83 research outputs found
Hezbollah as urban planner? Questions to and from planning theory
No full text[No abstract available]Charara W., 1996, DAWLAT HEZBOLLAH; CLERC V, 1996, THESIS U PARIS 8 PAR; Davis DE, 2003, IRREGULAR ARMED FORC; DEBOULET A, 2006, WORLD C SOC DURB S A; FAWAZ M, 2007, ISIM REV FAL, P22; FAWAZ M, 2005, NGOS GOVERNANCE ARAB, P229; FAWAZ M, 2007, RECONSTRUCTION H HRE; Friedman J., 1987, PLANNING PUBLIC DOMA; GHANDOUR M, 2008, MIDDL E CTR C NEG SP; Hall P., 1988, CITIES TOMORROW; HARB M, HEZBOLLAH B IN PRESS; Harb M, 2005, THIRD WORLD Q, V26, P173, DOI 10.1080-0143659042000322973; HILAL N, 2008, THESIS AM U BEIRUT; QASIM N, 2002, HEZBOLLAH AL MANHAJ; QUILTY J, 2007, MERIP, V37, P31; Sandercock L., 1998, COSMOPOLIS; YIFTACHEL O, 2001, POWER PLANNING; Yiftachel O, 2000, INT J URBAN REGIONAL, V24, P418, DOI 10.1111-1468-2427.0025542
The politics of property in planning: Hezbollah's reconstruction of Haret Hreik (Beirut, Lebanon) as case study
No full textThis research looks at post-2006-war reconstruction of the southern suburbs of Beirut under the auspices of Hezbollah (the Islamic resistance movement in Lebanon). The project was widely acclaimed as an alternative to current neoliberal planning practices in the Middle East and beyond. Based on a critical reading of the conception of property issues in this planning project, the article argues that this reconstruction presents a new geometry or alternative to the mainstream configuration of neoliberal urbanism, rather than a departure from its precepts. The reason for this is that the adopted language of property corresponds closely with the conception of property advocated by neoliberal planning, one that enshrines private, individual ownership as sacred and desirable and that works to strengthen its model in the city. I further argue that the 'neoliberal planning regime' within which Hezbollah's urban intervention occurs is not accidental; rather, it is necessary for the party's control of this space's future and for consolidating its territory in the city. It is hence expected that Hezbollah's planning in the city will produce the same decried effects as neoliberal planning elsewhere in the city rather than usher an innovative, progressive model of planning. © 2014 Urban Research Publications Limited.Abi-Samra M., 2004, WAR TESTIMONIE UNPUB; Blackmar E., 2006, POLITICS PUBLIC SPAC; Blomley N., 2004, UNSETTLING CITY; Blomley N, 2004, ANTIPODE, V36, P614, DOI 10.1111-j.1467-8330.2004.00440.x; Bollens S. A., 2012, CITY SOUL DIVIDED SO; Bromley D., 1991, ENV EC PROPERTY RIGH; Davis Mike, 2007, EVIL PARADISES DREAM; De Soto Hernando, 2003, MYSTERY CAPITAL WHY; Deboulet A., 2011, CITIES SOVEREIGNTY N; Fawaz M, 2009, PLAN THEOR, V8, P323, DOI 10.1177-1473095209341327; Fawaz M., TAKING LEFE IN PRESS; Fawaz M., 2004, NGOS GOVERNANCE ARAB; Fawaz M., 2007, RECONSTRUCTION HARET; Foucault M., 1991, FOUCAULT EFFECT; Harb M., 2000, ARAB WORLD GEOGRAPHE, V3.4, P272; Harb M., 2010, LESSONS POSTWAR RECO; Harb M., 2010, HEZBOLLAH BEYROUTH B; Hilal N., 2008, THESIS AM U BEIRUT B; Lefebvre Henri, 2003, URBAN REVOLUTION; Lefebvre Henri, 2000, PRODUCTION ESPACE; Lorde A., 1984, SISTER OUTSIDER ESSA; Low S., 2006, POLITICS PUBLIC SPAC; McCann EJ, 2003, J URBAN AFF, V25, P159, DOI 10.1111-1467-9906.t01-1-00004; Mervin S., 2008, HEZBOLLAH