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Ancient Classics for English Readers. Aristotle
No full textI. The life of Aristotle -- II. The works of Aristotle -- III. The "Organon" of Aristotle -- IV. Aristotle's "Rhetorio" and "Art of Poetry" -- V Aristotle's "Ethics" -- VI Aristotle's "Politics" -- VII. The natural philosophy of Aristotle -- VIII. The biology of Aristotle -- IX. The metaphysics of Aristotle -- X. Aristotle since the Christian Era."Supplementary Series.
Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle. Volume I
No full textIn English, with passages in Greek
Aristotle
No full textDr Lloyd writes for those who want to discover and explore Aristotle's work for themselves. He acts as mediator between Aristotle and the modern reader. The book is divided into two parts. The first tells the story of Aristotle's intellectual development as far as it can be reconstructed; the second presents the fundamentals of his thought in the main fields of inquiry which interested him: logic and metaphysics, physics, psychology, ethics, politics, and literary criticism. The final chapter considers the unity and coherence of Aristotle's philosophy, and records briefly his later influence on European thought. This is a concise and lucid account of the work of a difficult and profound thinker. Dr Lloyd's business is only with the essentials; but he does not shirk the difficulties which arise in their interpretation, nor does he invest Aristotle with a spurious modernity.</jats:p
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On fictionalism in Aristotle's philosophy of mathematics
Get PDFtextThe aim of this dissertation is to show that Aristotle’s ontology cannot provide a model for mathematics. To show this, I argue that (i) mathematical objects must be seen as fictional entities in the light of Aristotle’s metaphysics, and (ii) Aristotle’s mathematical fictionalism is not compatible with his metaphysical realism. My interpretation differs from that of other fictionalists in denying this compatibility. For Aristotle, mathematical objects are “something resulting from abstraction ([Greek phrase]).” For example, geometry investigates a man not qua man, but qua solid or figure. Traditionally, Aristotle’s abstraction has been interpreted as an epistemic process by which a universal concept is obtained from particulars; I rather show his abstraction as a linguistic analysis or conceptual separation by which a certain group of properties are selected: e. g., if a science, X, studies a qua triangle, X studies the properties which belong to a in virtue of a’s being a triangle and ignores a’s other properties. Aristotle’s theory of abstraction implies a mathematical naïve realism, in that mathematical objects are properties of sensible objects. But the difficulty with this mathematical naïve realism is that, since most geometrical objects do not have physical instantiations in the sensible world, things abstracted from sensible objects cannot supply all the necessary objects of mathematics. This is the so-called “precision problem.” In order to solve this problem, Aristotle abandons his mathematical realism and claims that mathematical objects exist in sensibles not as actualities but ‘as matter ([Greek phrase]).’ This claim entails a mathematical fictionalism in metaphysical terms. Most fictionalist interpretations argue that the fictionality of mathematical objects does not harm the truth of mathematics for Aristotle, insofar as objects’ matter is abstracted from sensibles. None of these interpretations, however, is successful in reconciling Aristotle’s mathematical fictionalism with his realism. For Aristotle, sciences are concerned with ‘what is ([Greek phrase])’ and not with ‘what is not ([Greek phrase]).’ Aristotle’s concept of truth rests on a realist correspondence to ‘what is ([Greek phrase])’: “what is true is to say of what is that it is or of what is not that it is not.” Thus, insofar as mathematical objects are fictional, Aristotle’s metaphysics cannot account for the truth of mathematics.Philosoph
Aristotle on music and emotions
Get PDFThis research aims to offer an original reconstruction of Aristotle’s psychology of
music that explains his views on the relation between instrumental music and
emotions. I argue that, contrary to the relevant scholarship, for Aristotle instrumental
music cannot convey emotions to the listener. What instrumental music does, I claim,
is to cause an objectless mood or disposition (διάθεσις) that “prepares the way”
(προοδοποιεῖν) for the emotions.
Most interpreters of Politics VIII (1340a12-29) argue that for Aristotle a piece of
instrumental music would be able to represent emotions and the listener would be
moved to the same emotion by a sort of sympathetic contagion. However, this
interpretation is inconsistent with Aristotle’s account of emotions. For Aristotle a
necessary condition for the emotions is that those experiencing them “judge” (κρίνειν)
a situation based on their beliefs. If it is accepted that there is such a thing as an
emotional contagion through music, then the cognitive theory of emotion presented by
Aristotle is at risk since no such a judgment would be required.
The thesis is presented in three chapters. In chapter one the cognitive elements that
give rise to emotions are analysed. The nature of the term παθή is explored as well as
the difference between its use as a ‘general affection’ and its use as the mental process
that we now call ‘emotion.’ In this latter sense the emotions are mental states directed
to an object on which a judgment is made and that are accompanied by pain or
pleasure. The nature of the emotional judgment is investigated and the possibility of
its existence in non-rational animals is explored. It is concluded that, even if we accept
emotions in animals, intentionality and predication of an object are necessary
conditions for the existence of emotions.
In the second chapter, I discuss two instances where it seems Aristotle makes an
exception to the judgment as necessary condition for the emotions. First, emotions
aroused by the perception of signs of emotions, like the mere voice of the orator (Rhet.
