1,721,088 research outputs found

    The Effect of Local and Global Pollution Mandates on a Nonrenewable Resource

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    Many regions such as the European Union and states in the U.S. have introduced mandates aimed at restricting carbon emissions. On the other hand, the stated goal of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) which provides the science behind the current global climate negotiations is to stabilize the atmospheric stock of carbon. How do these multiple pollution control efforts interact when the same nonrenewable resource (e.g., coal) creates the externality? In this paper we show that environmental mandates that aim to reduce emissions and those aiming to limit the stock of pollution, may not compliment each other. For example, a stricter emissions mandate may actually increase the global pollution stock and hasten the date when the global pollution mandate becomes binding. A stricter local mandate will lead to the global mandate binding for a longer time period and a delay in the eventual transition to a clean substitute.dynamics; environmental regulation; externalities; resource allocation; energy markets

    Climate change and carbon capture and storage

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    Climate change and carbon capture and storage / Michel Moreaux and Cees Withagen. IDEI ; Toulouse School ofEconomics, April 2013, 29 p. (Working paper  ; IDEI-774) http://idei.fr/doc/wp/2013/wp_idei_774.pdf Abstract : We study optimal carbon capture and storage (CCS), taking into account damages incurred from the accumulation of carbon in the atmosphere and exhaustibility of fossil fuel reserves. High carbon concentrations call for full CCS. We identify conditions under which partial or no CC..

    Climat : papiers de recherche moissonnés (24 novembre 2016)

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    Limit Pricing, Climate Policies, and Imperfect Substitution / Gerard van der Meijden and Cees Withagen. Tinbergen Institute, Oct. 2016, 25 p. (Discussion Paper TI 2016-089/VIII) http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tin:wpaper:20160089 The effects of climate policies are often studied under the assumption of perfectly competitive markets for fossil fuels. In this paper, we allow for monopolistic fossil fuel supply. We show that, if fossil and renewable energy sources are perfect substitutes, a phase w..

    Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis

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    The present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed

    Introduction

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    Rationing on the Bonds Market

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    A MIXED BENTHAM-RAWLS CRITERION FOR INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY: THEORY AND IMPLICATIONS

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    Ranking development programs using integrals of discounted utilities can yield drastic consequences that offend our sense of justice. New alternative social welfare criteria should be considered. A reaction to discounted utilitarianism is to moderate its effects by adding to the social welfare function a second term that takes seriously the welfare of the generations that live in the far distant future. Chichilnisky proposes a social welfare function that has two desirable properties: (i) non-dictatorship of the present, and (ii) non-dictatorship of the future. However, in many economic models, there exists no optimal path under the Chichilnisky criterion. We introduce a third desideratum: "non-dictatorship of the least advantaged," and propose a new welfare criterion that is morally compelling. It is a weighted average of two terms: (a) the sum of discounted utilities, and (b) the utility level of the least advantaged generation. We derive necessary conditions to characterize growth paths that satisfy our criterion, and show that in some models with familiar dynamic specifications, an optimal path exists and displays appealing characteristics.
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