2,004 research outputs found
The use of economic instruments for pollution control in Latin America: lessons for future policy design*
No full textABSTRACTI review the few programs implemented in Latin America to control pollution with direct economic instruments and draw general lessons for the future implementation of these instruments in the region. The available evidence suggests that a combination of low capacities and political economy issues negatively affected the implementation of these programs. As a result, the capacity of the economic instruments to induce emission reductions cost effectively and their future political viability in these countries in the short- or medium-run may have been compromised. This present state of affairs provides more evidence in favor of the policy recommendation that Latin American countries should build local capacities before implementing direct economic instruments, than in favor of the alternative that these countries should adapt direct economic instruments to their institutional and political characteristics.</jats:p
The Cost-Effective Choice of Policy Instruments to Cap Aggregate Emissions with Costly Enforcement
No full textWe study the cost-e§ectiveness of inducing compliance in a program that caps aggregate emissions of a given pollutant from a set of heterogeneous Örms based on emissions standards and the relative cost-e§ectiveness of such a program with respect to an optimally designed program based on tradable discharge permits. Our analysis considers abatement, monitoring and sanctioning
costs, as well as perfect and imperfect information on the part of the regulator with regard to the pollutersí abatement costs. Under perfect information we Önd that (a) the total cost-e§ective design of a program based on standards is one in which the standards are Örm speciÖc and perfectly enforced, and (b) the total cost of an optimally designed program based on standards is lower than
the total cost of an optimally designed transferable emission permits system, except under special conditions. This is true when it is optimum to induce perfect compliance and when it is not. Under imperfect information, nevertheless, it is only with a system of tradable permits that is perfectly enforced with a constant marginal penalty tied to the price of the permits that the regulator can surmount the informational problem and at the same time minimize the total cost of the program with certainty
Informe final del proyecto: Efectividad de incentivos económicos vs mecanismos para motivar la conducta pro-social en la internalización de externalidades. Una comparación usando experimentos económicos de laboratorio
No full textEn esta investigación se desarrolló un modelo teórico y se desarrollaron y condujeron experimentos económicos de laboratorio con el propósito de evaluar hipótesis sobre la efectividad relativa de incentivos económicos (impuesto) vs mecanismos de motivación intrínseca (mensaje para motivar la conducta pro-social), en la reducción de un mal público. Se realizaron dos conjuntos de experimentos. en uno, el mal público era “real”. en este, las decisiones del laboratorio afectaban la donación resultante a una ONG ambiental. En el segundo conjunto de experimentos, las decisiones de los sujetos afectaban sus ganancias en el laboratorio. Los resultados se pueden resumir de la siguiente manera. En ambos casos, el mensaje reduce la externalidad respecto a la situación de la línea de base (“ausencia de regulación”). Sin embargo, un impuesto es más efectivo que el mensaje, aun cuando este es “bajo” (no es lo suficientemente alto como para inducir la cantidad óptima de la externalidad). En lo que es el aporte completamente novedoso de este proyecto, cuando se implementa en conjunto con el impuesto, el mensaje no logra un resultado adicional en materia de disminución del nivel de actividad que causa la externalidad en los experimentos sin donación, pero sí lo logra en el caso con donación.Agencia Nacional de Investigación e Innovación FCE_1_2019_1_15633
Informe final del proyecto: Efectividad de incentivos económicos vs mecanismos para motivar la conducta pro-social en la internalización de externalidades. Una comparación usando experimentos económicos de laboratorio
No full textEn esta investigación se desarrolló un modelo teórico y se desarrollaron y condujeron experimentos económicos de laboratorio con el propósito de evaluar hipótesis sobre la efectividad relativa de incentivos económicos (impuesto) vs mecanismos de motivación intrínseca (mensaje para motivar la conducta pro-social), en la reducción de un mal público. Se realizaron dos conjuntos de experimentos. en uno, el mal público era “real”. en este, las decisiones del laboratorio afectaban la donación resultante a una ONG ambiental. En el segundo conjunto de experimentos, las decisiones de los sujetos afectaban sus ganancias en el laboratorio. Los resultados se pueden resumir de la siguiente manera. En ambos casos, el mensaje reduce la externalidad respecto a la situación de la línea de base (“ausencia de regulación”). Sin embargo, un impuesto es más efectivo que el mensaje, aun cuando este es “bajo” (no es lo suficientemente alto como para inducir la cantidad óptima de la externalidad). En lo que es el aporte completamente novedoso de este proyecto, cuando se implementa en conjunto con el impuesto, el mensaje no logra un resultado adicional en materia de disminución del nivel de actividad que causa la externalidad en los experimentos sin donación, pero sí lo logra en el caso con donación.Agencia Nacional de Investigación e Innovación FCE_1_2019_1_15633
Complementarity of inspections and permits as leverages for capping emissions: experimental evidence
No full textRecent analysis on the cost-effectiveness of inducing perfect compliance in cap and trade programs is based on the possibility that a regulator has of inducing each individual firm to emit the same level of pollution by altering the supply of permits and the monitoring probability according to theoretical models that assume rational and risk-neutral agents. In this paper we test this possibility based on a series of laboratory experiments. Contrary to what theory predicts, our experiments suggest that a regulator cannot manipulate the supply of permits and the monitoring probability as suggested by these models and keep the level of emissions of each individual firm constant. This result does not depend on whether or not we control for risk aversion. Policy implications are discussed