1408a16-26) and the spectacle in the theatre (Poet. 1453b1-10) and second, emotions
aroused by bodily changes (De an. 403a25). I argue that in Aristotle’s view in both
cases the factors at work (voice, sight, bodily condition) only facilitate the arousal of
emotions, but the actual arousal requires an additional narrative context that supplies
grounds for the judgment that in turn gives rise to the emotion in question. In the first
case the orator’s voice and the theatre’s spectacle work just as a condiment (ἥδυσμα)
that helps to intensify (συναπεργάζεσθαι) the object of judgment (Pol. 1340b17; Poet.
1449b25; 1450b16; Rhet. 1386a31). Our emotional response has as its object their
story, not the elements that decorate it. In the second case, the bodily changes are the
material constituents of emotions; facilitate the generation of emotions: hotness around
the heart, for example, makes the subject prone to anger; but the emotion of anger
appears only after a particular situation is evaluated by the mind.
In the third chapter, I turn to the specific case of music. From an exegesis of Pol.
1340a12-29, I argue that the emotions ostensibly transmitted by music (μουσική) to
the listener are due to the lyrics of the songs (μέλη), not to the instrumental music
itself. Therefore the question about the nature of the emotional effect of pure
instrumental music remains open. My answer to this question is based on the analysis
of the causal mechanism by means of which instrumental music affects the listener.
Aristotle’s physiology reveals the physical impact of sound on the sense of hearing,
and from there to the heart, the first sensorium. Bodily changes in the organ create an
objectless disposition (διάθεσις) in the listener by relaxing or agitating his body,
without providing any content for the mind besides the perception of the sound.
Exciting or relaxing the heart by means of music would leave the listener in the
disposition of readiness to react emotionally, but the emotion would appear only once
an intentional object, i.e., the content of the emotion, is presented and evaluated by the
mind.
Finally, I show the relevance of my interpretation of these dispositions to
understanding the role of emotions in the education of character in the Politics.
Aristotle proposes to use only a certain type of music in his educational curriculum,
not one too relaxed or too tense, but a middle between them that puts the students in a
stable and noble disposition that would, in turn, lead them to be guided by reason
instead of their emotions
Aristotle on the economy
No full textFrom seemingly outdated passages of Aristotle on oikonomikè,
this paper tries to select and separate what is old-fashioned from
what is valid for today. From these latter elements –which may be
abridged in the intrinsic ethical and political character of economics–
we can extract useful lessons. These lessons refer to the impact of
Ethics and Politics on Economics. They stress the relevance of personal
virtues and institutions for a suitable functioning of the economy.
From an epistemological point of view, these lessons highlight
the inexact character of Economics and the necessity of firm reliance
on data. Current economics does not deal with ends, but only with
means. The Aristotelian perspective would specially deal with ends.
This concern with ends leads to prudential, not technical analysis and
decisions. This calls for broadening the scope of Economics and consequently
should provoke changes in its instruction. The paper concludes
that a closer attention to Aristotle’s thought would have a high
impact on current economy and Economics
Which Kind of Science Is Construction Management?
No full textIt is argued that the mainstream views on the nature of construction management are insufficient, and as one consequence of this, the relevance of construction management has been questioned. As a solution to this situation, construction management is suggested to be repositioned as a design science, rather than as an explanatory science. A historical consideration reveals that design science equals to one of the sciences proposed by Aristotle, however, the suggestion of Aristotle has been forgotten. Thus, there has been a long-standing neglect of the design science, which explains the present fragmentation of this field. It is argued that this redefinition of construction management will solve several problems plaguing this discipline, including the problem of relevance
Aristotle on ethical ascription : a philosophical exercise in the interpretation of the role and significance of the hekousios/akousios distinction in Aristotle's Ethics
No full textIn his ethical treatises Aristotle offers a rich account of those conditions that render people’s behaviour involuntary, and defines voluntariness on the basis of the absence of these conditions. This dissertation has two aims. One is to offer an account of the significance of the notions of involuntariness and voluntariness for Aristotle’s ethical project that satisfactorily explains why he deems it necessary to discuss these notions in his Ethics. My own account of the significance of these notions for Aristotle’s Ethics emerges from my arguments against the two most influential views concerning this significance: I argue that Aristotle’s concern with voluntariness in his Ethics is not (primarily) shaped by a concern with accountability, i.e. with those conditions under which fully mature and healthy rational agents are held accountable or answerable for their actions; nor is it (primarily) shaped by a concern with the conditioning of pain-responsive agents for the sake of socially useful ends that are not, intrinsically, their own. Rather, his concern is with reason-responsive agents (which are not morally accountable agents, nor merely pain-responsive agents) and the conditions for attributing ethically significant behaviour to them. This is what I call ‘ethical ascription’. The second aim of this dissertation is to provide a comprehensive account of those conditions that defeat the ascription of ethically significant pieces of behaviour to reason-responsive agents, and to show the distinctiveness of Aristotle’s views on the nature of these conditions. The conclusions I arrive at in this respect are shaped by the notion of ethical ascription that I develop as a way of reaching the first aim
Love and friendship in Plato and Aristotle
No full textBook synopsis: Reissued in 1997 with corrections and a new Afterword, this book fully explores for the first time an idea common to Plato and Aristotle, which unites their treatments - otherwise very different - of love and friendship. The idea is that although persons are separate, their lives need not be. One person's life may overflow into another's, and as such, helping another person is a way of serving oneself. The author shows how their view of love and friendship, within not only personal relationships, but also the household and even the city-state, promises to resolve the old dichotomy between egoism and altruism
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