169,957 research outputs found
Commentarii delle cose de Turchi, di Paolo Giouio, et Andrea Gambini, con gli fatti et la vita di Scanderbeg.
No full textEl pie de imp. consta en colofones (v. de E\b4\s y v. de 2K\b4\s)Marca tip. en portSign.: A-D\p8\s, E\p4\s, 2A-2I\p8\s, 2K\p4\s, 3A-3F\p8\s, 3G\p4\sCommentario de Andrea Cambini Fiorentino, della origine de Turchi, et imperio della casa Ottomana Libro primo, con port., pag. y sign. propiasCommentario delle cose de Turchi, et del s. Georgio Scandenberg, principe di Epiro, con la sua vita ..., con port., pag. y sign. propia
“To Bid or Not to Bid, This is the Question: The Italian Experience in Competitive Tendering for Local Bus Services”
No full textCompetitive tendering is a popular mechanism for the provision of local bus services when a major objective is subsidy savings. Despite uncertainties in the legal rules some competitive tendering was implemented in Italy since 1998. The evidence so far is that participants were limited in number, the incumbents were almost everywhere able to gain the franchise, whilst subsidy savings were in many cases negligible. If some “political” conditions favouring more effective tendering procedures are not fulfilled, other regimes should be considered in order to obtain substantial subsidy savings.Local bus services; Competitive Tendering
Investments and Network Competition
No full textThis paper analyzes the impact of two-way access charges on the incentives to invest in networks with different levels of quality. When quality has an impact on all calls initiated by customers (destined both on-net and off-net), we obtain a result of "tacit collusion" even in a symmetric model with two-part pricing. Firms tend to under-invest in quality, and this is exacerbated if they can negotiate reciprocal termination charges above cost. When the quality of off-net calls depends on the interaction between the quality of the two networks, no network has an incentive to jump ahead of its rival by investing more
Carpe Data: Protecting online privacy with naive users
No full textIn this paper, we study the optimal design of incentives to induce a digital platform to limit the extraction of data from users, whose privacy loss is further aggravated by their naive use of the platform. We show that caps on the amount of data collected can induce the optimal data-saving effort by the platform. If the platform's effort is not observable, a menu of data caps should be provided and it entails a higher (lower) loss of privacy for less (more) naive users, relative to the first best. We also show that compensating users for their data can efficiently incentivize effort, but might increase the privacy loss of more naive users
Designing grid tariffs in the presence of distributed generation
No full textFirst published online: 21 November 2019In recent years, an increasing number of electricity consumers have decided to become prosumers. Prosumers can introduce both environmental and social benefits, as well as various utility and regulatory challenges. Utilities and regulators need to either update the current compensation systems and tariff structures or to develop new ones to account for the impact imposed on distribution system operators (DSOs) due to a high penetration rate of distributed generators (DGs), including costs related to connecting DG prosumers to the grid. The goal of this paper is to introduce and examine a novel, multi-part tariff structure that accounts for these costs under the net metering mechanism. Our results show that by applying a multi-part tariff for prosumers, which includes a fixed component that reflects recurring grid-connection costs together with a variable component that reflects the net effect on operating cost of distribution networks, it is possible to alleviate the drawbacks of net metering and optimize prosumption.EU's H2020 research and innovation project: PLANET (Planning and operational tools for optimizing energy flows and synergies between energy networks
Concorrenza ed efficienza nel mercato del commercio elettronico
No full textAs the Internet develops into a robust channel for (e)commerce, many experts state that in online markets competition would be stronger, prices would be much lower and so the market seems to approximate the competitive paradigm. Is this view correct? In this paper we review the growing literature on e-commerce and its market structure, and we analyze, in particular, how the typical ex-post intervention of competition policy could be applied in order to increase digital markets efficiency
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