ETAT LIEUX; Mitchell Don, 1996, LIE LAND MIGRANT WOR; Qassem N., 2002, HEZBOLLAH AL MANHAJ; Rogerson R, 2000, PROG PLANN, V54, P133, DOI 10.1016-S0305-9006(00)00011-8; Roy A, 2009, ANTIPODE, V41, P159, DOI 10.1111-j.1467-8330.2008.00660.x; Saliba R., 2000, EXPLORING BUILT ENV; Scott James C, 1998, SEEING STATE; Simone AbdouMaliq, 2010, CITY LIFE JAKARTA DA; Singer J., 1997, PROPERTY LAW RULES P; Singer JW., 2000, ENTITLEMENT PARADOXE; SINGER JW, 1988, STANFORD LAW REV, V40, P611, DOI 10.2307-1228814; Smith N., 2002, ANTIPODE, V34.3, P452; Smith N., 2006, POLITICS PUBLIC SPAC0
Neoliberal urbanity and the right to the city: A view from Beirut's periphery
No full textDrawing on Lefebvre's theorization of space in order to examine the compatibility of neoliberalism and the right to the city, this study investigates how the formation of informal settlements since the 1950s had provided low-income dwellers in Beirut (Lebanon) a means to conceive of and engage in city making (neighbourhood production, management, and organization) at a time when state regulations and-or market constraints would have excluded them from the city. It also examines how the prevailing neoliberal ideology of the 1990s, as translated through Lebanon's sectarian-clientelist regime, is curtailing these possibilities. Evidence for the article was drawn from interviews with dwellers, developers and public officials, as well as from archival searches and aerial photographs. © Institute of Social Studies 2009.AJAMI F, 1987, VANISHED IMAM; Aveline N., 2000, 6 CERMOCORBR; Benton Lauren, 1994, SOCIAL LEGAL STUDIES, V3, P223, DOI 10.1177-096466399400300202; BERRYCHIKHANOUI I, 2000, COMPETENCES CITADINS; BEY H, 1991, TAZ TEMPORARY AUTOMA; BOURGEY A, 1973, REV GEOGRAPHIE LYON, V48, P107, DOI 10.3406-geoca.1973.1623; Brenner N, 2002, ANTIPODE, V34, P349, DOI 10.1111-1467-8330.00246; Charara W., 1996, DAWLAT HEZBOLLAH; Davis M., 2007, PLANET SLUMS; de Souza M. L., 2001, DISP, V147, P25; DEBOULET A, 2005, URBANISME, V336, P34; DELACUEVA AA, 1987, INT J URBAN REGIONAL, V11, P522; Dikec M, 2001, ENVIRON PLANN A, V33, P1785, DOI 10.1068-a3467; Dikec M, 2006, ANTIPODE, V38, P59, DOI 10.1111-j.0066-4812.2006.00565.x; Dikec M, 2002, GEOJOURNAL, V58, P91, DOI 10.1023-B:GEJO.0000010828.40053.de; FAOUR A, 1981, SYRIAN GEOGRAPHICAL, V6, P3; FAVIER A, 2001, CAHIERS CERMOC, V24; FAWAZ M, 2004, THESIS MIT CAMBRIDGE; Fawaz M, 2008, INT J URBAN REGIONAL, V32, P565, DOI 10.1111-j.1468-2427.2008.00812.x; FAWAZ M, 2003, ACCESS HOUSING POOR; FAWAZ M, 2002, SLUMS BEIRUT HIST DE; FAWAZ M, 2005, NGOS GOVERNANCE ARAB, P229; Fawaz Mona, 2009, COMP CITIES MIDDLE E, P197; Fernandes E, 2007, SOC LEGAL STUD, V16, P201, DOI 10.1177-0964663907076529; Fernandes Edesio, 1998, ILLEGAL CITIES LAW U; FRIEDMAN J, 1988, RETHINKING LATIN AM, P99; GENBERG D, 2002, URBAN ETHNIC ENCOUNT, P81; Hall T, 1996, PROG HUM GEOG, V20, P153, DOI 10.1177-030913259602000201; HARB M, HEZBOLLAH B IN PRESS; Harb M, 2005, THIRD WORLD Q, V26, P173, DOI 10.1080-0143659042000322973; Harb M., 2003, GENESES, V51, P70; Harloe M, 2001, INT J URBAN REGIONAL, V25, P889, DOI 10.1111-1468-2427.00350; Harvey D, 2008, NEW LEFT REV, P23; Harvey D, 2007, ANN AM ACAD POLIT SS, V610, P22, DOI 10.1177-0002716206296780; Isin E., 2000, DEMOCRACY CITIZENSHI; Kassir Samir, 2003, HIST BEYROUTH; Keyder