and Brandeis grounded the right to privacy in the inviolate personality, and the need for individuals to have personal space that was free from the demands of the larger social order.
Legend originally held that the article was written after unwanted publicity in the gossip columns detailing a party held by the wife of SD Warren to celebrate their daughter’s wedding. It comes as no surprise that the rise of gossip such as this was attributed to the excesses of the media. Today, similar concerns are still expressed, particularly about the tabloid press, but the press in turn has become increasingly concerned about the potential erosion of freedom of expression by the invasion of privacy tort.
Despite this early recognition of the need to protect privacy interests, it was almost a hundred years before the New Zealand courts evinced an interest in protecting privacy by a new common law cause of action. This was not because privacy was not recognised as important, but rather it was due to the belief that the existing common law torts, such as intentional infliction of emotional distress, trespass to land, nuisance, defamation and the like, provided adequate protection if an individual’s privacy was invaded. It was also clear that the relationship of any form of invasion of privacy tort with the older tort of defamation required proper analysis and reconciliation. Added to this was definitional concern for the ambit of the tort. Any potential recognition of a new tort protecting privacy was not helped by the categorical refusal of the English courts of the time to recognise a common law action for invasion of privacy.https://auckland.primo.exlibrisgroup.com/permalink/64UAUCK_INST/13vfdcn/alma9926549798080209
The Privacy Acts 1993 and 2020
No full textThe first Privacy Act, introduced in 1993, was ground-breaking in its time, especially inasmuch as it applied not only to the public sector (as in many other jurisdictions) but also to the private sector (uniquely in New Zealand at the time).
In 2011, when the Act had already been in place for some 18 years, its operation and effectiveness were reviewed by the New Zealand Law Commission as Stage 4 of a comprehensive review of privacy law. Technological advances and other factors since the passing of the first Privacy Act gave rise to more than 140 amendments being recommended by the Commission.
The response of the Government at the time was not to amend the 1993 Act extensively, but rather to introduce a new Privacy Bill leading to a new statute (as indeed the Law Commission had suggested). The Bill was expected to be introduced in 2015, but in fact it took until 2018 for the Privacy Bill to come before the House, and until 2020 for it to be passed into law. Most provisions of the Privacy Act 2020 came into effect on 1 December 2020 so that, at the time of writing, it has been in effect for nearly a year and a half.
The new 2020 statute does not, in fact, represent a wholesale replacement of the 1993 Act. Although it has introduced some significant new features, it retains
most of its predecessor’s provisions, albeit the corresponding sections have been re-ordered, re-numbered and sometimes tweaked. A quick survey of the comparative table in Appendix 1 will show that most features of the 1993 Act are preserved in the current statute. Accordingly, the jurisprudence of the earlier Act remains applicable.
It has been said, by the Privacy Commissioner on several occasions, and by others, that the 2020 Act is really an Act for 2011, incorporating many of the Law Commission’s 2011 recommendations but disregarding some important recent technological developments as well as international legislative trends.
In this chapter, I preserve much of the corresponding chapter in the second edition of this book, dealing with the background to the Privacy Act 1993, its operation, key features and shortcomings. That is followed by consideration of the changes (that is, new features or improvements) brought by the 2020 Act. Lastly, deficiencies in the current statute are addressed
Information Privacy Law in the Data Economy: Shifting From a Property-Like Model (of Consent and Control) to a Fiduciary-Like Model (of Trust, Confidence and Loyalty)
No full textThe modern information age poses unique and vexing challenges to privacy. It brings with it new technologies and institutions that threaten to erode our privacy interests. The information age is marked by a digital economy built on the collection of data from consumers, the processing of that data by machine learning algorithms, and the use of the information and behavioural inferences extrapolated from the original dataset for targeted advertisements and manipulation of users. Put
simply, online service providers and businesses (also known as ‘corporate data controllers’) provide
goods and services to consumers in return for their personal data. The result is a digital economy
run by transferring data (also known as the ‘data economy’). The data economy has given rise to
complex and novel privacy practices and problems that require us to rethink our current approach
to information privacy law. New social circumstances require new legal thinking. But all legal
thinking has a foot in the past. The question that this Thesis seeks to address is which legal
concepts should be retained or newly adopted in thinking about information privacy in the data
economy. In particular, the Thesis investigates the question of how to regulate novel privacy
problems relating to the collection, processing, storage, and use of personal data and data-derived
insights by corporate data controllers to influence human behaviour (also known as the ‘data
economy problem’). The Thesis explores a paradigm shift from the individualistic, control paradigm
to a more relational, collectivist, and structural paradigm. It examines proposals for a fiduciary
model of information privacy, drawing analogies between data controllers and professional advisory
and trustees. The Thesis ultimately concludes that although equity and fiduciary-like principles
might provide a helpful frame of reference for thinking about information privacy in the data
economy moving forward, any juridical claims to treat data controllers as actual fiduciaries (as
some scholars suggest) is a step too far
Privacy and Employment
No full textThis chapter is an inquiry into aspects of privacy in the workplace, or legitimate expectations of privacy in the employment relationship. It canvasses both the employment jurisdiction, based in the Employment Relations Authority and Employment Court, and the privacy jurisdiction, based in the Office of the Privacy Commissioner and the Human Rights Review Tribunal (HRRT). Aggrieved individuals (whether employers or employees) may, of course, seek redress through the courts of general jurisdiction, by way of actions for invasion of privacy and/ or breach of confidence. The focus of this chapter is, however, on the specialist jurisdictions
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
Full text linkThe present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
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