1,721,039 research outputs found
The right to be killed: reassessing the case for the moral right to voluntary active euthanasia
Get PDFThis thesis defends an individual's moral right to be aided in dying by a physician (that is, voluntary active euthanasia, or VAE), but departs significantly from the view in its favor generally accepted in the bioethics literature. The prevailing view appeals to both respect for an individual's autonomy and promotion of an individual's well-being as necessary conditions for a right to VAE, so as to justify the right only for those suffering grave illnesses and/or disabilities. The author argues that such a view is logically untenable; one or another aspect must be given up. Since invoking the premise that certain individuals would be better off dead necessarily relies on controversial assumptions about both the value of life and the nature and value of death, about which reasonable people disagree, it is the justification from an individual's best interest which must be excluded in a liberal society. The author endorses a self-determination justification for the right to VAE, but rejects understanding this in terms of respecting personal autonomy, instead making the case for a right to VAE grounded in self-ownership. The author’s main conclusion is that the right to VAE is a general right applying to all competent adults, not only those suffering grave illnesses or disabilities, or those whose choice for VAE is an exercise of autonomy. Moreover, by analyzing the basis of physician authority over prescription medicine and how this can be justified to a society of self-owners, she maintains that individuals have not only the right to choose VAE without state interference, but also the right to be provided VAE by doctors. Nevertheless, both rights are compatible with reasonable limitations to protect both the interests of VAE seekers and the rights of others
Equality and global justice
Get PDFThis dissertation aims to defend an egalitarian conception of global distributive justice. Many hold that the scope of egalitarian justice should be defined by membership of a single political community but my dissertation will challenge this view. I begin by considering three distinctive arguments against the ideal of global equality. They maintain that egalitarian obligations of justice apply only to those people who are subject to the same sovereign authority which coerces them to abide by its rules; or to those who contribute to the preservation of each other’s autonomy through collectively sustaining a state; or to those who belong to the same nation. The first three chapters deal with these arguments respectively. Central to these arguments is the assumption that the domestic and the global contexts are different in some morally relevant way so egalitarian principles of justice apply to the former but not the latter. After rebutting these anti-egalitarian arguments I turn to the more constructive task of developing a form of global egalitarianism that is grounded in the value of equality as a normative ideal of how human relations should be conducted. I argue in Chapter 4 that relational equality—that is, standing in relations of equality to one another (rather than relations characterized by domination or exploitation)—is a demand of justice in the global context. This ideal of relational equality has distributive implications. In Chapter 5 I try to spell out these implications by defending a set of principles of global distributive justice that would follow from our commitment to global relational equality. In the sixth and final chapter, I discuss what responsibilities we have in relation to global injustice, how to distribute the burdens associated with these responsibilities, and whether they are excessively demanding on complying agents
Justice, governance and climate change: designing fair and effective climate institutions
Get PDFMultilateral efforts are yet to produce meaningful action on climate change. Part of the problem with these approaches is a perceived lack of fairness among state actors. Whilst academic discussion has traditionally focused on the issue of distributive fairness, very little has been said about procedural fairness in this respect. To this end, this thesis analyses principles of procedural justice in order to develop practical policy measures for institutional design. It does so in four steps. First, it argues that procedural justice is important for reaching a mutually acceptable agreement when there is reasonable disagreement about the substantive ends that collective action should achieve. Second, it develops several principles of procedural justice that should govern the decision-making processes of climate institutions. This includes principles that govern who should participate in decisions, how these decisions should take place, and how transparent they should be. Third, it considers the relative value that procedural justice should be given against other important ends. In doing so, it proposes that procedural justice is a fundamental feature of fair and effective climate institutions. Finally, it considers what this means for climate institutions in practice by determining a set of pragmatic policy prescriptions that can guide the design of climate governance institutions
On affluence and poverty: morality, motivation and practice in a global age
