1,721,630 research outputs found
Pratham Information Project -- Read India
This data is the basis for the article: Banerjee, Abhijit V.; Banerji, Rukmini; Duflo, Esther; Glennerster, Rachel; and Khemani, Stuti: "Pitfalls of Participatory Programs: Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation in Education in India" in the American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
Policies for a better-fed world
Paper prepared at the occasion of receiving the Kiel Institute’s Bernhard-Harms Prize on October 7, 2014.A wide range of interventions, from subsidized grains all the way to conditions on nutrition in conditional cash transfers, have either been tried or put in place in different countries in order to fight under-nutrition. A number of important policy experiments in recent years, directly or indirectly, offer important insights into how best to design these interventions. This essay is an attempt to pull together some of those insights, with the aim of saying something about what the optimal design should look like
Targeting the Poor: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia
This paper reports an experiment in 640 Indonesian villages on three approaches to target the poor: proxy means tests (PMT), where assets are used to predict consumption; community targeting, where villagers rank everyone from richest to poorest; and a hybrid. Defining poverty based on PPP$2 per capita consumption, community targeting and the hybrid perform somewhat worse in identifying the poor than PMT, though not by enough to significantly affect poverty outcomes for a typical program. Elite capture does not explain these results. Instead, communities appear to apply a different concept of poverty. Consistent with this finding, community targeting results in higher satisfaction
Under the Thumb of History? Political Institutions and the Scope for Action
Draft prepared for the Annual Review of Economics, Oct. 5, 2013Under the Thumb of History?
Political Institutions and the Scope for Action
This paper discusses the two leading views of history and political institutions. For some scholars, institutions are mainly products of historical logic, while for others, accidents, leaders, and decisions have a significant impact. We argue that while there is clear evidence that history matters and has long-term effects, there is not enough data to help us distinguish between the two views. Faced with this uncertainty, what is a social scientist to do? We argue that given the possibility that policy decisions indeed make a difference, it makes sense to assume they do and to try to improve policymaking
(Dis)Organization and Success in an Economics MOOC
Massive Online Open Courses (MOOCs) present the potential to deliver high quality education to a large number of students. But they suffer from low completion rates. This paper identifies disorganization as a factor behind failure to complete a MOOC. Students who enroll one day late are 17 percentage points less likely to earn a certificate than students who enroll exactly on time. This reflects selection, but it does seem to be related to demographic characteristics, motivation to complete the course, or ability. This suggests that building in even more structure in the MOOC could be a factor in improving performance
Labor market discrimination in Delhi: Evidence from a field experiment
We study the role of caste and religion in India s new economy sectors software and call-
centers by sending 3160 ctitious resumes in response to 371 job openings in and around
Delhi (India) that were advertised in major city papers and online job sites. We randomly
allocate caste-linked surnames across resumes in order to isolate the e¤ect of caste on appli-
cants job-search outcomes. We nd no evidence of discrimination against non-upper-caste
(i.e. Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe, and Other Backward Caste) applicants for software
jobs. We do nd larger and signi cant di¤erences between callback rates for upper-castes and
Other Backward Castes (and to a lesser extent Scheduled Castes) in the case of call-center
jobs. There is no evidence of discrimination against Muslims for either of the two kinds of
jobs we apply for. Overall, the evidence suggests that applicants caste identities do not signi cantly a¤ect the callback decisions of rms in these rapidly-growing sectors of the Indian
econom
Why Does Misallocation Persist?
Recent papers argue that the misallocation of resources can explain large cross-country TFP differences. This argument is underpinned by empirical evidence documenting substantial dispersion in the marginal products of resources, particularly capital, in developing countries. But why does misallocation persists? That is, why don't distortions disappear on their own? This is particularly true for capital misallocation, a point we illustrate in a simple model of capital accumulation with credit constraints. We distinguish between misallocation on the intensive and the extensive margin, and show that the former should disappear asymptotically under general conditions, while the latter may persist. We conclude by discussing possible theories of persistent misallocation. (JEL D24, E22, G31, G32, L26)
The Bloody Millennium: Internal Conflict in South Asia
This paper documents the short-term and long-term trends in internal conflict in South Asian countries, using multiple data sources. I find that incidents of terrorism have been rising across South Asia over the past decade, and this increase has been concentrated in economically lagging regions in the post-2001 period. This is in contrast to both the historical patterns of conflict, and the evolution of other types of violence. Analyzing the role of economic, geographic and demographic factors, I find that poorer areas have significantly higher levels of conflict intensity. The paper reviews the various approaches taken by governments to deal with conflict, contrasting security-based approaches with political accommodation and economic approaches. Finally, the paper reviews the potential role of regional cooperation in mitigating conflict.
Bundling Health Insurance and Microfinance in India: There Cannot be Adverse Selection if There Is No Demand
Microfinance institutions have started to bundle their basic loans with other financial services, such as health insurance. Using a randomized control trial in Karnataka, India, we evaluate the impact on loan renewal from mandating the purchase of actuarially-fair health insurance covering hospitalization and maternity expenses. Bundling loans with insurance led to a 16 percentage points (23 percent) increase in drop-out from microfinance, as many clients preferred to give up microfinance than pay higher interest rates and receive insurance. In a Pyrrhic victory, the total absence of demand for health insurance led to there being no adverse selection in insurance enrollment.National Institutes of Health (U.S.) (Grant PO1 HD061315-04
Does Public Good Provision Determine Incumbent’s Fate? Evidence from India
In this paper we empirically examine whether public facilities like providing primary school, medical clinics, electricity etc help incumbents to stay in power. Specifically, we analyze the parliamentary election outcomes in 483 constituents in rural India from 1971 to 1991. This study is based on a simple voter model where the voter looks at the supply of public goods provided by the incumbent and then decides whether to re-elect the incumbent. We find empirical evidence that voters do significantly care about educational, electricity and communication facilities, whereas incumbents face defeat if they provide more medical or safe drinking water facilities.Election and voting behavior; performance of government; public good; inter-jurisdictional differential and their effect; India
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