C, 2005, INT J URBAN REGIONAL, V29, P124, DOI 10.1111-j.1468-2427.2005.00574.x; Larner W, 2003, ENVIRON PLANN D, V21, P509, DOI 10.1068-d2105ed; Lefebvre H., 1974, PRODUCTION ESPACE; Lefebvre H., 1968, DROIT VILLE; Logan J. R., 1987, URBAN FORTUNES; Martin D, 2003, J URBAN AFF, V25, P113, DOI 10.1111-1467-9906.t01-1-00001; McCann E., 2002, GEOJOURNAL, V58, P77, DOI 10.1023-B:GEJO.0000010826.75561.c0; Miraftab F, 2005, J PLAN EDUC RES, V25, P200, DOI 10.1177-0739456X05282182; Mitchell Don, 2003, RIGHT CITY SOCIAL JU; Nagel C, 2000, GROWTH CHANGE, V31, P211; NAVEZBOUCHANINE F, 2003, ESPACES SOC, V112, P59; NORTON R, 1987, AMAL SHIA; Pamuk A, 2000, INT J URBAN REGIONAL, V24, P379, DOI 10.1111-1468-2427.00253; Purcell M., 2002, GEOJOURNAL, V58, P99, DOI DOI 10.1023-B:GEJ0.0000010829.62237.8F; Purcell M, 2003, INT J URBAN REGIONAL, V27, P564, DOI 10.1111-1468-2427.00467; QASIM N, 2002, HEZBOLLAH AL MANHAJ; RAZZAZ OM, 1994, LAW SOC REV, V28, P7, DOI 10.2307-3054136; Razzaz O.M., 1998, ILLEGAL CITIES LAW U, P69; Schmid H, 2006, EUR PLAN STUD, V14, P365, DOI 10.1080-09654310500420859; Shields R, 1998, LEFEBVRE LOVE STRUGG; SIMONC AM, 2005, AFRICA MEDITERRANEO, V50, P37; Smith N., 2002, ANTIPODE, V34, P434; TABET J, 2001, BEYROUTH COLLECTION; TRABOULSI F, 2008, TARIKH LOUBNAN AL HA; Turner J., 1972, FREEDOM BUILD, P148; *UN HAB, HAB INT COAL; Varley A, 2002, INT J URBAN REGIONAL, V26, P449, DOI 10.1111-1468-2427.00392; Ward P., 1982, SELF HELP HOUSING CR; WARD PM, 1992, INT J URBAN REGIONAL, V16, P60; ZUMINO HM, 2006, URBAN STUD, V43, P1825129
Contracts and retaliation: Securing housing exchanges in the interstice of the formal-informal Beirut (Lebanon) housing market
No full textThe current housing policy paradigm supports the integration of informal settlements' housing markets with the larger housing markets. Given, however, that housing production and exchange happen in a continuum of formal and informal processes, this article seeks to look at the effects of this integration on the conditions of housing acquisition for low-income urban dwellers. Based on a case study in Hayy el-Sellom (Beirut), the article traces the changing practices that ensued from the integration of this informal settlement's housing market in the affordable housing market of the city's suburbs by looking at how exchanges were secured and redress sought in cases of default. Research findings indicate that the introduction of practices borrowed from the larger housing market did not improve market securities. This suggests that rather than focusing on the formal-informal divide, planners should devise context-specific methods to address locally identified market weaknesses. © 2009 Association of Collegiate Schools of Planning.ACIOLY C, 2007, LAND LINES, V19, P1; *AG CENTR STAT, 1996, VILL BEYR RES REC IM; Assaad R, 1996, J PLAN EDUC RES, V16, P115, DOI 10.1177-0739456X9601600204; AVELINE N, 2000, MARCHES FONCIERS IMM; BAKEN RJ, 1993, THIRD WORLD PLAN REV, V15, P1; BENJAMIN S, 1996, THESIS MIT; Benton Lauren, 1994, SOCIAL LEGAL STUDIES, V3, P223, DOI 10.1177-096466399400300202; Berner E., 2001, DEV PRACTICE, V11, P292, DOI 10.1080-09614520120056423; Bourdieu P., 1986, HDB THEORY RES SOCIO, P241, DOI DOI 10.1177-0265532207083743; Bridge G, 2001, INT J URBAN REGIONAL, V25, P87, DOI 10.1111-1468-2427.00299; BURGESS