1,721,038 research outputs found
The art of coercion: the primitive accumulation and management of coercive power:by Antonio Giustozzi, New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 2011, 298 pp., £25 (hard back), ISBN 978-1-849-04081-5
Centralising rents and dispersing power while pursuing development: Exploring the strategic uses of military firms in Rwanda
The Rwandan Patriotic Front has achieved significant economic progress while also maintaining political stability. However, frictions among ruling elites have threatened progress. This paper explores the use of military firms in Rwanda. Such firms are used to invest in strategic industries, but the use of such firms reflects the vulnerability faced by ruling elites. Military firms serve two related purposes. First, ruling elites use such firms to centralise rents and invest in strategic sectors. Second, the proliferation of such enterprises and the separation of party- and military-owned firms contribute to dispersing power within a centralised hierarchy. [Rentes centralisées et pouvoir diffus tout en poursuivant le développement ? Examiner les utilisations stratégiques des entreprises militaires au Rwanda.] Le front patriotique rwandais a accompli d'importants progrès économiques tout en maintenant une stabilité politique. Cependant, les frictions parmi les élites au pouvoir ont menacé ces progrès. Cet article examine l'utilisation des entreprises militaires au Rwanda. De telles entreprises sont utilisées pour investir dans des industries stratégiques, mais l'utilisation de telles firmes reflète la vulnérabilité à laquelle font face les élites au pouvoir. Les entreprises militaires servent deux objectifs liés. Premièrement, les élites au pouvoir utilisent de telles entreprises pour centraliser les rentes et investir dans des secteurs stratégiques. Deuxièmement, la prolifération de telles entreprises et la séparation d'entreprises appartenant aux partis et aux militaires contribuent à la dispersion du pouvoir au sein d'une hiérarchie centralisée
The Political Economy of Import Substitution in the 21st Century:The Challenge of Recapturing the domestic market in Rwanda
Import substitution has been marginalised from development policy discourse since the 1970s. This paper examines the Rwandan government’s recent attempt at reintroducing industrial policy with some attention devoted to ‘recapturing the domestic market’ – a term used to replace the ignominy associated with ‘import substitution.’ The paper examines two cases – cement and textiles – where such policies have been recently established in Rwanda. The paper argues that any attempt at recapturing the domestic market will require a strategy close to the policies of East Asian developmental states in terms of ‘picking winners.’ However, strategically maintaining reciprocity through statebusiness relationships is only part of the challenge. Though foreign investors have been leant on initially, actions must be put in place to develop local capitalist partners who may step in if foreign investors leave once incentives are reduced. This is further complicated by the government’s failure to develop partnerships with existing local capitalist partners. The Rwandan government is also constrained by a small market size. Any attempt at import substitution must occur in the context of accessing larger markets through the East African Community (EAC). This paper demonstrates that such regional trade agreements constitute a much greater constraint on the use of industrial policy than multilateral trade agreements or bilateral trade agreements with the United States of America or European countries (although pressure from donors may also contribute to reducing policy space). Such challenges showcase how the Rwandan government has sought to build reciprocal control mechanisms while attempting to access large markets through regional integration. Though the Rwandan government has made some progress recently, state intervention is required to reintroduce import substitution in the 21st century and must be balanced by the need to meet domestic and international political constraints
Comparative regionalisms for development in the 21st century,:edited by Emmanuel Fanta, Timothy M. Shaw, and Vanessa T. Tang. Farnham: Ashgate, 2013. xviii + 269 pp. £58.50 (hardback). ISBN 978 1 40946 520 1. (e-book, pdf) ISBN 978 1 40946 521 8. (e-book, EPUB) ISBN 978 1 47240 706 1.
