7,927 research outputs found
An Oral History Interview with Daniel J. Bernstein
No full textOral History Interview with Daniel J. Bernstein Conducted by Gerardo Con Diaz, University of California, Davis.This oral history interview is sponsored by NSF 2202484, “Mining a Usable Past: Perspectives, Paradoxes, and Possibilities with Security and Privacy,” at the Charles Babbage Institute, University of Minnesota. The interview is with Daniel J. Bernstein, Professor of Computer Science at the University of Illinois at Chicago. Bernstein reflects on his early life in New York, his formative exposure to mathematics and computer science, and his long-standing interest in cryptographic security. He discusses his work in algorithm design, the development of crypto-graphic tools, and his legal challenge to U.S. export controls on encryption. The interview explores his views on academic freedom, adversarial design, and the relationship between crypto-graphic practice and public interest.National Science FoundationBernstein , Daniel J.. (2025). An Oral History Interview with Daniel J. Bernstein. Retrieved from the University Digital Conservancy, https://hdl.handle.net/11299/274366
The devil's guide to citing the literature
No full textAls tweede deel van onze minireeks ‘Wiskundig werktuig’ laat Dan Bernstein zien hoe je best niét de wiskundige literatuur kunt citeren, in deze tijden van internet en Google. Daniel J. Bernstein is onderzoekshoogleraar informatica aan de University of Illinois at Chicago, gast aan de Technische Universiteit Eindhoven en winnaar van de Beeger Prijs 2008 van het KWG
Mr. Melvin J. Collier, RWWL AUC, June 2011
No full textThis video is a conversation with Mr. Melvin J. Collier. Mr. Collier talks about his book, "From Mississippi to Africa: A Journey of Discovery". Daniel Le, AUC Woodruff Library, is the interviewer
Report on Meteorological Research March 1, 1935 (m-1)
No full textThe object of the report was to elucidate in detail the various features of the research program in meteorology being carried on at the Daniel Guggenheim Airship Institute in Akron, Ohio. Mr. L. J. Fangman, of the U.S. Weather Bureau, was collaborating with the author in carrying out work such as a study of autographic records of the various meteorological elements during frontal passages with a view to the possible prediction of the intensity of the accompanying disturbance as it may affect the operation of aircraft and a study of atmospheric gustiness with a view to finding the dependence between frequency end amplitude of velocity fluctuations and the vertical temperature and velocity gradients
Daniel J. Boorstin
No full textPhotograph used for a newspaper owned by the Oklahoma Publishing Company. Caption: "Daniel J. Boorstin, author and keynote speaker.
Dr. Daniel J. Boorstin (S2_B32_F3_33)
No full textDr. Daniel J. Boorstin-historian, author and Director of the National Museum of History and Technology at the Smithsonian Institution. He was the guest speaker at Bierce Library's Dedication Ceremony
Author Meets Reader: Not the Marrying Kind: A Feminist Critique of Same-Sex Marriage
No full textThis is an audio recording of an author meets reader session held at the SLSA Annual Conference, University of York, 27 March 2013. Nicola Barker's book, Not the Marrying Kind: A Feminist Critique of Same-Sex Marriage, was the winner of the 2013 Hart SLSA Book Prize. In the session she introduces the book and then engages in discussion about it with Daniel Monk
Towards a provably secure DoS-Resilient key exchange protocol with perfect forward secrecy
No full textJust Fast Keying (JFK) is a simple, efficient and secure key exchange protocol proposed by Aiello et al. (ACM TISSEC, 2004). JFK is well known for its novel design features, notably its resistance to denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. Using Meadows’ cost-based framework, we identify a new DoS vulnerability in JFK. The JFK protocol is claimed secure in the Canetti-Krawczyk model under the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption. We show that security of the JFK protocol, when reusing ephemeral Diffie-Hellman keys, appears to require the Gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) assumption in the random oracle model. We propose a new variant of JFK that avoids the identified DoS vulnerability and provides perfect forward secrecy even under the DDH assumption, achieving the full security promised by the JFK protocol
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