R, 1982, SELF HELP HOUSING CR, P17; De Soto H., 2000, MYSTERY CAPITAL WHY; DELACUEVA AA, 1987, INT J URBAN REGIONAL, V11, P522; DOWALL DE, 1989, URBAN STUD, V26, P327, DOI 10.1080-00420988920080331; DURANDLASSERVE A, 1990, TRANSFORMATION LAND, P37; DURANDLASSERVE A, 1987, CITIES, V4, P325; DURANDLASSERVE A, 1994, METHODOLOGY LAND HOU, P55; Eggertsson T, 1990, EC BEHAV I; Fawaz M, 2008, INT J URBAN REGIONAL, V32, P565, DOI 10.1111-j.1468-2427.2008.00812.x; FAWAZ M, 2003, ACCESS HOUSING UNPUB; FAWAZ M, 2002, SLUMS BEIRUT HIST DE; FAWAZ M, 2004, THESIS MIT; FEDER G, 1991, WORLD BANK ECON REV, V5, P135, DOI 10.1093-wber-5.1.135; Fekade W, 2000, HABITAT INT, V24, P127, DOI 10.1016-S0197-3975(99)00034-X; Field Erica A., 2004, DO PROPERTY TITLES I; Gilbert A, 2002, INT DEV PLANN REV, V24, P1; GOUGH KV, 1998, HOUSING STUDIES, V13, P148; Harb M., 2003, GENESES, V51, P70; JENKINS P, 2001, URBAN DEV CIVIL SOC, P16; Jenkins P, 2001, HOUSING STUD, V16, P485; Jones G., 1994, METHODOLOGY LAND HOU; JONES G, 2007, HOUSING FINANCE DEV; Keivani R, 2001, PROG PLANN, V55, P65, DOI 10.1016-S0305-9006(00)00022-2; Keivani R, 2001, HABITAT INT, V25, P191, DOI 10.1016-S0197-3975(00)00024-2; Kironde JML, 2000, HABITAT INT, V24, P151; Klein DB, 1997, REPUTATION STUDIES V; Kombe WJ, 2000, HABITAT INT, V24, P231, DOI 10.1016-S0197-3975(99)00041-7; Kombe WJ, 2000, HABITAT INT, V24, P167, DOI 10.1016-S0197-3975(99)00036-3; Lanjouw JO, 2002, ECON J, V112, P986, DOI 10.1111-1468-0297.00067; Linn J., 1983, CITIES DEV WORLD POL; MALPEZZI S, 1994, 3 WORLD PLANNING REV, V16, P451; McAuslan Patrick, 2003, BRINGING LAW BACK ES; Merry Sally Engle, 1997, REPUTATION STUDIES V, P47; Mooya MM, 2007, URBAN STUD, V44, P147, DOI 10.1080-00420980601032498; Mukhija V, 2004, URBAN STUD, V41, P2231, DOI 10.1080-0042098042000268438; North D., 1990, I CHANGE EC PERFORMA; Pamuk A, 2000, INT J URBAN REGIONAL, V24, P379, DOI 10.1111-1468-2427.00253; PEATTIE L, 1987, WORLD DEV, V15, P851, DOI 10.1016-0305-750X(87)90038-6; RAKODI C, 2005, WORLD BANK URB RES S; RAZZAZ OM, 1993, LAND ECON, V69, P341, DOI 10.2307-3146452; Razzaz O.M., 1998, ILLEGAL CITIES LAW U, P69; SANTOS BDS, 1977, LAW SOC REV, V12, P5; SANYAL B, 2007, PLANNING I, P207; Sanyal Bish, 1996, REGIONAL DEV DIALOGU, V17, P161; Smith H, 2003, HABITAT INT, V27, P83, DOI 10.1016-S0197-3975(02)00037-1; STRASSMANN WP, 1994, CITIES, V11, P377, DOI 10.1016-0264-2751(94)90070-1; Tang BS, 2006, HOUSING STUD, V21, P799, DOI 10.1080-01436590600917647; Turner J., 1972, FREEDOM BUILD, P148; TURNER JC, 1967, J AM I PLANNERS, V33, P167, DOI 10.1080-01944366708977912; UN-Habitat, 2003, CHALL SLUMS; VANDERLINDEN J, 1994, THIRD WORLD PLAN REV, V16, P223; van Horen B, 2000, J PLAN EDUC RES, V19, P389, DOI 10.1177-0739456X0001900408; Varley A, 2002, INT J URBAN REGIONAL, V26, P449, DOI 10.1111-1468-2427.00392; Ward P., 1982, SELF HELP HOUSING CR; Ward PM, 2004, URBAN STUD, V41, P2621, DOI 10.1080-0042098042000294592; Wehbi S, 2002, WOMEN STUD INT FORUM, V25, P287; Williamson IP, 2001, LAND USE POLICY, V18, P297, DOI 10.1016-S0264-8377(01)00021-7; *WORLD BANK, 1993, EN MARK WORK; World Bank, 2002, WORLD DEV REP 2002; YINGER J, 1981, AM ECON REV, V71, P5910
Al-Qaida today: a movement at the crossroads