Get PDFThis thesis looks at the failure of individual people living in affluent societies to do more to help those living in conditions of extreme poverty at the present moment. Affluent people have the capacity to assist, by contributing additional funds to aid and humanitarian organisations. Given an understanding of what is at stake, the fact that they fail to do so is both morally problematic and difficult to explain. Yet, without an understanding of the causes of inaction, it is difficult to know what measures may be taken to alleviate extreme suffering in the world today. The thesis draws upon different philosophical accounts of practical reason to argue that the conduct of the affluent can only be understood in one of three ways: these people may lack decisive reason to assist, they may be misinformed, or they may be rationally deficient in some regard. Considering each possibility in turn, it advances two central arguments. Firstly, the normative reasons claim is sound: affluent people, who do not incur minor costs by assisting, ought to do more. Secondly, these people tend to have false beliefs about the nature of poverty, to make substantive errors of judgement, and to follow flawed patterns of reasoning when they deliberate about what to do. Taken together, these factors explain their failure to act. Building upon this diagnosis, the thesis then considers how to respond to the problem of inaction, advancing a solution that is institutional in character. It argues for the construction of a division of labour between state and citizen, at the national level, which would see political institutions take on responsibility for poverty eradication, thereby leaving individuals freer to pursue their own personal goals and objectives. In order to perform this function effectively, wealthy nations would have to improve the quantity and quality of assistance that they provide to low-income countries. They would also have to cease partaking in practices that harm the global poor. This approach has a number of advantages over reliance on private philanthropy alone: it forms part of a fair and effective solution to the problem of motivating assistance, the arrangement it proposes is both stable and legitimate, and it is also something that could be achieved in practice. Therefore, it represents part of the best possible way in which to proceed
A theory of dystopian liberalism: A restatement of Shklar's liberalism of fear
Get PDFThis dissertation aspires to revive the dystopian liberalism which identifies the avoidance of the worst as the fundamental aim of politics. The theory I present consists of three elements overall: The first element is what I call the Priority Claim, stating that the most important aim of social institutions should, morally speaking, be to avoid cruelty qua worst evil (Part I). The second element is the identification of the informal structure, the set of social norms within a population, as an important site to realize this ideal (Part II). The third element is the application of the principle that cruelty be avoided to the in-formal structure (Part III). This leads to an account of desirable social norms and in turn to a concrete answer to the question how individuals can in their everyday lives do their part to create a world that is overall less cruel and more humane
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
Get PDFThe present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
Procreative justice: the ethics of creating and raising children
Get PDFDespite its immense personal significance, procreation is an inherently other-regarding endeavor. By its very nature, the decision to procreate is the decision to bring into existence another morally considerable being, one who will be exposed to the full range of harms, benefits, and risks that accompany a typical human life, and one who cannot by its nature ever consent to being born. Moreover, when this decision is undertaken in a community of persons, it is also a decision to affect the lives of others in a host of profound (if often underappreciated) ways, from its effects on population size and environmental sustainability, to its consequences for a communityâs distribution of resources. In many cases, of course, these interests coincide: adults need children for their parenting projects, societies need citizens for the maintenance of their institutions, and children themselves are often happy to have been brought into existence. However, as a burgeoning literature is beginning to demonstrate, the various interests that are implicated by procreative decision-making can also come into conflict as well, and in ways that raise basic questions of justice.
This thesis explores five of these questions, and in so doing, seeks to contribute to our understanding of the normative significance of procreation. Chapter One considers the relationship between procreation and child welfare, asking what role (if any) prospective childrenâs interests play in limiting the scope of the right to procreate. Chapters Two and Three consider the relationship between procreation and parenthood, asking whether the act of creating a child generates special rights and/or obligations to parent that child. Chapter Four considers how the significant costs of procreation and parenting ought to be distributed through society, asking whether parents are responsible for paying the full cost of their childrearing projects, or whether childrearing costs should be shared in some way among parents and non-parents alike. Finally, Chapter Five considers our moral obligations to orphaned children, asking whether it is permissible to create new children in conditions where there are already existing children in need of parental care. While numerous positions are defended on each of these interrelated questions, one general conclusion runs through all of them: rather than being viewed as something that is immune from moral scrutiny, or as something that individuals have an unqualified right to do, procreation ought to be viewed as the site of potentially conflicting interests that must be carefully balanced against one another.</p
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