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    A Novel Range Test

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    In a range test, one party holds a ciphertext and needs to\ud test whether the message encrypted in the ciphertext is within a certain\ud interval range. In this paper, a range test protocol is proposed, where\ud the party holding the ciphertext asks another party holding the private\ud key of the encryption algorithm to help him. These two parties run the\ud protocol to implement the test. The test returns TRUE if and only if\ud the encrypted message is within the certain interval range. If the two\ud parties do not conspire, no information about the encrypted message is\ud revealed from the test except what can be deduced from the test result.\ud Advantages of the new protocol over the existing related techniques are\ud that it achieves correctness, soundness, °exibility, high e±ciency and\ud privacy simultaneously

    Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis

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    The present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed

    Tweaking generic OTR to avoid forgery attacks

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    This paper considers the security of the <i>Offset Two-Round</i> (OTR) authenticated encryption mode [9] with respect to forgery attacks. The current version of OTR gives a security proof for specific choices of the block size (n) and the primitive polynomial used to construct the finite field F2n. Although the OTR construction is generic, the security proof is not. For every choice of finite field the distinctness of masking coefficients must be verified to ensure security. In this paper, we show that some primitive polynomials result in collisions among the masking coefficients used in the current instantiation, from which forgeries can be constructed. We propose a new way to instantiate OTR so that the masking coefficients are distinct in every finite field F2n, thus generalising OTR without reducing the security of OTR
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