No full textWhat is happening to al-Qaida: does it still constitute a threat to its adversaries, and if so how grave? Fawaz A Gerges, author of "The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global", uses extensive survey evidence to examine the movement’s standing in the Muslim world and take the measure of its ability to continue its campaig
FRAX-vs. T-score-based intervention thresholds for osteoporosis
No full textSummary:Many current guidelines for the assessment of osteoporosis, including those in Kuwait, initiate fracture risk assessment in men and women using BMD T-score thresholds. We compared the Kuwaiti guidelines with FRAX-based age-dependent intervention thresholds equivalent to that in women with a prior fragility fracture. FRAX-based intervention thresholds identified women at higher fracture probability than fixed T-score thresholds, particularly in the elderly.Purpose:A FRAX® model been recently calibrated for Kuwait, but guidance is needed on how to utilise fracture probabilities in the assessment and treatment of patients.Methods:We compared age-specific fracture probabilities, equivalent to women with no clinical risk factors and a prior fragility fracture (without BMD), with the age-specific fracture probabilities associated with femoral neck T-scores of −2.5 and −1.5 SD, in line with current guidelines in Kuwait. Upper and lower assessment thresholds for BMD testing were additionally explored using FRAX.Results:When a BMD T-score of −2.5 SD was used as an intervention threshold, FRAX probabilities of a major osteoporotic fracture in women aged 50 years were approximately twofold higher than those in women of the same age but with an average BMD. The increase in risk associated with the BMD threshold decreased progressively with age such that, at the age of 83 years or more, a T-score of −2.5 SD was associated with a lower probability of fracture than that of the age-matched general population with no clinical risk factors. The same phenomenon was observed from the age of 66 years at a T-score of −1.5 SD. A FRAX-based intervention threshold, defined as the 10-year probability of a major osteoporotic fracture in a woman of average BMI with a previous fracture, rose with age from 4.3% at the age of 50 years to 23%, at the age of 90 years, and identified women at increased risk at all ages. Qualitatively comparable findings were observed in the case of hip fracture probability and in men.Conclusion:Intervention thresholds based on BMD alone do not optimally target women at higher fracture risk than those on age-matched individuals without clinical risk factors, particularly in the elderly. In contrast, intervention thresholds based on fracture probabilities equivalent to a ‘fracture threshold’ consistently target women at higher fracture risk, irrespective of age
An Unusual Clique of City-Makers: Social Networks in the Production of a Neighborhood in Beirut (1950-75)
