925,685 research outputs found
Interview with Alvin J. Banker
No full textAlvin Banker joined the U.S. Marine Corps on July 16, 1942. He attended boot camp at Montford Point, Camp LeJeune, N.C. Montford Point, which opened April 26, 1942, was a segregated training facility constructed to accommodate the first African American Marine Corps recruits. Banker was one these recruits. Banker was assigned to a Special Duty Platoon of the 51st Composite Defense Battalion. He remained at Montford Point as a cook and Mess Supervisor until September of 1946. He was then transferred to the 6th Colored Replacement Draft Marines and Deployed to the Marianna Islands. He served in the Pacific and the U.S. until August of 1966
Interview with Al Banker
No full textMaster Sergeant Al Banker of New Orleans joined the Corps in his hometown and made it a career. In World War II he served with occupation forces on Saipan. He later served at a number of bases in the United States, as well as in Cuba during the Cuban Revolution under Fidel Castro. Upon leaving the Corps he joined the security forces of Grumman Aerospace Corporation. Retired, he resides in Bolivia, North Carolina
Optimal Central Bank Conservatism and Monopoly Trade Unions
No full textOPTIMThe “conservative central banker” has come under attack recently. Explicitly modeling the interaction of a trade union with monetary policy, it has been argued that the standard solution to the inflationary bias in monetary policy might actually be welfare reducing if the trade union has an exogenously given preference against inflation. We reframe this discussion in a standard trade union model. We show that the case against the conservative central banker rests exclusively on the assumption of a strictly nominal outside option (for instance, unemployment benefits) for the union. There is no welfare gain associated with making the central bank less conservative than society, however if the outside option is in real terms. As the nominal components of the trade union’s outside option are mainly public transfers, we also show that the conservative central banker is always optimal if the government can choose the level of unemployment benefits as well as the degree of central bank conservatism.Central bank, monetary policy, trade unions, conservative central banker
Incentive Contracts for Central Bankers under Uncertainty: Walsh-Svensson Non-Equivalence Revisited
No full textWe look at the implications of uncertain monetary policy preferences for the targeting and contracting approach to monetary stability. It turns out that in presence of uncertain preferences a linear incentive contract in the sense of Walsh (1995) performs better in terms of social welfare than an explicit inflation target as proposed by Svensson (1997). The reason is that, although both approaches can get rid of the inflationary bias, the impact of uncertain preferences on the variance of inflation will be considerably higher with an inflation target. We also find that on top of an optimal linear contract or target, a quadratic contract, in the sense of Rogoff's (1985) "weight-conservative" central banker, improves the outcome. In the case of an inflation target, a more conservative banker is needed than with a Walsh contract.non-linearities;economic fluctuations;inflation targets;optimal contracts
Variations on the Author
No full text“Variations on the Author” discusses two of Eduardo Coutinho’s recent films (Um Dia na Vida, from 2010, and Últimas Conversas, posthumously released in 2015) and their contribution to the general question of documentary authorship. The director’s filmography is characterized by a consistent yet self-effacing form of authorial self-inscription: Coutinho often features as an interviewer that rather than express opinions propels discourses; an interviewer that is good at listening. This mode of self-inscription characterizes him as an author who is not expressive but who is nonetheless markedly present on the screen. In Um Dia na Vida, however, Coutinho is completely absent form the image, while Últimas Conversas, on the contrary, includes a confessional prologue that moves the director from the margins to the center of his films. This article examines the ways in which these works stand out in the filmography of a director who offers new insights into the notion of cinematic authorship
Vera Songwe wins African Banker Icon of the Year, as women steal the spotlight at the African Banker Awards
