637 research outputs found
The role of political competition in the link between electoral systems and corruption: an extension
No full textThis work provides an extension to an international context of the analysis made by Alfano, Baraldi and Cantabene (2013) on the role of political competition as a channel through which electoral systems affect corruption. Our result conflicts with that found by empirical literature on that topic that makes plurality rules the most virtuous in terms of corruption. Political scientists must be cautious in designing the degree of proportionality of electoral rules without take into account the variation in political competition that follows
Political Competition
No full textIn this entry, we tried to explain the role of political competition in the economy. Political science provided various definitions of political competition. After analyzing in detail all of those, we mentioned the actors political competition involves. In economic terms, competition in political market has seen as competition in good market. Therefore, economic science studied if this kind of competition is good or bad in terms of economic variables as, for example, growth
The Size of the Critical Mass as a Function of the Strength of Network Externalities: a Mobile Telephone Estimation
No full textThe amount of financial incentives required to stimulate network growth depends on the size of the critical mass which, in its turn, depends on the intensity with which network externalities play their role in the diffusion process. The measurement of the strength of network effects and all that can enforce or depress them is fundamental for forecasting the diffusion of new goods. Looking at the mobile telephone network for the OECD countries surveyed between 1989 and 2006, we propose a new methodology which allows us to estimate the size of the critical mass through the estimation of the parameters which determines the concavity degree of the inverse demand curve for mobiles. We found that socio-demographic variables, as well as variables which proxy the efficiency of fixed-line operators or the availability and cost of alternative services, affect the strength of network effects and, therefore, the critical mass size
Una risposta a 'Equilibrium Size in Network with Indirect Network Externalities: a Comment'
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Effects of Electoral Rules, Political Competition and Corruption on the Size and Composition of Government Consumption Spending: an Italian Regional Analysis
No full textThis paper analyses how proportionality of the electoral system, political competition and corruption affect the total amount of Italian regional public consumption expenditure and alter the
public budget structure. The Italian case is particular: from 1993 the country underwent a change
in the electoral system (from proportional to majoritarian) and, at the same time, a campaign
was waged against the corruption of public bureaucrats. The aim of this work is to study the
political determinants of public consumption spending, and more specifically the role played by
political institutions (meaning electoral rules), the intensity of political competition in the “votes’
market” and the corruption of public bureaucracy. We used panel data for 20 Italian regions
from 1980 to 2003 in order to estimate a quantity effect and an allocation effect of the degree of
proportionality of the electoral system, political competition and corruption of public bureaucracy
on public consumption spending. The quantity effect of the proportionality of the electoral system
and of the degree of political competition is positive; the same holds for corruption, meaning that
corruption increases the total level of public spending. Analysis of the allocation effect shows
that corruption, rather than the electoral system and political competition, alters the public budget
structure towards social services and securities and general service sectors instead of education
and health, leading to important policy implications
Privatizzazione e Oligopoli misti: il caso delle Telecomunicazioni
No full textIn this paper we develop a competition model between a private firm and a partially privatised
firm. If the two firms compete à la Cournot, the deriving value of the welfare is greater
than that if the competition is between a private and a totally public firm, and between two private
firms. Therefore, either the public ownership, or the privatization of the public monopoly
are the best policy if the object of the government is the maximization of the welfare. We
checked this hypothesis by analysing the privatization in the telecommunication market through
data from 18 OECD Countries. The results confirm our hypothesis: the relationship between
the welfare indicators (main lines per capita and total staff in TLC services) and the share of the
government in the TLC incumbent is positive but not linear, that is, there is an optimal share of
the government in the TLC incumbent
Estimation of Network Externalities and Critical Mass in the Mobile Telephone Market: a panel data analysis of the OECD Countries
No full textEffects of the electoral rules on the size of government spending: an Italian Regional panel data analysis
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