No full textThis article documents the early development of an informal settlement in Beirut (Lebanon) through the trajectories of the developers who participated in its production, looking specifically at the role that social networks played in the process. Drawing primarily on the methodological approach developed by Pierre Bourdieu, my analysis reveals that social networks play a central role as conduits for developers to access the necessary housing ingredients and market securities they need to conduct their businesses. Social networks also function as accumulated capital, enabling developers to strengthen their hold over the production of housing in the neighborhood. My analysis also indicates that while some of these networks were inherited, many were built through patient investments deployed by these developers within the changing limitations of the micro (neighborhood) and macro (city-wide) contexts. Finally, the changing distribution of social networks in this neighborhood determined when and how different social agents were able to participate as developers in the production and exchange of housing. These findings are important since they generate new insights into how (informal land) markets work, the practices of developers in this type of neighborhood, as well as the yet unstudied mechanisms of informal housing production in the Lebanese context. © 2008 The Authors. Journal Compilation © 2008 Joint Editors and Blackwell Publishing Ltd.[Anonymous], 2000, BREAKDOWN STATE LEBA; Aristizabal NC, 2004, HABITAT INT, V28, P245, DOI 10.1016-S0197-3975(03)00075-4; Assaad R, 1997, J DEV ECON, V52, P1, DOI 10.1016-S0304-3878(96)00441-5; Berner E., 2001, DEV PRACTICE, V11, P292, DOI 10.1080-09614520120056423; BERNER E, 2001, NAER C ESF N AERUS I; Bourdieu P., 1994, RAISONS PRATIQUES TH; Bourdieu P., 1992, INVITATION REFLEXIVE; Bourdieu P., 1970, REPROD ELEMENTS THEO; Bourdieu P., 2000, STRUCTURES SOCIALES; Bourdieu Pierre, 1986, HDB THEORY RES SOCIO; BOURDIEU P, 1987, HASTINGS LAW J, V38, P805; Bourdieu Pierre, 1980, SENS PRATIQUE; Bourdieu Pierre, 1979, DISTINCTION; CHABBI M, 1988, INT J URBAN REGIONAL, V12, P8; CHARAFEDDINE W, 1991, THESIS U PARIS 8; COLEMAN J.S., 1987, EC IMPERIALISM EC AP; Collier D., 1976, SQUATTERS OLIGARCHS; De Soto H., 2000, MYSTERY CAPITAL WHY; De Soto H, 1989, OTHER PATH INVISIBLE; DEBOULET A, 1994, THESIS U PARIS 12 CR; DEBOULET A, 1993, ANN RECHERCHE URBAIN, V59, P78; DEMAGALHAES CS, 1999, INT J URBAN REGIONAL, P445; DESOUSASANTOS B, 1977, LAW SOC REV, P5; FAOUR A, 1981, SYRIAN GEOGRAPHICAL, V6, P3; FAWAZ M, 2004, THESIS MIT; Fernandes Edesio, 1998, ILLEGAL CITIES LAW U; Fichter R., 1972, FREEDOM BUILD DWELLE; FOLEY M, 1999, J PUBLIC POLICY, V0019; GARCIA B, 1994, METHODOLOGY LAND HOU; Gidden A., 1979, CENTRAL PROBLEMS SOC; Granovetter M, 2001, SOCIOLOGY EC LIFE; Granovetter M, 2005, J ECON PERSPECT, V19, P33, DOI 10.1257-0895330053147958; HADJIMICHALIS C, 2006, INT J URBAN REGIONAL, P690; HASAN A, 2000, HOUSING POOR FAILURE; Jenkins P, 2001, HOUSING STUD, V16, P485; Khuri F, 1975, VILLAGE SUBURB ORDER; Leontidou L, 1990, MEDITERRANEAN CITY T; MOOYA MM, 2007, URBAN STUD, P147; NASR S, 1978, MERIP, V13, P3; Pamuk A, 2000, INT J URBAN REGIONAL, V24, P379, DOI 10.1111-1468-2427.00253; Perlman J., 1976, MYTH MARGINALITY; Putnam Robert, 1993, MAKING DEMOCRACY WOR; RAZZAZ O, 1998, ILLEGAL CITIES LAW U; RAZZAZ O, 1996, INFORMAL SECTO UNPUB; RAZZAZ OM, 1993, LAND ECON, V69, P341, DOI 10.2307-3146452; Salibi K., 1976, CROSSROADS CIVIL WAR; SEWELL WH, 1992, AM J SOCIOL, V1, P1; SMART A, 1983, SQUATTER PROPERTY MA; SMART A, 1993, CULT ANTHROPOL, V8, P388, DOI 10.1525-can.1993.8.3.02a00060; Smith H, 2003, HABITAT INT, V27, P83, DOI 10.1016-S0197-3975(02)00037-1; SOLIMAN A, 2004, URBAN INFORMALITY TR; TANG B, 2006, HOUSING STUDIES, P799; Topalov C., 1987, LOGEMENT FRANCE HIST; TRABOULSI F, 1993, THESIS U PARIS 3; Varley A, 2002, INT J URBAN REGIONAL, V26, P449, DOI 10.1111-1468-2427.00392; Ward P., 1982, SELF HELP HOUSING CR; Ward P. M., 1999, COLONIAS PUBLIC POLI; World Bank, 2002, WORLD DEV REP 2002108
