1,721,181 research outputs found
Il mercato del lavoro dei politici
No full textLe classi dirigenti hanno una funzione importante nelle nostre società. Rendono possibili obiettivi altrimenti irragiungibili, rimuovendo gli ostacoli che inibiscono la crescita nel lungo periodo. Ma come si formano? Il rapporto analizza la selezione dei politici in italia
The Research Agenda: Dynamic Model of Crime and Punishment
No full textAntonio Merlo is the Lawrence R. Klein Associate Professor of Economics at the University of Pennsylvania and is Director of the Penn Institute for Economic Research. His field is political economy, in particular bargaining, political stability, and crime.
One-dimensional bargaining with a general voting rule
Full text linkWe study a model of multilateral bargaining over social outcomes represented by points in the unit interval. An acceptance or rejection of a proposal is determined by a voting rule as represented by a collection of decisive coalitions. The focus of the paper is on the asymptotic behavior of subgame perfect equilibria in stationary strategies as the discount factor goes to one. We show that, along any sequence of stationary subgame perfect equilibria, as the discount factor goes to one, the social acceptance set collapses to a point. This point, called the bargaining outcome, is independent of the sequence of equilibria and is uniquely determined by the set of players, the utility functions, the recognition probabilities, and the voting rule. The central result of the paper is a characterization of the bargaining outcome as a unique zero of the characteristic equation.microeconomics ;
On the asymptotic uniqueness of bargaining equilibria
Full text linkThe paper studies the model of multilateral bargaining over the alternatives representedby points in the mâdimensional Euclidean space. Proposers are chosen randomly and the acceptance of a proposal requires the unanimous approval of it by all the players. The focus of the paper is on the asymptotic behavior of subgame perfect equilibria in pure stationary strategies (called bargaining equilibria) as the breakdown probability tends to zero. Bargaining equilibria are said to be asymptotically unique if the limit of a sequence of bargaining equilibria as the breakdown probability tends to zero is independent of the choice of the sequence and is uniquely determined by the primitives of the model. We show that the limit of any sequence of bargaining equilibria is a zero point of the soâcalled linearization correspondence. The asymptotic uniqueness of bargaining equilibria is then deduced in each of the following cases: (1) m = n−1, where n is the number of players, (2) m = 1, and (3) in the case where the utility functions are quadratic, for each 1 ≤ m ≤ n−1. In each case the linearization correspondence is shown to have a unique zero. Result 1 hasbeen established earlier in Miyakawa and Laruelle and Valenciano. Result 2 is subsumed by the result in Predtetchinski. Result 3 is new.microeconomics ;
New governance of Europe: Parliamentary or presidential?, The
Full text linkThis paper discusses the main issues at stake in the Convention preparing a Constitutional Treaty for Europe. It builds on recent work in political economics to discuss the trade-offs between the parliamentary and the presidential model of democracy for legislative and executive activity in areas of competence of an enlarged EU. It argues in favor of a presidential model in the context of the EU with the president being elected by national parliaments.EU governance; parliamentary system; presidential system; commission president; convention future Europe;
Money, Political Ambition, and the Career Decisions of Politicians, Second Version
Full text linkIn this paper we assess the impact of a variety of policies that may influence the career decisions of members of the U.S. Congress, using the empirical framework of Diermeier, Keane and Merlo (2005). These policies alter incentives to run for re-election, run for higher office or leave Congress, by altering wages, non-pecuniary rewards and career prospects (both in and out of Congress). We find that reducing the relative wage of politicians would substantially reduce the duration of congressional careers. Notably, however, the effect varies considerably across different types of politicians. A reduction in the congressional wage would disproportionately induce exit from Congress by “skilled” politicians, Democrats, and politicians who were relatively young when first elected. Interestingly, however, it would not cause the type of politicians who most value legislative accomplishments (“achievers”) to disproportionately exit Congress. Thus, wage reductions would not reduce the “quality” composition of Congress in this sense. Term limits also have similar effects on achievers and non-achievers. However, we find that term limits would disproportionately induce members of the majority party to exit Congress. This has the interesting implication that term limits make it more difficult to sustain substantial congressional majorities over time. We do find three types of policies that disproportionately induce non-achievers to leave Congress: (i) elimination of seniority as a determinant of key committee assignments, (ii) restricting private sector employment after leaving Congress, and (iii) reducing the seniority advantage in elections.politicians, political careers, monetary and non-monetary incentives, U.S. Congress
Politiche ambientali e sviluppo economico: simulazioni per l'Italia con un modello dinamico
No full textThe Transparency of Politics and the Quality of Politicians
Full text linkIn this paper, we analyze the relationship between the transparency of politics and the quality of politicians in a model of parties’ political recruitment. We find that an increase in the transparency of politics reduces the average quality of the politicians a party recruits in equilibriumTransparency, politicians, parties, political recruitment
Money, Political Ambition, and the Career Decisions of Politicians
Full text linkIn this paper we assess the impact of a variety of policies that may influence the career decisions of members of the U.S. Congress, using the empirical framework of Diermeier, Keane and Merlo (2005). These policies alter incentives to run for re-election, run for higher office or leave Congress, by altering wages, nonpecuniary rewards and career prospects (both in and out of Congress). We find that reducing the relative wage of politicians would substantially reduce the duration of congressional careers. Notably, however, the effect varies considerably across different types of politicians. A reduction in the congressional wage would disproportionately induce exit from Congress by “skilled” politicians, Democrats, politicians who were relatively young when first elected, and those without pre-congressional political experience. Interestingly, however, it would not cause the type of politicians who most value legislative accomplishments (“achievers”) to disproportionately exit Congress. Thus, wage reductions would not reduce the “quality” composition of Congress in this sense. Term limits also have similar effects on achievers and non-achievers. However, we find that term limits would disproportionately induce members of the majority party to exit Congress. This has the interesting implication that term limits make it more difficult to sustain substantial congressional majorities over time. We do find three types of policies that disproportionately induce nonachievers to leave Congress: (i) elimination of seniority as a determinant of key committee assignments, (ii) restricting private sector employment after leaving Congress, and (iii) reducing the seniority advantage in elections.politicians, political careers, monetary and non-monetary incentives, U.S. Congress
José Antonio Merlo Vega, subdirector del Centro de Desarrollo Sociocultural de Peñaranda de Bracamonte (Salamanca) [Entrevista]: "Cualquier plan de fomento de la lectura no basado en la colaboración biblioteca-escuela está llamado al fracaso"
No full text[ES] Desde su experiencia como Subdirector del Centro de Desarrollo Sociocultural de Peñaranda de Bracamonte
(Salamanca), dependiente de la Fundación Germán Sánchez Ruipérez, José Antonio Merlo Vega habla en esta entrevista de la importancia de las bibliotecas para fomentar el hábito de lectura entre la población. Para ello es necesario que exista no sólo colaboración entre las distintas entidades implicadas, sino también iniciativas de apoyo a las bibliotecas públicas desde los ámbitos público y privad
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