The regulatory choice of noncompliance in the lab: effect on quantities, prices, and implications for the design of a cost-effective policy
No full textRecent theoretical developments show the conditions under which it is cost-effective for the regulator to induce perfect compliance in cap-and-trade programs. These conditions are based on the ability that a regulator with perfect information has to induce the firms to emit any desired level with different combinations of the number of permits supplied to the market and the monitoring probability, assuming that firms are expected profit maximizers. In this paper, we test this hypothesis with a series of laboratory experiments. Our results suggest that firms may behave significantly different from what these models predict precisely when the different combinations of the supply of permits and the monitoring probability induce compliance versus noncompliance. More specifically, by allowing noncompliance in a manner consistent with theory, the regulator could produce a decrease in emissions and an increase in the market price of tradable permits that is not predicted by the theoretical models. The implications for the cost-effective design of environmental policy are discussed
Getting polluters to yell the truth
No full textWe study the problem of a regulator who must control the emissions of a given pollutant from a series of industries when the firms’ abatement costs are unknown. We develop a mechanism in which the regulator asks firms to report their abatement costs and implements the most stringent emissions standard consistent with the firms’ declarations. He also inspects one of the firms in each industry which declared the cost structure consistent with the least stringent emissions standard and with an arbitrarily small probability, he discovers whether the report was true or not. The firm is punished with an arbitrarily small fine if and only if its report was false. This mechanism is simple, is implementable in practice, its unique equilibrium is truth telling by firms, it implements the first best pollution standards and shares some features of the regulatory processes actually observed in reality
Uncertain penalties and compliance
No full textUsing a series of laboratory economic experiments, we study the effect of information regarding the amount of the fine on the individual decision to violate an emission standard. Specifically, the analysis considers variations in the information available for the regulated subjects regarding the amount of the monetary sanction, as well as variations in the stringency in the inspection effort by the regulator.Our results suggest that in the case of a regulation design that induces compliance, the presence of uncertainty regarding the amount of the fine may increase violations in certain cases. When enforcement is not sufficient to induce compliance, the uncertainty regarding the amount of the fine does not have any effect on the level of transgression. Overall, the results suggest that a cost-effective regulation design should consider including public information on the consequences of an offense
Uncertain penalties and compliance
No full textWe present the results of a series of laboratory economic experiments designed to study compliance behavior of polluting firms when information on the penalty is uncertain. The experiments consist of a regulatory environment in which university students face emission standards and an enforcement mechanism composed of audit probabilities and penalties (conditional on detection of a violation). We examine how uncertainty on the penalty affects the compliance decision and the extent of violation under two enforcement levels: one in which the regulator induces perfect compliance and another one in which it does not. Our results suggest that in the first case, uncertain penalties increase the extent of the violations of those firms with higher marginal benefits. When enforcement is not sufficient to induce compliance, the uncertain penalties do not have any statistically significant effect on compliance
behavior. Overall, the results suggest that a cost-effective design of emission standards should consider including public and complete information on the penalties for violations
Exposures to Particulate Matter from the Eruptions of the Puyehue Volcano and Birth Outcomes in Montevideo, Uruguay
No full textBackground : The ashes and dust resulting from the 2011 eruptions of the Puyehue volcano inChile more than doubled monthly averages of PM10 concentrations in Montevideo, Uruguay. Fewstudies have taken advantage of natural experiments to assess the relationship between ambient airpollutant concentrations and birth outcomes.
Objectives : In this study we explored the effect of particulate matter with diameter of ≤ 10 μm(PM10) on perinatal outcomes in Uruguay, a middle-income country in South America with levelsof PM 10 that in general do not exceed the recommended thresholds. The analyzed outcomes arepreterm birth, term birth weight, and term low birth weight.
Methods : We took advantage of the sharp variation in PM10 concentrations due to the Puyehueeruptions to estimate the associations between mother’s exposure to PM10 in each trimester of preg-nancy and perinatal outcomes. We use birth registries for 2010–2013 and control for covariates, including maternal and pregnancy characteristics, weather, co-pollutants, and calendar quarter andhospital indicators.
Results: A 10-μg/m3 increase in exposure to PM10 during the third trimester was associated with ahigher likelihood of a preterm birth [odds ratio (OR) = 1.10; 95% CI: 1.03, 1.19]. The associationwas robust to different model specifications, and increased with categorical exposure levels (OR forthird-trimester PM10 ≥ 70 vs. < 30 μg/m3 = 5.24; 95% CI: 3.40, 8.08). Exposures were not consis-tently associated with birth weight or low birth weight among term births, though second-trimesterexposures were associated with higher birth weight, contrary to expectations.
Conclusions: Taking advantage of a natural experiment, we found evidence that exposure to highlevels of PM10 during the third trimester of pregnancy may have increased preterm births amongwomen in Montevideo, Uruguay
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