The far enemy : why Jihad went global /
No full textSince September 11, Al Qaeda has been portrayed as an Islamist front united in armed struggle, or jihad, against the Christian West. However, as the historian and commentator Fawaz A. Gerges argues, the reality is rather different. In fact, Al Qaeda represents a minority within the jihadist movement, and its strategies have been criticized and opposed by religious nationalists among the jihadis, who prefer to concentrate on changing the Muslim world rather than taking the fight global. Based on primary field research, the author unravels the story of the jihadist movement and explores its philosophies, its structure, the rifts and tensions that split its ranks, and why some members, like Osama bin Laden and his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri, favored international over local strategies in taking the war to the West. Gerges asks where the jihadist movement is going, and whether it can be transformed into a non-violent, socio-political force
DCIM: Distributed cache invalidation method for maintaining cache consistency in wireless mobile networks
No full textThis paper proposes distributed cache invalidation mechanism (DCIM), a client-based cache consistency scheme that is implemented on top of a previously proposed architecture for caching data items in mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs), namely COACS, where special nodes cache the queries and the addresses of the nodes that store the responses to these queries. We have also previously proposed a server-based consistency scheme, named SSUM, whereas in this paper, we introduce DCIM that is totally client-based. DCIM is a pull-based algorithm that implements adaptive time to live (TTL), piggybacking, and prefetching, and provides near strong consistency capabilities. Cached data items are assigned adaptive TTL values that correspond to their update rates at the data source, where items with expired TTL values are grouped in validation requests to the data source to refresh them, whereas unexpired ones but with high request rates are prefetched from the server. In this paper, DCIM is analyzed to assess the delay and bandwidth gains (or costs) when compared to polling every time and push-based schemes. DCIM was also implemented using ns2, and compared against client-based and server-based schemes to assess its performance experimentally. The consistency ratio, delay, and overhead traffic are reported versus several variables, where DCIM showed to be superior when compared to the other systems. © 2002-2012 IEEE.Andrel T., 2006, IEEE COMPUT, V39, P48; Artail H, 2008, IEEE T MOBILE COMPUT, V7, P961, DOI 10.1109-TMC.2008.18; Bahat O, 2005, PERFORM EVALUATION, V62, P439, DOI 10.1016-j.peva.2005.07.015; Barbara D., 1994, P ACM SIGMOD C MAN D, P1, DOI DOI 10.1145-191943.191844; Boudriga N., 2005, P IEEE WIR COMM NETW; Bright L, 2006, ACM T DATABASE SYST, V31, P631, DOI 10.1145-1138394.1138399; Cao GH, 2003, IEEE T KNOWL DATA EN, V15, P1251; Cao GH, 2004, COMPUTER, V37, P32; Cao