1,720,974 research outputs found
Institutions and Stakeholder Influence on CEO Compensation and Corporate Social Responsibility
Full text linkThis thesis of three (stand-alone) chapters centres around the premise that institutions and stakeholders influence corporate policy, in particular with regards to CEO Compensation, and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Chapter 1 focuses on the implicit regulation that unions may pose to corporate governance, and finds that during the financial crisis (2008-2011), union density at corporate level was positively related to non-equity components of CEO pay such as salary and pension contributions with no significant effects on equity components such as options and restricted stock units. These findings have some precedence in the literature but they also go counter to more prominent theoretical predictions and empirical research which posit that unions should in fact reduce CEO compensation. Chapter 2 looks at the influence of unions on CSR profiles and, through the lenses of stakeholder and neo-institutional theories, finds that unions generally tend to gear companies towards more internal rather than external CSR. However, the observed effect of unions on the internal-external CSR profile of companies is not linear. At low levels of unionization, there is a substitution effect where companies substitute internal for external CSR, but at higher levels of unionization, both elements complement and reinforce each other. Drawing from the employment relations literature, I propose that the complementarity perhaps points to a labour-management relationship which is based on more equally-shared power, trust, and loyalty. Chapter 3 looks at the causal impact of regulatory changes on Corporate Social Performance. Using difference-in-difference techniques, I find that forcing companies to disclose CSR practices makes them improve their social performance. I attribute this finding to firms facing higher social pressures and firms being soft targets for activists given that their CSR practices become public information. Further, I find that the social and governance elements of CSR improve more than the environment aspect. This finding bodes well with stakeholder identification and salience theory, which posits that stakeholders who have power and whose claims are more legitimate and urgent will be given more attention by management. All three chapters reinforce the hypothesis that institutional pressure and stakeholder pressure have an impact on Corporate policy. The data used in this thesis come from new and proprietary sources, and cover three different countries (Canada, the UK, and India), adding to the expansion of the management literature.Ph.D
The effects of mandatory CSR reporting on corporate social performance: does state regulation lead to desirable outcomes?
No full textThe role of unions in corporate social performance
No full textThis paper was also presented at LERA/AEA/ASSA Conference, Boston, MA
Do highly unionized companies compensate their CEOs less in periods of financial distress? Evidence from Canada
Full text linkIn this article, the author studies the strategic interaction between employee stakeholders, in particular labor unions, and top management, and he evaluates the effect of the two parties’ inherent competitive rent-seeking behavior on CEO pay. Using a panel of firms listed on the S&P/TSX Composite Index, the author shows that CEO compensation withstood the financial crisis (2008–2011) despite lower and even negative corporate performance. Further, highly unionized companies were associated with higher CEO pay in terms of non-equity elements such as salary and pension allocations. The presence of unions had no observed effect in reducing bonuses, stock options, and restricted stock units. These findings have implications for the debate on income inequality and the power of unions to bring about change
Why pay packages based on fair criteria matter
No full textHappiness has a large relational (or relative) component. The amount of utility an individual derives from, say, an annual salary of V compares to the salary $X received by a referent other (for example, a co-worker [Bruce Kaufman, 1999
The influence of unions on companies’ CSR profiles: more internal policies and programs, but not always at the expense of external endeavors.
Full text linkThis paper compares the CSR profiles of companies operating under the same macroeconomic institutions but with different levels of union density. Drawing from stakeholder and neo-institutional theories that distinguish between internal and external actions, this paper finds that companies initially have to substitute internal for external CSR. After some experience dealing with unions, companies can complement both actions. There is perhaps a reinforcement of mutual trust and loyalty, and has implications for managerial prerogatives
Institutions and Stakeholder Influence on CEO Compensation and Corporate Social Responsibility
No full textThis thesis of three (stand-alone) chapters centres around the premise that institutions and stakeholders influence corporate policy, in particular with regards to CEO Compensation, and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Chapter 1 focuses on the implicit regulation that unions may pose to corporate governance, and finds that during the financial crisis (2008-2011), union density at corporate level was positively related to non-equity components of CEO pay such as salary and pension contributions with no significant effects on equity components such as options and restricted stock units. These findings have some precedence in the literature but they also go counter to more prominent theoretical predictions and empirical research which posit that unions should in fact reduce CEO compensation. Chapter 2 looks at the influence of unions on CSR profiles and, through the lenses of stakeholder and neo-institutional theories, finds that unions generally tend to gear companies towards more internal rather than external CSR. However, the observed effect of unions on the internal-external CSR profile of companies is not linear. At low levels of unionization, there is a substitution effect where companies substitute internal for external CSR, but at higher levels of unionization, both elements complement and reinforce each other. Drawing from the employment relations literature, I propose that the complementarity perhaps points to a labour-management relationship which is based on more equally-shared power, trust, and loyalty. Chapter 3 looks at the causal impact of regulatory changes on Corporate Social Performance. Using difference-in-difference techniques, I find that forcing companies to disclose CSR practices makes them improve their social performance. I attribute this finding to firms facing higher social pressures and firms being soft targets for activists given that their CSR practices become public information. Further, I find that the social and governance elements of CSR improve more than the environment aspect. This finding bodes well with stakeholder identification and salience theory, which posits that stakeholders who have power and whose claims are more legitimate and urgent will be given more attention by management. All three chapters reinforce the hypothesis that institutional pressure and stakeholder pressure have an impact on Corporate policy. The data used in this thesis come from new and proprietary sources, and cover three different countries (Canada, the UK, and India), adding to the expansion of the management literature.Ph.D
Volkswagen affair: global coordination is needed to enforce ethical corporate behaviour
Full text linkIs the world ready to review its system of carrots and sticks for corporations?, asks Muhammad Umar Boodo
Does mandatory CSR reporting regulation lead to improved Corporate Social Performance? Evidence from India.
Full text linkThis paper analyses whether mandatory CSR reporting regulation leads to an improvement in corporate social performance. Using a quasi-natural experiment where the Stock Exchange Board of India mandated all companies listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange to disclose their CSR activities and practices, this paper finds that companies significantly improved in all aspects of Environment, Social, and Governance performances. However, governance and social performance improvements were significantly greater than environment performance, which is attributed to the stakeholder salience typology. Potential harm from definitive, dominant and dangerous stakeholders was given greater consideration by management, which improved governance and social performances accordingly
Governance structures, unionization, and their relation to CEO pay
No full textThis paper was also presented at Canadian Economics Association (CEA) Conference, Montreal, QC
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