No full textVera Songwe wins African Banker Icon of the Year, as women steal the spotlight at the African Banker Awards. Two of the most prestigious awards at the African Banker Awards, the African Banker Icon and the Finance Minister of the Year, were awarded to two powerful African women, Ms Vera Songwe and the Honourable Minister Vera Esperança dos Santos Daves de Sousa, respectively. Ms Vera Songwe, United Nations Under-Secretary-General and Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa, was awarded the African Banker Icon Award for her tireless work in providing governments with the fiscal ammunition to deal with the impact of COVID-19. “It really was a moment to demonstrate that Africa is resilient. Angola’s Finance Minister, Hon Vera Esperança dos Santos Daves de Sousa, was recognized as the Finance Minister of the Year for her standout work in restoring stability and market confidence to her country. The African Banker Awards are a landmark annual event for African banking taking place during the annual meetings of the African Development Bank
Testing basil as banker plant in IPM greenhouse tomato crops
No full textInternational audienceIn order to reduce the use of pesticides, banker plants may be added to crop systems. They can improve the presence of predatory arthropods by offering shelter or alternative food. In the present study, we analyzed basil as banker plant in a greenhouse IPM tomato crop system testing different plant combinations in monocultures vs. dicultures. We measured the influence of the presence of basil on the reduction of pest number, predator population stability, plant health and crop yield. Significantly fewer pests were present in dicultures when basil was present, but the number of predators, crop yield and leaf health was not statistically different between plant combinations. Under the given conditions, basil could not be categorized as an efficient banker plant for Macrolophus pygmaeus
The Mortgage Banker-Industrial Loan Company: A New Exempt Lender
No full textIn 1973, to alleviate the plight of commercial real estate lenders caught between the rising costs of making loans and the limitations on interest and charges, the California Legislature enacted legislation which authorized the formation of the mortgage banker-industrial loan company, a new entity intended to fall within the class of exempt lenders created by article XX, section 22 of the California Constitution. The author discusses the nature and formation of the mortgage banker-industrial loan company and addresses provisions which allow the mortgage banker-industrial loan company to make assignments or transfers to nonexempt lenders. In this discussion he concludes that while such operations are generally authorized by the legislation, the courts will not allow the new institution to act as a mere conduit, circumventing the distinction between classes of exempt and nonexempt lenders. Finally, the author discusses he constitutionality of the mortgage banker-industrial loan company, marshalling arguments that the institution is a valid subclass of the constitutionality exempt industrial loan company, that public policy considerations support an affirmative finding of constitutionality, and that the creation of the institution does not violate equal protection of the law
banker
No full textbanker...while a recent work on "Newfoundland Fisheries," tells us that "the crew of a _banker_ is generally composed of twelve men, including the skipper or captain, who exercises no direct control over the others, but is recognized by them as the principal personage on board."PRINTED ITEMDNE-cit.Colin Penney 69 May 23Used I and SupUsed I and Sup1Not usedThe quotation mark at the end of the passage is written in ink on the card
Central Banker Contracts, Incomplete Information, and Monetary Policy Surprises: In Search of a Selfish Central Banker?
No full textApproaching monetary policy as a principal agent problem provides a useful framework for interpreting alternative delegation schemes. In this paper, we consider the effectiveness of central banker incentive schemes when the principal delegates monetary policy through contracts but remains uncertain about the central banker\u27s responsiveness to such schemes. We adopt a simple principal-agent model and assume that the central banker\u27s trade-off between social welfare and the incentive scheme is private information. We consider two types of central bankers; one who responds to the incentive scheme ( selfish ) and one who does not and only cares about social welfare ( benevolent ). We demonstrate that when a benevolent central banker accepts a contract designed for a selfish central banker, positive inflation surprises occur and output exceeds its natural rate. We further show that a benevolent central banker with an inflation bias has an incentive to masquerade as selfish. Mechanisms exist that solve that problem by achieving preference revelation. We consider a simple mechanism in dominant strategies that induces the benevolent type either not to breach or not to accept the appointment (contract) in the first place. This multi-period mechanism works with either inflation targets, or the appointment of a conservative central banker. Our results suggest that more complicated incentive schemes, embedded within broader constitutional arrangements, are required in the presence of private information for them to work effectively
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