JN, 2007, COMPUTER, V40, P60, DOI 10.1109-MC.2007.123; Cao P, 1998, IEEE T COMPUT, V47, P445; CATE V, 1992, PROCEEDINGS OF THE USENIX FILE SYSTEMS WORKSHOP, P1; Chand N, 2006, INT J COMMUN SYST, V19, P1009, DOI 10.1002-dac.795; Chen X., 1999, P 1999 IEEE WORKSH I, P54; Danzig C.P., 1996, P ANN C USENIX ANN T, P13; Denko MK, 2006, WIMOB 2006: 2ND IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WIRELESS AND MOBILE COMPUTING, NETWORKING AND COMMUNICATIONS, PROCEEDINGS, P38; Du Y., 2005, P JOINT INT C AUT AU, P58; Du Y, 2009, AD HOC NETW, V7, P579, DOI 10.1016-j.adhoc.2008.07.007; Fang YG, 2004, WIREL NETW, V10, P607, DOI 10.1023-B:WINE.0000036462.21300.25; Fawaz K., 2012, P IEEE GLOB COMM C G; Hara T., 2004, P DAT SYST ADV APPL, P111; Holt CC, 2004, INT J FORECASTING, V20, P5, DOI 10.1016-j.ijforecast.2004.09.015; Hu Q, 1998, CLUSTER COMPUT, V1, P39, DOI DOI 10.1023-A:1019012927328; Huang Y., 2007, P 5 ANN IEEE INT C P, P239; Jacobson V., 1995, P ACM SIGCOMM COMP C, V25, P187; Jing J., 1997, Mobile Networks and Applications, V2, DOI 10.1023-A:1013616213333; Jung J., 2003, P IEEE INFOCOM; Kahol A, 2001, IEEE T PARALL DISTR, V12, P686; Krishnamurthy B., 1998, P 7 INT C WORLD WID; Krishnamurthy B., 1997, P USENIX S INT TECHN; Lee J., 2002, P C WEB INF SYST ENG, P21; Li D., 2001, WCIP WEB CA IN PRESS; Li WZ, 2009, INT CON DISTR COMP S, P215, DOI 10.1109-ICDCS.2009.23; Lim S, 2007, COMPUT COMMUN, V30, P1854, DOI 10.1016-j.comcom.2007.02.020; Maalouf HW, 2002, PERFORM EVALUATION, V50, P245, DOI 10.1016-S0166-5316(02)00085-8; Mershad K, 2010, IEEE T MOBILE COMPUT, V9, P778, DOI 10.1109-TMC.2010.18; Ninan U.A., 2001, P 21 INT C DISTR COM, P371; Papadimitratos P., 2003, P 2 ACM WORKSH WIR S, P41; Sit Y., 2005, P 11 INT C PAR DISTR, P264; Tang XY, 2008, IEEE T PARALL DISTR, V19, P1683, DOI 10.1109-TPDS.2008.44; Wang ZJ, 2004, IEEE T PARALL DISTR, V15, P983, DOI 10.1109-TPDS.2004.60; Wessels D., 1998, SQUID INTERNET OBJEC; Yin LZ, 2006, IEEE T MOBILE COMPUT, V5, P77; Zhang WS, 2008, AD HOC NETW, V6, P363, DOI 10.1016-j.adhoc.2007.02.005; Zipf G. K., 1949, HUMAN BEHAV PRINCIPL61
Iraq war fuels global Jihad
No full textMuslims initially condemned Al Qaeda’s 2001 attacks on the US. But then the US invaded Iraq, triggering chaos that could overwhelm more than one country throughout the Middle East. As a result, even more moderate Muslims support anyone who defends Muslim lands and values against occupiers, particularly in Palestine and Iraq. Jihadists emerged during the early 1980s, opposed to Egypt and Israel seeking peace; then during the 1990s in Afghanistan, in armed opposition to the Russian invasion. But the war in Iraq has unleashed deep bitterness and instability throughout the region, and many more young Muslims with minimal education aspire to a form of jihad more volatile and deadly than what was seen in the previous decades. Instead of containing terrorism with war in Iraq, the US has fortified it, giving terrorists a new base of operations, argues international affairs professor and author Fawaz Gerges. US voters have rejected their president’s strategies for the Iraq war. If US leaders and Iraqis can find a way to stop fighting and set goals that benefit ordinary Muslims, then jihadists may still be discouraged and political stability for Iraq may yet be a reality
- …
