1,720,971 research outputs found

    Social corrections act as a double-edged sword by reducing the perceived accuracy of false and real news in the UK, Germany, and Italy

    No full text
    Corrective or refutational posts from ordinary users on social media have the potential to improve the online information ecosystem. While initial evidence of these social corrections is promising, a better understanding of the effects across different topics, formats, and audiences is needed. In three pre-registered experiments (N = 1944 UK, N = 2467 Italy, N = 2210 Germany) where respondents completed a social media post assessment task with false and true news posts on various topics (e.g., health, climate change, technology), we find that social corrections reduce perceived accuracy of and engagement with false news posts. We also find that social corrections that flag true news as false decrease perceived accuracy of and engagement with true news posts. We did not find evidence to support moderation of these effects by correction strength, anti-expert sentiments, cognitive reflection capacities, or susceptibility to social influence. While social corrections can be effective for false news, they may also undermine belief in true news.</p

    The loss of trust in the European Union during the great recession since 2007: The role of heuristics from the national political system

    No full text
    How can we explain the decline in support for the European Union (EU) and the idea of European integration after the onset of the great recession in the fall of 2007? Did the economic crisis and the austerity policies that the EU imposed—in tandem with the IMF—on several member countries help cause this drop? While there is some evidence for this direct effect of EU policies, we find that the most significant determinant of trust and support for the EU remains the level of trust in national governments. Based on cue theory and using concepts of diffuse and specific support, we find that support for the EU is derived from evaluations of national politics and policy, which Europeans know far better than the remote political system of the EU. This effect, however, is somewhat muted for those sophisticated Europeans that are more knowledgeable about the EU and are able to form opinions about it independently of the national contexts in which they live. We also find that the recent economic crisis has led to a discernible increase in the number of those who are disillusioned with politics both at the national and the supranational level. We analyze 133 national surveys from 27 EU countries by estimating a series of cross-classified multilevel logistic regression models

    The EU may have a democratic deficit, but national governments are facing an even greater legitimacy crisis

    No full text
    Trust in the EU has declined in several countries since the start of the financial crisis in 2007. Using Eurobarometer data, Besir Ceka compares trust in the EU with the trust citizens place in the national governments of EU states. He notes that while both have declined during the crisis, most states still show higher levels of trust in the EU’s institutions than they do in national governments. This suggests that concerns over the EU’s democratic deficit should be expanded to include the legitimacy of governments at the national level

    The perils of political competition: explaining participation and trust in political parties in Eastern Europe

    Get PDF
    This thesis investigates the determinants of conventional political participation such as voting, contacting officials and attending political meetings in Eastern Europe. The central argument of this paper is that, in postcommunist Europe, vibrant and robust political competition has stifled direct political participation of the citizens. To make this case, I analyze survey data to identify the individual and country level factors that determine the likelihood of political participation at the individual level. The results point in one direction: the postcommunist polities that saw vibrant political competition in their electoral arenas also witnessed the highest levels of disillusionment with political parties and, consequently, with the political system. Decades of monopolization of the electoral arena by communist parties left Eastern Europeans ill prepared to appreciate vigorous political competition, which, depending on the intensity of the competition, tended to depress trust in political parties as an institution and, consequently, stifled political participation

    The Causes and Consequences of Political Trust and Satisfaction With Democracy in Eastern Europe

    Get PDF
    In my dissertation, I study the causes and consequences of political trust and satisfaction with democracy in Eastern Europe. The extent to which citizens trust key political institutions has significant ramifications for their political behavior, for electoral dynamics, and for the consolidation of democracy in a country. Three major questions about how citizens evaluate the performance of democracy and democratic institutions have shaped my research: (1) the causes of political trust; (2) the effect of media exposure on political attitudes; and (3) the political behavior of dissatisfied citizens. Thus, I investigate the main factors that explain political trust and satisfaction with democracy and then explore the consequences of such political attitudes for electoral behavior. My findings suggest that the intensity of political competition--and the extent to which opposition parties criticize, and expose the misdeeds of the government--has a significant effect on trust in political institutions. I also find that exposure to foreign owned media, which rely on sensationalist coverage, depresses political trust and satisfaction with democracy. The opposite is the case for state-owned media because most state-owned media in Eastern Europe are controlled by the governing parties of the day and, thus, the news coverage tends to be more positive and focuses less on the failures and more on the achievements of the government. As for the effect of political attitudes on electoral behavior, I find that citizens who do not trust key political institutions are less likely to be civically active and turn out to vote. If they do vote, however, I show that dissatisfied citizens are far more likely to vote for extreme nationalist and radical left parties than for other more moderate non-mainstream parties.Doctor of Philosoph
    corecore