190,328 research outputs found
U.S. Domestic Barter : an Empirical Investigation
No full textThis paper studies the barter industry developed in North America during he 1950s, pointing ut some of its main characteristics. Thus, it examines its two main sectors : (i) Corporate Barter and (ii) Commercial Barter. Contrary to expectations, the analysis of official data shows that this phenomenon is essentially pro-cyclical for the Commercial Barter component. Moreover, commecial barter activity turns out to be complementary to the cash economy. While the two sectors display some differences in their pattern, they both help firms to increase their profits.E-Barter; Corporate Barter; Economic Cycle
Barter in Russia: Liquidity Shortage versus Lack of Restructuring
No full textThe rapid growth of barter is one of the most surprising phenomena in Russia: As a percentage of industrial sales it steadily increased from 5% in 1992 to nearly 55% in 1998. Unknown in CEEC's transition countries, barter is only one aspect of the Russian economy's demonetisation [process, along with dollarisation, growing arrears, and the widespread use of veksels and offsets. Barter is often seen as the consequence of the lack of restructuring, but some authors argue that it is a mechanism used to avoid shutting down potentially viable firms, in a context of market imperfections. The implications differ depending on the analysis chosen: in the first case, an expansionary monetary policy might not be appropriate, while the contrary is true if the demonetisation process jeopardizes potentially good enterprises. This paper aims to assess this phenomenon in the Russian economy. The paper's main contribution to work in this field (reviewed and documented in section II) is to highlight two different rationales for barter. Before studying the latter more closely, section III uses official monthly data collected by the central bank of Russia, the Goskomstat, and the Russian Economic Barometer (REB), to emphasize the macro-economic features of barter in Russia, and, more specifically, the link between monetary policy and bartering activity. It appears that macroeconomic policy and macroeconomic indicators are unable to explain the whole process. In section IV, quarterly statistics for 1995 and 1996 taken from the REB survey of roughly 200 firms make it possible to implement a more qualitative survey. The conclusion is striking: barter is used by potentially viable firms as a way of avoiding closure, while at the same time financing increasing inventories and soft goods in the case of indebted firms who use barter transactions, bank credit and choose to accumulate arrers in order to avoid restructuring.barter, non-monetary transactions, virtual economy, Russia, transition
Debt Overhang and Barter in Russia
No full textIn this paper we study, both theoretically and empirically, the relationship between barter and the indebtedness of Russian firms. We build a model in which a firm uses barter to protect its working capital against outside creditors even when barter involves high transaction costs. The main innovation of our work is to allow renegotiation between the firm and its creditors. If the creditors are rational, they often agree to postpone debt payments in order to avoid destroying the firm's working capital. It turns out, however, that even if the firm cannot ensure it will not divert cash ex post, the outcome of renegotiation still provides ex ante incentives to use barter. We show that the greater the debt overhang, the more likely the use of barter, and although the possibility of debt restructuring reduces barter, it does not eliminate it altogether. We also discuss the role of the government bond market and weak bankruptcy legislation. The firm-level evidence is consistent with the model's predictions.barter, demonetisation, debt overhang, renegotiations
Barter in Transition Economies: Competing Explanations Confront Ukranian Data
No full textIn this paper we survey the common explanations of barter in transition economies and expose them to detailed survey data on 165 barter deals in Ukraine in 1997. The evidence does not support the notion that soft budget constraints, lack of restructuring, or that the virtual economy are the driving forces behind barter. Further, tax avoidance is only weakly associated with the incidence of barter in Ukraine. We then explore an alternative explanation of barter as a mechanism to address transitional challenges where capital markets and economic institutions are poorly developed. First, barter helps to maintain production by creating a deal-specific collateral which softens the liquidity squeeze in the economy when credit enforcement is prohibitively costly. Second, barter helps to maintain production by preventing firms to be exploited by their input suppliers when suppliers' bargaining position is very strong due to high costs of switching suppliers. Thus, in the absence of trust and functioning capital markets barter is a self-enforcing response to imperfect input and financial markets in the former Soviet Union. The paper concludes by discussing potential long-term costs of barter arrangements, and by suggesting particular pitfalls of expansionary monetary policy in barter economies such as Ukraine and Russia.financial crisis, trust, contract enforcement in transition, arrears, the virtual economy, imperfect capital markets
Barter in Transition Economies: Competing Explanations Confront Ukranian Data
No full textIn this paper we survey the common explanations of barter in transition economies and expose them to detailed survey data on 165 barter deals in Ukraine in 1997. The evidence does not support the notion that soft budget constraints, lack of restructuring, or that the virtual economy are the driving forces behind barter. Further, tax avoidance is only weakly associated with the incidence of barter in Ukraine. We then explore an alternative explanation of barter as a mechanism to address transitional challenges where capital markets and economic institutions are poorly developed. First, barter helps to maintain production by creating a deal-specific collateral which softens the liquidity squeeze in the economy when credit enforcement is prohibitively costly. Second, barter helps to maintain production by preventing firms to be exploited by their input suppliers when suppliers' bargaining position is very strong due to high costs of switching suppliers. Thus, in the absence of trust and functioning capital markets barter is a self-enforcing response to imperfect input and financial markets in the former Soviet Union. The paper concludes by discussing potential long-term costs of barter arrangements, and by suggesting particular pitfalls of expansionary monetary policy in barter economies such as Ukraine and Russia.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/39671/3/wp287.pd
Petty capitalism, perfecting capitalism or post-capitalism? : lessons from the Argentinian barter network
No full texteconomic systems;Argentina;barter;currencies;monetary systems
Barter in practice: a case study of liwac transaction in Addis Ababa
No full textThe author examines the contemporary liwac or barter system in Addis Ababa, a thriving part of the informal economy which involves the exchange of household goods for second-hand clothes and shoes. He concludes that this form of transaction positively co-exists with and is not superseded by the monetised economy.This article is hosted by our co-publisher Taylor & Francis.</p
Barter, P G, NX46162
No full textThis record was harvested from a previous catalogue system and will be withdrawn in 2025. Information in this record may be superseded or incomplete. Visit this record in UMA's new catalogue at: https://archives.library.unimelb.edu.au/nodes/view/370451Surname: BARTER
Given Name(s) or Initials: P G
Military Service Number or Last Known Location: NX46162
Missing, Wounded and Prisoner of War Enquiry Card Index Number: 22600180711
Item: [2016.0049.02778] "Barter, P G, NX46162
Barter Economies and Centralized Merchants
No full textThe main goal of this essay is to analyze the emergence of a barter economy, and the rise of centralized merchants and a barter redistribution system out of a primitive barter system. The environment is a spatial general equilibrium model where exchange is costly. Since exchange becomes more complicated as the scope of the economy increases, we prove that, after the economy reaches a critical size, the cost of trade expansion surpasses its benefits. This imposes limitations on the scope of the economy and the production level. To overcome these limitations, rational individuals can develop a more advanced barter system leading to the appearance of centralized merchants. This more sophisticated system is the redistribution system. We also show that under some circumstances, in the presence of transaction costs it may be optimal for individuals to keep using barter instead of adopting a monetary system. This result explains why some primitive economies, like the Incas in Peru and ancient Egypt, did not evolve to a monetary system, and kept barter as their main exchange system.
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