1,720,978 research outputs found
The Quasi-split Effect, Active Insiders and the Italian Market Reaction to Equity Rights Issues
No full textThe positive market reaction at the announcement of most European rights issues can be explained by two major factors which distinguish them from a US public offering: active insiders, and a quasi-split effect which signals a large increase in the dividend yield. An analysis of 428 Italian rights offerings and an event study involving 82 observations in the 1980–94 period show that Italian insiders are completely ‘active’, and almost 85% of the equity rights issues result in a dividend yield increase, which corresponds to the quasi-split effect in approximately 40% of the issues. The dividend yield rises, on average, by a significant +61% after a combined rights offering and by a significantly lower +20% following a fully-paid rights issue. The market reaction to the announcement is significantly positive for combined rights offerings (+2.77%) and positive, but not significant, for the whole sample (+0.79%). The dividend increase signalled by the quasi-split effect explains almost 30% of the abnormal returns’ cross-sectional variation and it is the only significant explanatory variable. © 1998 Blackwell Publishers Ltd
Eastward enlargement: Privatization in mecc
No full textThis paper tries to offer a review of the literature on the main privatisation methods adopted by the Central and East European Countries which have joined European Union in 2004. After having analysed the major advantages and shortcomes of each privatisation method the paper briefly describes the privatisation processes adopted by each single country
Gli errori di misurazione e il premio per il diritto di voto: evidenze empiriche per lâ€TMItalia
No full textThe stock market reaction to investment decisions: Evidence from Italy
No full textBased on a study of new investment announcements from 1989 to 1995 by Italian firms listed on the Milan Stock Exchange, we find a positive stock price reaction to new investment decisions. The stock price reaction is larger for joint venture announcements. The market response is also larger for non-state owned companies and when the announcement is released in a period of rising stock prices. The announced investment has no impact on the non-voting shares but increases the voting shares' market price through a significant revaluation of their vote-segment. We find some evidence that new investments lead to management's private benefits rather than towards firm value. This is consistent with the typical Italian corporate governance structure, where a majority shareholder safely controls a listed company while having only a fractional claim on the firm's cash flows. © 1998 Kluwer Academic Publishers
Bolstering Family Control: Evidence from Loyalty Shares
Full text linkWe study the introduction of a new control-enhancing mechanism in Italy, a country still characterized by family-controlled firms but with increasing importance of institutional investors. Since 2014, Italian firms have been able to adopt loyalty shares, which allow a double voting right if shares are continuously held for at least two years. We find that about 20 percent of listed firms have introduced loyalty shares, and family-controlled firms are the most likely adopters. Loyalty shares neither anticipate acquisitions, nor equity issues by the adopting firm. Instead, they allow controlling shareholders to reduce their equity stake without losing control. We report no evidence of an adverse wealth effect both at the adoption and in the years following it. As expected, institutional investors vote against the introduction of loyalty shares. Yet, they do not reduce their holdings afterwards, as incremental governance costs are outweighed by the superior performance of adopting firms. Overall, our evidence suggests that bolstering family control is the main effect of the introduction of loyalty shares
Ownership ties, conflict of interest, and the tone of news
Full text linkThis paper investigates the tone newspapers use in reporting information on a company that it is linked with through an ownership tie. Our empirical setting is Italy, a country characterized by dominant national industrial groups’ high ownership of newspapers. Based on a sample of about 123,000 articles, we document that newspapers’ coverage of firms in conflict of interest is greater, with significantly fewer negative and uncertain words. We also document that the slant increases with ownership stakes and decreases with the newspaper's reputation
Industry influence on firms' R&D and innovation
Full text linkThis paper examines the effect of peers on a firm's research and development (R&D) policy. We show that firms do not make R&D decisions in isolation, and that industry dynamics play an important role in defining a firm's R&D intensity. Using a large sample of 54,393 firm-year observations from 1991 to 2015 in the United States, we find that firms' R&D decisions are mainly driven by their industry peers' R&D policies. Moreover, we find that R&D mimicking is significant only in the presence of strong product market competition, whereas we do not find any evidence of information-based herding in R&D investments. Our additional analysis shows that our main conclusions remain valid even in the presence of financial constraints, and regardless of the firms' market positions. Finally, we provide evidence that R&D mimicking increases firms' future values, future patent outputs, and estimated patent dollar values. Our findings are robust to endogeneity concerns, and to using alternative sample compositions, R&D intensity proxies, and different industry classifications
Prime riflessioni sul finanziamento allo sviluppo delle imprese cooperative alla luce della recente riforma sul Diritto Societario
No full textChanges in management ownership and the valuation effects of equity offerings
No full textSeasoned equity issues trigger share price declines, and this is usually interpreted as evidence of signalling. We find that seasoned equity issues also typically result in much lower managerial ownership in U.S. firms. Jensen and Meckling (1976) predict a stock price decline when managerial ownership falls. We conduct several tests to distinguish agency explanations form signalling explanations, and conclude that both effects are present. © 1999 Kluwer Academic Publishers
ESG score, board structure and the impact of the non-financial reporting directive on European firms
Get PDFThe primary objective of this research is to examine the impact of the EU Non-Financial Reporting Directive on the significance of specific board characteristics in promoting higher ESG scores among 835 European companies listed from 2002 to 2020. Empirical results indicate that gender
diversity, cultural diversity, a higher number of independent directors on the board, and the presence of a CSR committee all significantly contribute to achieving higher ESG scores.
Furthermore, the Non-Financial Reporting Directive 95/2014, which requires large EU firms to report on various environmental, social, and governance issues, not only drives EU firms to attain higher ESG scores but also significantly reduces the ESG gap between companies with and without a CSR committee. Meanwhile, other board characteristics have maintained their rele-
vance to a substantial extent
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