188,112 research outputs found
Carruthers' marvelous magical mindreading machine
No full textCarruthers presents an interesting analysis of confabulation and a clear attack on introspection. Yet his theory-based alternative is a mechanistic view of "mindreading" which neglects the fact that social understanding occurs within a network of social relationships. In particular, the role of language in his model is too simple
Expédition Douglas Carruthers en Mongolie
No full textZimmermann Maurice. Expédition Douglas Carruthers en Mongolie. In: Annales de Géographie, t. 20, n°114, 1911. p. 469
Why We Must Care About Animal Consciousness: Against Carruthers’ Nihilism
No full textOne of the most challenging positions in contemporary philosophy of animal consciousness is that proposed by Peter Carruthers (2018a, 2018b, 2019, 2020). According to Carruthers, there is no fact of the matter about whether animals instantiate conscious states. This radical conclusion arises from the conjunction of two theses he endorses: the global workspace theory and the phenomenal concept strategy. This paper argues against Carruthers’ radical viewpoint. Its structure is as follows. First, I will present Carruthers’ theses on consciousness, such as the all-or-nothing characterization of consciousness and the distinction between ‘qualia realism’ and ‘qualia irrealism’. Subsequently, I will provide a brief overview of the global workspace theory and the phenomenal concept strategy. Next, I will reconstruct the arguments that underpin Carruthers’ skepticism about attributing consciousness to animals. Finally, I will present two arguments that challenge Carruthers’ position, highlighting inherent contradictions within his project. Contrary to Carruthers’ controversial assertion (2020, p. 18), I will conclude that animal consciousness deserves attention from both philosophy and the cognitive sciences
Carruthers, Pamela Isabel Jameson
No full textCarruthers [née Torrie], Pamela Isabel Jameson (1916–2009), showjumping course designer, was born on 11 August 1916 at 19 Atholl Crescent, Edinburgh, the only child of Thomas George Jameson Torrie (1880–1916), a lieutenant-colonel in the Life Guards, and his wife, Esmé Muriel, née Crabbe (1895–1984). Her parents had married in Killin, Perthshire, on 6 September 1915, and her father was killed in action on the western front in November 1916. In 1920 her mother married Basil Eddis, a merchant in India, where Pamela spent part of her childhood. After the breakdown of this marriage Pamela and her mother moved back to Britain, where her mother was married for a third time, to Ralph Hope Vere. In her late teens Pamela and her family lived in Dumfriesshire. She was educated at Westonbirt School, near Tetbury, and at the Ozanne finishing school, Paris. She embarked on her riding career at an early age and while in France she attended a course at Saumur, the French cavalry school, as part of her education. On returning to Scotland she opened her own riding school in Dumfriesshire and commenced her career as a showjumper and a hunter exhibitor. On 8 November 1939 she married, in All Saints (Episcopal) Church, Lockerbie, Hew Douglas Carruthers (b. 1914), RAF officer, son of Lieutenant-Colonel Francis John Carruthers, army officer. Eventually the couple bought a farm in Malmesbury, Wiltshire. They had two sons: Christopher Hew, born in Hoddom, Dumfriesshire, in 1940, and John Anthony, born in Chippenham, Wiltshire, in 1941.</p
Why We Must Care About Animal Consciousness: Against Carruthers’ Nihilism
No full textOne of the most challenging positions in contemporary philosophy of animal consciousness is that proposed by Peter Carruthers (2018a, 2018b, 2019, 2020). According to Carruthers, there is no fact of the matter about whether animals instantiate conscious states. This radical conclusion arises from the conjunction of two theses he endorses: the global workspace theory and the phenomenal concept strategy. This paper argues against Carruthers’ radical viewpoint. Its structure is as follows. First, I will present Carruthers’ theses on consciousness, such as the all-or-nothing characterization of consciousness and the distinction between ‘qualia realism’ and ‘qualia irrealism’. Subsequently, I will provide a brief overview of the global workspace theory and the phenomenal concept strategy. Next, I will reconstruct the arguments that underpin Carruthers’ skepticism about attributing consciousness to animals. Finally, I will present two arguments that challenge Carruthers’ position, highlighting inherent contradictions within his project. Contrary to Carruthers’ controversial assertion (2020, p. 18), I will conclude that animal consciousness deserves attention from both philosophy and the cognitive sciences
Why We Must Care About Animal Consciousness: Against Carruthers’ Nihilism
No full textOne of the most challenging positions in contemporary philosophy of animal consciousness is that proposed by Peter Carruthers (2018a, 2018b, 2019, 2020). According to Carruthers, there is no fact of the matter about whether animals instantiate conscious states. This radical conclusion arises from the conjunction of two theses he endorses: the global workspace theory and the phenomenal concept strategy. This paper argues against Carruthers’ radical viewpoint. Its structure is as follows. First, I will present Carruthers’ theses on consciousness, such as the all-or-nothing characterization of consciousness and the distinction between ‘qualia realism’ and ‘qualia irrealism’. Subsequently, I will provide a brief overview of the global workspace theory and the phenomenal concept strategy. Next, I will reconstruct the arguments that underpin Carruthers’ skepticism about attributing consciousness to animals. Finally, I will present two arguments that challenge Carruthers’ position, highlighting inherent contradictions within his project. Contrary to Carruthers’ controversial assertion (2020, p. 18), I will conclude that animal consciousness deserves attention from both philosophy and the cognitive sciences
Carruthers' theorem for any spin and parastatistics
No full textIt is shown that Carruthers' theorem (that particle multiplets of half-integral isospin cannot be self-conjugate) holds even for particles which obey the general parastatistics instead of the usual Bose or Fermi statistics
Why We Must Care About Animal Consciousness: Against Carruthers’ Nihilism
No full textOne of the most challenging positions in contemporary philosophy of animal consciousness is that proposed by Peter Carruthers (2018a, 2018b, 2019, 2020). According to Carruthers, there is no fact of the matter about whether animals instantiate conscious states. This radical conclusion arises from the conjunction of two theses he endorses: the global workspace theory and the phenomenal concept strategy. This paper argues against Carruthers’ radical viewpoint. Its structure is as follows. First, I will present Carruthers’ theses on consciousness, such as the all-or-nothing characterization of consciousness and the distinction between ‘qualia realism’ and ‘qualia irrealism’. Subsequently, I will provide a brief overview of the global workspace theory and the phenomenal concept strategy. Next, I will reconstruct the arguments that underpin Carruthers’ skepticism about attributing consciousness to animals. Finally, I will present two arguments that challenge Carruthers’ position, highlighting inherent contradictions within his project. Contrary to Carruthers’ controversial assertion (2020, p. 18), I will conclude that animal consciousness deserves attention from both philosophy and the cognitive sciences
Paroles et silences.. (CEMA -Paris IV)
No full textCarruthers Leo Martin. Paroles et silences.. (CEMA -Paris IV). In: Bulletin des anglicistes médiévistes, N°59, été 2001. p. 48
The International Medieval Sermon Studies Society
No full textCarruthers Leo Martin. The International Medieval Sermon Studies Society. In: Bulletin des anglicistes médiévistes, N°42, hiver 1992. p. 695
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