Countering threats, stabilisng politics and selling hope: Examining the Agaciro concept as a response to a Critical Juncture in Rwanda
The political settlements literature [Khan, M. Political Settlements and the Governance of Growth-enhancing Institutions. School of Oriental and African Studies Working Paper, 2010. Accessed June 19, 2014. http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/9968; North, D., J. Wallis, and B. Weingast. Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009] has assigned a privileged role to rents as instruments used by ruling elites to maintain political stability. Since then, there has been some attempt [Hickey, S. Thinking about the Politics of Inclusive Development: Towards a Relational Approach. Effective States and Inclusive Development Research Centre Working Paper No. 1, 2013; Hudson, D., and A. Leftwich. 2014. From Political Economy to Political Analysis. Development Leadership Programme Research Paper 25, Birmingham] to highlight how ideas may play a similarly important role in contributing to political stability. This article explores how ruling elites in Rwanda responded to a ‘critical juncture’ in 2012 when donors withdrew foreign aid after they alleged that the Rwandan Patriotic Front government was supporting rebel groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Ruling elites then used an idea – Agaciro (a Kinyarwanda word, which means dignity or self-respect) – as one instrument to maintain political stability and legitimise its revised development programme in Rwanda. Ruling elites have also used the rhetoric around Agaciro to target the younger generation in Rwanda. This paper argues that Agaciro is symbolic of the vulnerabilities faced by ruling elites in Rwanda today. These vulnerabilities are a specific outcome of the Rwandan developmental strategy, which combines neoliberal market-led reforms, with some developmental state-like policies. The Agaciro concept was also operationalised, with the creation of an Agaciro Development Fund (AgDF) in 2012. The AgDF was legitimised on the basis of a commitment to self-reliance (among elites) during a time where symbolic coalition building among elites was important for political stability. However, Agaciro is also used to project the country’s development strategy (particularly in relation to entrepreneurship and financial inclusion) as one of opportunity, instead of acknowledging the severe inequality that has been associated with development in Rwanda thus far
Book Review: Rwanda 1994:The Myth of the Akazu Genocide Conspiracy and Its Consequences by Barrie Collins,
Between party capitalism and market reforms - Understanding sector differences in Rwanda
Different strategies have been used by the Rwandan government to promotecapitalist accumulation. In some sectors, party and military owned enterprisesare predominant. In others, the government has chosen to embrace marketledreforms. Ultimately, the vulnerability experienced by ruling elites contributesto the choice of how capital accumulation is promoted in differentsectors. Ruling elites use party and military enterprises to centralise rents andestablish control over the direction of economic policy. However, centralisingrents is a political choice and excludes individuals from developing access torents. The pyrethrum sector shows that the use of such groups has resulted inunequal outcomes despite increases in productivity. Reduced internationalprices have stunted further productivity. Conversely, the mining sector showsevidence of the pursuit of market-led reforms. These reforms have beenaccompanied by rapid growth in domestic production and exports. Foreigninvestment was necessary in order to bring capital and expertise to the sector.However, the government has struggled to retain the capacity to enforce legislationand discipline foreign investors in line with national priorities. Bothsectors show evidence that ruling elites have been prompted by vulnerabilityto commit to economic development. Constraints that have accompanied strategiespursued in these sectors have forced the government to work ‘reactively’to achieve strategic targets
Book review: peasants in power:the political economy of development and genocide in Rwanda, by Philip Verwimp
Learning from Role Models in Rwanda:Incoherent Emulation in the Construction of a Neoliberal Developmental State
In the 21st century, developing country policymakers are offered different market-led role models and varied interpretations of ‘developmental state role models’. Despite this confusion, African countries pursue emulative strategies for different purposes – whether they may be for economic transformation (in line with developmental state strategies), market-led reforms or simply to signal the implementation of ‘best practices’ to please donors. Rwanda has been lauded for the country’s economic recovery since the 1994 genocide, with international financial institutions and heterodox scholars both praising different facets of its development strategy. This paper argues that Rwanda is an example of a country that has simultaneously pursued emulative strategies for different purposes – often even within the same sector. This paper examines the Rwandan government’s emulation of different role models for varied purposes. Two studies of emulation are explored: the emulation of Singapore’s Economic Development Board (RDB) through the establishment of Rwanda’s own Rwanda Development Board (RDB) and the evolution of Rwanda’s financial sector with reference to the use of contending market-led and developmental state models. The paper argues that in Rwanda, incoherent emulation for different purposes has resulted in contradictory tensions within its development strategy and the construction of a neoliberal developmental state
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