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Brief von Kurt Rothschild an Ariel Rubinstein
No full textBRIEF VON KURT ROTHSCHILD AN ARIEL RUBINSTEIN
Brief von Kurt Rothschild an Ariel Rubinstein (1
Economics and Language
No full textThis online text is a collection of five essays examining the relationships between economics and language. These essays are extended versions of the Churchill lectures delivered by Ariel Rubinstein in May 1998. Among other issues, these essays examine the relationship between mathematical language and natural language in economic analysis.economics and language,online textbook
Economic Fables (PDF)
No full textI had the good fortune to grow up in a wonderful area of Jerusalem, surrounded by a diverse range of people: Rabbi Meizel, the communist Sala Marcel, my widowed Aunt Hannah, and the intellectual Yaacovson. As far as I'm concerned, the opinion of such people is just as authoritative for making social and economic decisions as the opinion of an expert using a model. Part memoir, part crash-course in economic theory, this deeply engaging book by one of the world's foremost economists looks at economic ideas through a personal lens. Together with an introduction to some of the central concepts in modern economic thought, Ariel Rubinstein offers some powerful and entertaining reflections on his childhood, family and career. In doing so, he challenges many of the central tenets of game theory, and sheds light on the role economics can play in society at large. The book is as thought-provoking for seasoned economists as it is enlightening for newcomers to the field. Sylvia Nasar, author of A Beautiful Mind, describes Economics Fables as a "wonderfully inviting introduction to game theory, rich in personalities, history and sense of place. Ariel Rubinstein is not only a brilliant theorist with a knack for lucid exposition, but a gifted storyteller. Students will find the ideas surprisingly accessible. Aspiring scholars, wondering whether a life of the mind is worth pursuing, will find his personal journey of intellectual discovery thrilling.
Imperfect Contract Enforcement
Full text linkWe model imperfect contract enforcement when repudiators and their victims default to spot trading. The interaction between the contract and spot markets under improved enforcement can exacerbate repudiation and reduce contract execution, harming all traders. Improved contract execution benefits traders on the excess side of the spot market by attracting potential counter-parties, but harms them by impeding their exit from contracts found to be unfavorable. Multiple equilibria and multiple optima are possible, with anarchy a local optimum, perfect enforcement a local minimum and imperfect enforcement a global optimum. LDCs exhibit parameter combinations such that imperfect enforcement is optimal from their side of international markets. The model thus rationalizes the internationally varying patterns of imperfect enforceability observable in survey data.
Lecture Notes in Microeconomic Theory
No full textA set of lecture notes for the first quarter of a graduate microeconomics class, based on classes taught by the author at Tel Aviv, Princeton, and New York Universities.microeconomics, graduate microeconomics, online textbook
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
Full text linkThe present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
Integration of markets vs. integration by agreements
Full text linkThis paper provides an analysis of the two channels of regional integration: integration via markets and integration via agreements. Given that East Asia and Latin America are two fertile regions where both forms of integrations have taken place, the authors examine the experiences of these two areas. There are four related results. First, East Asia had been integrating via markets long before formal agreements were in vogue in the region. Latin America, by contrast, has primarily used formal regional trade treaties as the main channel of integration. Second, despite the relative lack of formal regional trade treaties until recently, East Asia is more integrated among itself than Latin America. Third, from a purely economic and trade standpoint, the proper sequence of integrations seems to be first integrating via markets and subsequently via formal regional trade agreements. Fourth, regional trade agreements often serve multiple constituents. The reason why integrating via markets first can be helpful is because this can give stronger political bargaining power to the outward-looking economic-oriented forces within the country.Trade Law,Free Trade,Trade and Regional Integration,Trade Policy,Emerging Markets
Lost in Translation? Basis Utility and Proportionality in Games
Full text linkCooperative and noncooperative games have no representation of players's basis utilities. Basis utility is the natural reference point on a player's utility scale that enables the determination the marginal utility of any payoff or allocation. A player's basis utility can be determined by an observer and other players under standard rationality assumptions. Basis utility allows interpersonal comparison of proportional utility gains relative to the disagreement outcome. Proportional pure bargaining is the unique solution satisfying efficiency, symmetry, affine transformation invariance and monotonicity in pure bargaining games with basis utility. Characterization of the Nash (1950) bargaining solution requires the assumption of the irrelevance of basis utility in games with basis utility. All existing cooperative solution functions become translation invariant once proper account is taken of basis utility. The noncooperative rationality of these results is demonstrated with a proportional bargaining based on Gul (1988). Further noncooperative application is demonstrated by showing that quantal response equilibria with multiplicative error structures (Goeree, Holt and Palfrey (2004)) become translation invariant with specification of basis utility.Basis utility, equal split, Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, Nash bargaining, quantal response equilibria, proportional bargaining, translation invariance.
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